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Abstract
For a long time, pairings on elliptic curves have been considered to be destructive in elliptic
curve cryptography. Only recently after some pioneering works, particularly the well-known
Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption (IBE), pairings have quickly become an important
tool to construct novel cryptographic schemes.
In this thesis, several new cryptographic schemes with pamngs are proposed, which
are both efficient and secure with respect to a properly defined security model, and some
relevant previous schemes are revisited.
IBE provides a public key encryption mechanism where a public key can be an arbitrary
string such as an entity identifier and unwieldy certificates are unnecessary. Based on the
Sakai-Kasahara key construction, an IBE scheme which is secure in the Boneh-Franklin IBE
model is constructed, and two identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms are proposed.
These schemes achieve the best efficiency among the existing schemes to date.
Recently Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced the certificateless public key encryption
(CL-PKE) paradigm, which eliminates the need of certificates and at the same time retains
the desirable properties of IBE without the key escrow problem. The security formulation
of CL-PKE is revisited and a strong security model for this type of mechanism is defined.
Following a heuristic approach, three efficient CL-PKE schemes which are secure in the
defined strong security model are proposed.
Identity-based two-party key agreement protocols from pairings are also investigated.
The Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model is enhanced and within the model several pre-
viously unproven protocols in the literature are formally analysed. In considering that the
user identity may be sensitive information in many environments, an identity-based key
agreement protocol with unilateral identity privacy is proposed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the literature, many cryptographic schemes such as [69, 72] were constructed on finite
Abelian groups. As the points on the elliptic curve form an Abelian group, it is natural
to consider using elliptic curves in cryptography. In the mid-1980s, Victor Miller [120]
and Neal Koblitz [105] independently proposed elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Point
groups of elliptic curves exhibit some particular properties which make them more attractive
than other groups. For example, the subexponential-time index calculus algorithm of the
discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [157] does not work on the elliptic curve point groups.
The known algorithms for the general elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP),
such as the Baby-Step-Giant-Step algorithm and the Pollard's Rho algorithm [127], are
running in exponential-time. Hence for those cryptographic schemes based on the hardness
of DLP, they can be implemented on elliptic curve point groups with smaller size than the
multiplicative group of a finite field. This results in better performance of certain schemes
and smaller bandwidth cost as well. Gradually, ECC gathered strength in practice partially
due to this advantage.
However, not all the elliptic curves have such advantage. In 1991 Menezes, Okamoto
and Vanstone [126] found that for certain curves called supersingular curves, by using the
Weil pairing [140], ECDLP can be converted to DLP over some extension of the ground
field on which the curve is defined, and so can be solved by the faster subexponential-time
1
2algorithm. This algorithm is named as the MOV reduction. Later, it was shown that the
MOV reduction can be applied to ordinary curves as well when the embedding degree (see
the definition in Section 2.5.2) is sufficiently small [155]. Hence, in practice one is advised
to avoid using curves with small embedding degrees when implementing ECCs l .
However, recent developments on the pairing-based cryptography created another "twist".
Although the MOV reduction implies faster algorithms to solve the ECDLP when the em-
bedding degree is small, certain security levels for practical use can still be achieved if the
ground field size and the embedding degree are chosen properly. Moreover, in this con-
text efficient pairings can be applied in very constructive ways to build novel cryptographic
schemes. For example, Joux [102] observed that the pairing can be used to construct a
round-efficient tripartite key agreement protocol. By using the pairing computation and a
Diffie-Hellman-like message exchange, the Joux protocol requires each party to broadcast
only a single message to establish an agreed session key among three parties. An even more
striking development is that in 2001 Boneh and Franklin [19] using pairing constructed the
first practical identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme with provable security based on a
reasonable pairing-based intractability assumption. This work has solved the long-standing
cryptographic problem of constructing a secure and practical IBE as proposed by Shamir
in 1984 [138]. After these pioneering works, many novel cryptographic systems have been
constructed with pairings. This thesis is devoted to the study of pairing-based cryptography.
In the last three decades, we have learned an important lesson that ad hoc approaches
to construct cryptographic schemes are a dangerous way to go. Numerous security schemes
with only ad hoc security analysis were later broken. As an alternative, many researchers
have been seeking to build cryptography on firm foundations by borrowing methods from
the theory of complexity. Rigorous approaches to treat cryptography have then prevailed.
Now it has become more or less a standard process to solve a cryptographic problem with
lIt was also shown that for abnormal curves, there exist polynomial-time algorithms for the DLP [142,
148, 141] and the Weil descent attack is applicable to certain normal curves [83].
3two phases: a definitional phase and a constructive phase [77]. In the definitional phase, one
identifies the functionality of a cryptographic task and rigorously defines the cryptographic
problem to capture natural security concerns. Then, in the constructive phase, one designs
a cryptographic scheme to satisfy the definition with a rigorous proof based on a compu-
tational complexity assumption. There are two categories of constructive activities. One
is to demonstrate that a cryptography definition is achievable in principle by constructing
schemes based on some fundamental assumptions such as the existence of one-way func-
tions. Those constructions may be general but often inefficient. The other aims to construct
schemes suitable for practical applications. The constructions of the second category make
use of stronger but reasonable assumptions and in return deliver attractive performance
for the practitioner. Over the years, there have been many cryptographic schemes con-
structed in the literature, but only few have made it from theory into practice [107]. To
increase the likelihood that results are applied in practice, this thesis focuses on crypto-
graphic schemes from pairings which not only meet robust security definitions based on
reasonable intractability assumptions but also achieve high efficiency.
In this work, three cryptographic primitives from pairings are studied, namely, the
identity-based encryption, the certificateless public key encryption, and the identity-based
key agreement protocol.
To simplify the management of public keys, III 1984 Shamir proposed the concept of
identity-based cryptography (IBC) in which the identity of an entity serves as the public
key of the entity directly; therefore unwieldy certificates are unnecessary and a public key
infrastructure (PKI) to issue certificates is not required. The construction of secure and
practical IBE had been an open problem for years. Finally, in 2001 Boneh and Franklin
constructed the first practical and security-provable IBE using pairings. After that, a
number of IBEs have been proposed, e.g. [10, 12, 162, 82]. Though significant improvement
has been made on speeding up the pairing computation [24, 22], pairing is still a very heavy
4operation and pairing-based schemes are an order of magnitude slower than the traditional
elliptic curve cryptography. Since the performance seriously affects a cryptography scheme 's
application, particularly in environments with devices of limited power, it is important to
design IBE schemes which are efficient as possible. We present another IBE which is secure
in terms of the Boneh-Franklin IBE security definition and is highly efficient. Based on the
basic version of the IBE scheme, we further propose two identity-based key encapsulation
mechanisms (ID-KEM), which working with a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) can
encrypt arbitrarily long messages securely. These schemes are the fastest among all the
published schemes from pairings to date.
The IBC following Shamir's formulation inherently exhibits the key escrow property. In
many environments this property is undesirable. In 2003 Al-Riyami and Paterson intro-
duced the certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) paradigm [5]. CL-PKC is an
intermediate model between traditional certificated PKC and IBC. It eliminates the need of
certificates and at the same time retains the desirable properties of IBC without the key es-
crow problem. We revisit the Al-Riyami-Paterson security definition of certificateless public
key encryption (CL-PKE) and define a strong security model for this type of encryption.
There have been a number of constructions of CL-PKE in the literature, some of which are
not very efficient and others are insecure. By making a simple observation on some existing
IBEs and PKEs, we propose a heuristic approach to constructing efficient CL-PKEs. Fol-
lowing this approach, using three IBEs, we construct three concrete CL-PKEs, which are
secure in the defined strong model and are the most efficient one derived from the three
types of IBE respectively. We also present a general conversion which can transform a weak
CL-PKE to a scheme satisfying the strong definition.
The key agreement protocol, as a fundamental cryptographic primitive, allows parties
to establish secret keys over a network controlled by adversaries. Since the publication of
Sakai et al. 's non-interactive identity-based key agreement (IB-KAP) from pairings [152],
5many identity-based two-party key agreement protocols using pairings have been proposed.
However, some elegant and efficient schemes are either not formally analysed, such as the
Smart-Chen-Kudla protocol [63] and the Shim-Yuan-Li protocol [166], or the security reduc-
tions are seriously flawed such as the McCallugh-Barreto protocols [124, 125]. As demon-
strated by numerous cases in the literature, the key agreements designed in ad hoc modes
are often vulnerable to certain attacks. Formal security analysis is necessary for one to build
confidence in the security of those schemes, particularly considering that the Shim-Yuan-Li
protocol is derived from a protocol suffering from serious attacks. We first enhance the
Bellare-Rogaway key agreement security model to cover all the commonly required security
properties. Then we prove the security of those three schemes in the defined strong model.
In considering that the user identity may be a piece of sensitive information in certain envi-
ronments, we construct a new identity-based protocol from pairings with unilateral identity
privacy. This protocol, apart from establishing an authenticated secret, can hide a user's
identity from an adversary.
1.1 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis consists of three major parts dealing with three topics: efficient IBEs, efficient
CL-PKEs and efficient IB-KAPs respectively.
In Chapter 2, before presenting those pairing-based cryptographic protocols, we intro-
duce some preliminaries which are relevant for the subsequent chapters. We begin with
introducing the concept of public key cryptography by focusing on techniques of authentic
public key distribution. Then we explain the provable security paradigm, the random ora-
cle model and our view on a security reduction in the random oracle model. After that we
define pairing and present the pairing instances on elliptic curves which serves as the basic
tool for the cryptographic schemes throughout the thesis. Finally we present the pairing-
related computational complexity assumptions which we will use to prove the security of
6the schemes presented in the thesis.
In Chapter 3, based on the Sakai-Kasahara's key construction [151], we first construct a
complete identity-based encryption SK-IBE, which is secure in terms of the Boneh-Franklin
IBE security definition. We then extend the basic version of the scheme to two ID-KEl\1s.
Through a detailed performance comparison, we demonstrate that these schemes achieve the
best efficiency among existing IBEs. We finally investigate the impact of Cheon's algorithm
to solve the strong Diffie-Hellman problem [41] on the proposed schemes.
In Chapter 4, we revisit the AI-Riyami-Paterson security definition of CL-PKE and
define a strong security model for this paradigm. Then by making a simple observation on
some existing IBEs and PKEs, we propose a heuristic approach to constructing efficient CL-
PKEs from IBEs. Following this approach, we construct three efficient concrete CL-PKEs
which are secure in the defined security model.
In Chapter 5, we first enhance the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model to cover all
of the common security properties. Then we formally analyse a few existing protocols
including the enhanced Smart protocol, the enhanced Shim protocol and the McCallugh-
Barreto protocol in the enhanced security model. Finally we construct an IB-KAP with
unilateral identity privacy which is suitable for those environments where identity privacy
is important.
1.2 Previous Publications
The efficient IBE scheme of Section 3.4 originally appeared in "Security Proof of Sakai-
Kasahara's Identity-Based Encryption Scheme", joint work with Liqun Chen [48] presented
at the IOth IMA International Conference of Cryptography and Coding 2005. The efficient
ID-KEM scheme of Section 3.5.3 originally appeared in "An Efficient ID-KEM Based On
The Sakai-Kasahara Key Construction", joint work with Liqun Chen, John Malone-Lee
and Nigel Smart, which was published in lEE Proceedings Information Security [51].
7The efficient CL-PKE schemes of Section 4.5 originally appeared in "Efficient Certifi-
cateless Public Key Encryption", joint work with Richard Comley, which was posted on
IACR ePrint in January 2005 [46].
The security analysis of the enhanced Smart protocol and the enhanced Shim protocol of
Section 5.4 originally appeared in "Identity-based Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings",
joint work with Liqun Chen and Nigel Smart [52] to appear in International Journal of In-
formation Security. The security analysis of the McCullagh-Barreto protocols [124, 125] of
Section 5.5 originally appeared in "On Security Proof of McCullagh-Barreto's Key Agree-
ment Protocol and its Variants", joint work with Liqun Chen to appear in International
Journal of Security and Networks - Special Issue on Cryptography in Networks [47]. The
protocol with unilateral identity privacy of Section 5.6 originally appeared in "Identity-
Based Key Agreement with Unilateral Identity Privacy Using Pairings", joint work with
Liqun Chen, Richard Comley and Qiang Tang [50] presented at ISPEC 2006.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter the necessary preliminaries are described. First a brief recap of the public
key cryptography and the public key authenticity problem in the public key cryptography
is presented. Then the provable security paradigm and our view on a security proof is
explained. After that pairing, which serves as the basic tools for the cryptographic schemes
throughout the thesis, is formally defined and two pairing instances on elliptic curves are
presented. Finally the pairing-related computational complexity assumptions which are
used to prove the security of the schemes in the thesis are defined.
2.1 Public Key Cryptography
After Diffie and Hellman pointed out the new direction of cryptography in 1976 [69], the
public key cryptography has become one fundamental stream of cryptography and has been
widely used in practice to provide information security.
In contrast with symmetric-key cryptography, an entity in the public-key cryptosystem
has two keys: One is publicly-known and the other is kept secret to the entity itself. The
entity uses the private key and others use the public key in the cryptographic operations.
For example, for encryption, the others use the entity's public key to encrypt messages,
while the entity uses its private key to decrypt the ciphertexts. A public-key encryption
can be formally specified by three algorithms:
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9• Key Generation GPKE(1k): On input 1k, which is a formal notation for a ma-
chine with running time polynomial in k, the probabilistic algorithm generates the
public/private key pair.
where K pub is the public key and K priv is the associated private key.
• Encrypt lEPKE(Kpub, m; r): The algorithm encrypts a message m from the message
space M PKE(Kpub).
Cf--lEpKE(Kpub, m; r),
where C is the ciphertext in the ciphertext space CPKE(Kpub). This probabilistic
algorithm uses the randomness r from the random space ~PKE(Kpub)'
• Decrypt Il))PKE(Kpub, K priv, C): The deterministic algorithm decrypts a ciphertext
and outputs value of the message m or a failure symbol 1...
Various security notions have been defined for a PKE scheme. The commonly accepted
definitions are based on one of the two-stage games in Table 2.1 between an adversary
A = (AI, A2 ) of the encryption algorithm and a challenger.
In the games, s is some state information and 0pKE are oracles to which the adversary
has access. There are various possibilities for these oracles depending on the attack model:
• Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) Model: In this model the adversary has no oracle
access.
• Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2) Model: In this model the adversary has
access to a decryption oracle which on query C returns Il))PKE(Kpub, Kpriv, C). There
is one restriction on how the adversary uses this oracle: In the second phase A2 is not
allowed to call the decryption oracle with C*.
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Table 2.1: PKE Security Formulation
OW Adversarial Game IND Adversarial Game
1. (Kpub, Kpriv)f-GPKE(1k).
1. (Kpub, Kpriv)f-GpKE(1 k).
2. °PKESf-AI (Kpub).
°PKE2. (s, mo, mdf-AI (Kpub).
3. mf-MpKE(Kpub), rf-]RPKE(Kpub). 3. bf-{O, I}, rf-]R PKE(Kpub).
4. C*f-IEpKE(Kpub, m; r). 4. C*f-IEpKE(Kpub, mb; r).
5. m'f-AoPKE(K C*)
b'f-A~PKE(KpUb' C*, s, mo, mI)'2 pub" S . 5.
Let MOD denote the mode of attack, either CPA or CCA2. The adversary's advantage
in the first game is defined to be
while, the advantage in the second game is given by
Adv~~~-MOD(A) =1 2Pr[b' = b] - 1 I .
A PKE algorithm is considered to be secure, in the sense of a given goal and attack
model (IND-CCA2, for example) if, for all PPT adversaries, the advantage in the relevant
game is a negligible function of the security parameter k.
Definition 2.1.1. (Negligible Function) A function dk) : N -4 ]R is negligible if for
every constant c > 0 there exists a positive integer k' such that E(k) < k- C for all k > k'.
In public key cryptography two fundamental problems should be solved. The first prob-
lem is regarding designing secure cryptographic primitives such as encryption, signature
or authenticated key exchange to provide information confidentiality, non-repudiation or
authentication. The second problem is regarding distributing public keys with authenticity.
Without the authenticity of public keys, a public key cryptographic system is vulnerable to
an impersonation attack. For example the impersonation attack on a PKE system works as
11
follows: The adversary Eve generates a pair of keys (K;ub' K;riv) and replaces entity Alice's
public key K pub with K;ub by certain means such as publishing the information on a white
board. When entity Bob uses the false public key K;ub to encrypt messages to Alice, Eve
can certainly decrypt the ciphertexts with the knowledge of K~riv' Hence, Bob has to know
Alice's real public key before encrypting any message to Alice.
There have been several solutions to the above second problem. The common strategy
is to introduce a third party (an authority) which is trusted by both Alice and Bob. The
authority authenticates an entity's ownership of a public key by some means. Based on the
role the authority can play and the information the authority knows, Girault defined three
security levels [76].
At levell, the authority knows every entity's private key and hence can impersonate any
entity without being detected. This is the paradigm where the IBC settles in. In the IBC,
each entity uses its identity as the public key (hence the public key authenticity problem is
trivial), while the private key is generated by an algorithm from the identifier and a piece
of secret information maintained by the authority. Hence the IBC is a natural key-escrow
system.
At level 2, the authority does not know an entity's real private key but can still im-
personate the entity without being detected. The CL-PKC introduced by Al-Riyami and
Paterson [5] is one of such systems. In the CL-PKC, the private key of an entity is deter-
mined by two pieces of secret information from the authority and the entity respectively.
Moreover one secret is not computable from the other. Hence the authority does not know
an entity's private key. In the CL-PKC the public key generated by an entity is not au-
thenticated by others, hence one can replace others' public keys without being detected.
However, without the secret passed from the authority to the legitimate entity, the imper-
sonator still cannot decrypt the ciphertext even with one piece of secret. On the other
hand, the authority can still impersonate an entity by generating a false public key and
12
hence with both pieces of secret information can decrypt a ciphertext generated under the
false public key.
At level 3, the authority does not know an entity's private key and if it generates a false
warranty that proves one entity owns a specific public key, such behavior is detectable. The
cryptographic schemes based on the PKI obtains the level 3 security. The authority called a
certificate authority (CA) issues a certificate, which by using a digital signature to prevent
certificate forgery, securely binds an entity's identifier with the entity's public key. In the
PKI system, Bob obtains and verifies Alice's certificate, so to get Alice's authentic public
key before encrypting messages to Alice. Because of the unforgeability of the used signature
scheme in the certificate generation, the CA will be held to account if a certificate binding
an entity with a false public key is issued.
Arguably, the level 3 security is the most attractive one in most cases. However, the
PKI system faces various challenges in practical deployment [80]. The system complexity
has been the major obstacle to its wider application. On the other hand, in certain circum-
stances, either level 1 or 2 security is acceptable, and maybe the level 1 system (with the
key escrow property) is even mandatory. Moreover, the IBC and CL-PKC offer much more
simplified systems. Hence it has been of great interest to design such types of secure system
with practical efficiency. In Chapter 3, 4 and 5 a number of efficient IBEs, CL-PKEs and
identity-based authenticated key exchange protocols are presented respectively.
2.2 Provable Security
Since the publication of the Diffie-Hellman work, many public-key cryptographic schemes
have been designed, with more or less heuristic proofs of their security relative to some com-
putational complexity assumptions. However, these proposed schemes were often broken,
sometimes years after they were first presented.
Arguably starting from the Goldwasser-Micali's landmark work [85], a different paradigm,
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provable security, was introduced into modern cryptography. In this paradigm, a crypto-
graphic scheme is analysed by providing a proof in the framework of complexity theory.
Specifically, the proof provides a reduction from a well-studied hard problem, such as the
RSA or the discrete logarithm problem, to an adversary against a cryptographic scheme in
a properly defined security model. A valid proof vindicates the security of a protocol in the
way that if in the defined security model there exists a polynomial-time adversary against
the scheme, there will be a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the hard problem on which
the proof is based; and turn the logic around: If the underlying problem is hard, then the
scheme is secure regarding the security model. Hence such proofs are also called security
reductions.
In the first few years, the work of this line was of great theoretical importance. Re-
searchers defined various security notions by formulating the corresponding security models
and then designed schemes to achieve these notions. Schemes were designed and analysed
in such ways that only very fundamental assumptions, such as the existence of one-way
function were made. Those works answered the fundamental questions that whether cer-
tain security notions can be achieved in the framework of computational complexity theory.
On the other hand, those cryptographic schemes with provably strong security based on
common intractability assumptions are often not practically efficient.
In the early 1990's, Bellare and Rogaway formally introduced another instrument "ran-
dom oracle model" [31] which simulates ideal hash functions. In the random oracle model,
to design a scheme, one assumes that all parties (including the adversary) share an ideal
random function. The ideal random function is interpreted as a program g with an initially
empty vector v and a sub-routine t. Program g on query input x and the auxiliary input y
works as follows:
then
Input: v, x, y
Ouput: g(v,x,y)
If x is in the vector v, l' e [], t t
.. v X 1S no emp y,
return vEx] ;
else
begin
v[x]=t(v, x, y);
return v[x];
14
end
where t (v , x, y) generates a truly random value on inputs v, x and y. To construct a real
cryptographic scheme one replaces the random oracle with a "good" cryptographic hash
function, i.e. providing all parties (including the adversary) with the description of this
function.
The random oracle model has far-reaching influence on the later cryptographic scheme
design. Many efficient schemes were designed and their security was proven in the random
oracle model, such as RSA-OAEP [33, 75].
As to the soundness of this model, no one has ever provided a convincing contradiction
to its practical validity. So far, only a few theoretical counter-examples [54, 130, 13] have
been presented. These counter-examples are either with easy-pick flaws in designs, or just
to meet artificial security notions purposely. There has been no scheme with valid proof
in the random oracle model reported being broken in practice except some with improper
implementations [122, 103]. Hence, the model has been largely accepted by the community
as a good instrument to validate the security of a scheme.
Following the line of provable security, in this thesis the security of the presented schemes
will be formally analysed, and all the analysis will be conducted in the random oracle model.
2.3 Two Views on Security Reductions
There are two views on a security proof in the framework of computational complexity:
asymptotic and concrete view. An asymptotic view on a security reduction is that the
15
reduction just guarantees the security of a system in general, but does not suggest a security
parameter at any concrete security level. On the contrary, the concrete view is that a
security analysis not only vindicates the security of a scheme, but also allows one based on
the quantitative result of a reduction to estimate the value of the security parameter for
which the scheme is secure at a chosen security level.
In this thesis we adopt the asymptotic view on a reduction in the random oracle model!
for the following reasons. First, the random oracle model essentially is just a heuristic
instrument to help security analysis. This has been demonstrated in [54]. The algorithm
constructed in a reduction with random oracles cannot serve as a hard problem solver
even if an adversary algorithm against the scheme is constructible in practice. Second, a
reduction with random oracle queries is almost unlikely to be tight if without resorting
to random oracle's distinctive properties. These properties include the programmability,
which allows one to choose certain parameters adaptively to optimise the reduction per-
formance, e.g. Theorem 4.1 in [19], the true randomness and the access to the random
oracle query jresponse list, which allows the potential stronger gap assumptions for better
tightness in theory. However, all these properties are not preserved by a cryptographic
hash function which replaces a random oracle in a concrete implementation. On the one
hand, a loose security reduction often cannot suggest any meaningful security parameter
for a practical implementation. On the other hand, some tricks played with the random
oracle resulting in a tight reduction seem not to be generally accepted, see the interesting
comment in Section 4.3 [111] on Katz-Wang's "magic bit" trick [113] played in a signature
for a tight reduction in the random oracle model. A similar trick was played by [4] resulting
in an lEE with a tight reduction.
Indeed, if a reduction result is related to hash queries, the quantitative result could be
meaningless for choosing a security parameter with an efficient implementation in practice.
1As the asymptotic view is adopted, for the simplicity of analysis some negligible quantity may be ignored
in some reductions in Chapter 5 of the thesis.
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For example, the well-known BF-IBE has the following simplified security result [79J: As-
sume the adversary A queries each random oracle qn times and wins the the adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack game defined in [19] (see Section 3.2 for details) with advantage E(k), then
there exists an algorithm B to solve the Bilinear DH (BDH) problem (see Definition 2.6.4
in Section 2.6) with the following advantage and time:
Adv~DH(k) ~ ~
qH
tB ~ tA + 640qHtH
where t n is the cost of the hash function.
Notice that the BasicPub in [19] is IND-CPA secure instead of merely OW-CPA secure.
By this fact, we get a tighter reduction than the one in [79J. For simplicity we further
assume the BDH problem has the same computational complexity as the DL problem and
all the operations including the hash query, decryption, encryption, extraction and group
multiplication use equivalent unit time.
It is generally believed that in an attack 250 hash queries should be considered possible
(i.e. 4qH ~ 250 in BF-IBE) and 230 other queries such as decrypt or sign should be presumed.
For the reduction to be meaningful, i.e. the reduction implies an algorithm with better
performance than the general DL algorithm V, which can recover the master secret key so
as to totally break the scheme, it should have Adv~DH(k) > Adv~DH(k), when both B and V
run in the time of te ~ 257 operations. It turns out that
We assume E(k) = 1/210, i.e. an adversary with 250 operations can break the scheme
with probability 1/210 by the adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. The security parameter
k = 80 is generally considered to be the proper choice for this security level. However,
the above reduction result implies that the BF-IBE should be implemented at least with
k = 163. Such an implementation is far from efficient in practice for the proposed security
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level. Even if we assume that a hash operation is thirty-two thousand times faster than
a group multiplication, k is still around 128, which implies that by using 128-bit security
level parameters in theory, the reduction can only guarantee the 80-bit security level.
2.4 Pairing
In this section, the pairing which is the basic tool to construct the cryptographic schemes in
the thesis is formally defined. First some notations that will be used throughout the thesis
are listed.
• <.G1: an additive cyclic group of prime order p.
• <.G2: an additive group of exponent p, whose order is some power of p.
• <.Gt : a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p.
• 'l/J: a homomorphism from <.G2 to <.GI·
• P2 : an element of order p in <.G2
• Zp: the modulo group with elements from {a, 1, ... ,p - I} and Z; with elements from
{1, ... ,p-1}
Definition 2.4.1. A pairing is a bilinear map e : <.G I x <.G2 -7 <.G t on three groups <.Gl, <.G2
and <.Gt, which has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all (P, Q) E <.GI X<.G2 and for all (a, b) E Zp x Zp, e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: there exist non-trivial points P E <.GI and Q E <.G2 both of order p
such that e(P,Q) =I 1.
3. Computability: for all (P, Q) E <.GI X <.G2, e(P, Q) is efficiently computable.
The groups <.Gl, <.G2 and <.Gt, the elements PI and P2, the pairing e, and possibly the
homomorphism 'l/J are referred as a set of pairing parameters. The subscript of an element
is used to refer to the the group where the element is chosen.
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2.5 Pairings on Elliptic Curve
Here we define the elliptic curve and introduce the basic facts of the point group and the
pairings on elliptic curves.
2.5.1 Elliptic Curve
Let K be a field and K be the algebraic closure of K. Let ai E K and E be an elliptic
curve defined by
over K, that is
where 0 is a special point, called the point at infinity.
Let L be an algebraic extension of K. Define
We say that the point (x, y) in E(L) is L-rational.
The addition operation of two points U,VEE is defined as follows:
1. Draw a straight line though U and V to find the third intersecting point W on the
curve,
2. Draw a vertical line through W to find the intersecting point Z on the curve,
and define U + V = Z. If U = V =I 0, then the straight line in Step 1 is the tangent
line of the curve through U. When U adding 0, the straight line in Step 1 is the vertical
line passing through U, and the vertical line in Step 2 is same as the line in Step 1, which
intersects the curve at the same point U. So, U + 0 = U.
By the above addition rules, the addition of points on an elliptic curve E has following
properties:
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• Identity: P + 0 = P for all points PEE.
• Inverse: for all PEE, there exists - P with P + (-P) = O.
• Commutativity: PI + P2 = P2+ PI for all Pi E E.
So the points on the elliptic curve E form an additive Abelian group with 0 as identity,
and E(L) is the subgroup of E.
All the points in E(L) whose order is a divisor of n, i.e. all P E E(L) with nP = 0,
form a group, called an n-torsion group, denoted by E(L)[n] which is a subgroup of E(L).
2.5.2 Weil Pairing and Tate Pairing
Now we introduce two pairing instances on elliptic curves: the Weil pairing and the Tate
pairing.
In the practice of cryptography, we normally set K = IFq where q is a pnme power
and implement cryptographic schemes in the group E(lFq)[r] where r is a prime dividing
#E(IFq) and char(IFq) f r (#E(IFq) denotes the number of points in E(lFq) and char(K) is
the characteristic of field K). Define J.Lr = {x E IFq I x" = I}, i.e. the group of r-th roots
of unity in IFq. Let k be the smallest positive integer such that r I qk - 1. k is called the
embedding degree of E(IFq)[r] and J.Lr ~ IF~k2. E(IFqk)[r] is a group of exponent r and is
isomorphic to Zr x Zr' Define r E(IFqk) = {rPIP E E(IFqk)} and then the quotient group
E (IFqk )/ r E (IFqk) is also of exponent r and isomorphic to z, x Zr'
Definition 2.5.1. The Weil pairing is defined as a map
The Wei! pairing satisfies the following properties:
2Hitt [94J noted that /Jr is also embedded in lFtx when q = t'" for some prime t and x is the least positive
integer such that rW -1. This may affect the security of schemes with certain pairing parameters if t" « q",
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1. Bilinearity: e-i]? + R, Q) = er(P, Q) . e-I R, Q) and er(P, Q + S) = er(P, Q) . er(P, S)
for all P, Q, R, S E E(JFqk)[r].
2. Non-degeneracy: if er(P, Q) = 1 for all P E E(JFqk)[r] then Q = 0 and also that if
er(P, Q) = 1 for all Q E E(JFqk)[r] then P = O.
3. er(P, P) = 1 for all P E E(JFqk)[r].
4. er(P, Q) = er(Q, P)-l for all P, Q E E(JFqk)[r].
Definition 2.5.2. Suppose E(JFqk) [r] has a point of order r. The Tate pairing is defined
as a map
(-, ')r : E(JFqk)[r] x E(JFqk)/rE(JFqk) ----t IF'~k/(JF~kr
and the modified Tate pairing is defined as a map
Tr : E(JFqk)[r] x E(JFqk)/rE(lF'qk) ----t !Lr.
The Tate pairing and the modified Tate pairing has the relation such that Tr(P, Q)
l-l
(P, Q)r r . The modified Tate pairing satisfies the following properties.
1. Bilinearity: Tr(P + R, Q) = Tr(P, Q) . Tr(R, Q) and Tr(P, Q + S) = Tr(P, Q) . Tr(P, S)
for all P, R E E(Fqk)[r] and Q, S E E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk).
2. Non-degeneracy: for each P i= 0 E E(Fqk)[r], there exists Q E E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk) such
that Tr(P, Q) i= 1.
As the modified Tate pairing Tr has unique result for each pair of inputs and this is
generally required by cryptographic schemes, in the sequel we use the Tate pairing to refer
to Tr to be used in the schemes presented.
Both the Weil and Tate pairing are polynomial-time computable and great efforts have
been made to speed up these pairing computation [84, 24, 121, 22, 98]. The Tate pairing
is relatively more efficient regarding the chosen parameters in practice [87]. Some other
pairings such the Eta [22] and Ate [98] pairings could perform even faster than the Tate
pairing in some circumstances.
2.5.3 Four Types of Pairing
When the Weil or the Tate pairing is used, the choice of G 1 , G2 is flexible and different
choices may significantly affect a cryptographic scheme's implementation and performance.
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Hence it is useful to further specify different types of pairing system by considering different
choices of ((;1 and ((;2. We will consider four types of pairing, three of which are taken from
[88] whilst the fourth is from [139].
Let 9 = E[p] which includes the points of prime order p on the elliptic curve E defined
over IFq and O. We assume that the group E[P] is contained in E(IFqk), where for simplicity
(and efficiency) we further assume that k is even. The group 9 is a product of two cyclic
groups 91, 92 of order p. We can take a point PI E E(IFq) [P] as a generator of 91 and a
point P2 E E (IFqk) as a generator of 92.
The representation of 92 may also affect the performance of pairings on ordinary curves.
A standard method is to represent a point in 92 as a point on a twist curve of E, and if
necessary map the representation point into 92. For example, the points on the quadratic
twist of E over IFqk/2 can be mapped onto E(IFqk) using a standard homomorphism. We
select P2 so that it is an image mapped from a point on the quadratic twist of E over IFqk/2.
The following is a concrete example from [156]. Suppose an elliptic curve E is defined
over IFq for a prime q > 3 as follows:
where b E IFq' Let k = 2d and let X denote an element of IFqd which is quadratic non-residue.
The quadratic twist of E over the field IFqd is defined as E':
Then we can define an injective homomorphism as follows:
{
E'(lFqd) ~ E(lFqk)
<I>'
. (x, y) f--4 (x, vxy).
It is not difficult to see that E' (IFqd) contains a subgroup of order p. Let this subgroup
be generated by a point P' E E'(IFqd). Then we set P2 = <I>(P'). Two groups (PI) and
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(<I>(P')) are linear independent, i.e. any non-identity element in (PI) is not a multiple of
an element in (<I>(P')). Smart and Vercauteren [156J showed that (PI) and (<I>(P')) are
the only two subgroups of E(lFqk) with order p that consist of elements with x-coordinate
contained in IFqd. We note that inputs with x-coordinate contained in IFqd can speed up
pairing computation, and other representations of 92 on a twist of higher degree can perform
even better [28, 98].
Let the Frobenius automorphism ¢ be defined as follows:
E(lFq) ~ E(lFq)
¢: (x,y) ~ (x q, yq),
0 ~ O.
The trace map
Tr: { E(;qk) ~ E(lFq)
k i~ L:i=l ¢ (P),
defines a group homomorphism on E(PJ which has kernel 92, i.e. the set of points which
map to 0 under the above map is precisely the group 92. For all parameter choices of
cryptographic interest which we know of the trace map can be very efficiently implemented
using only k elliptic curve point additions and a few finite field operations.
Now we are ready to specify pairings e satisfying Definition 2.4.1. We set G t = /1p but
will choose Gl and G2 from 9 differently. We focus on the following four cases.
Definition 2.5.3 (Type 1). In this situation, which corresponds to pairings over super-
singular elliptic curves, we can define a pairing using so-called distortion maps [159, 24],
by taking G l = G2 = 91. We let PI = P2 = Pl. There is an efficient algorithm to cryp-
tographically hash arbitrary bit strings into Gl and G2 and (a trivial) group isomorphism
'IjJ : G2 ---+ Gl mapping P2 to Pi .
The following three types correspond to pairings over ordinary elliptic curves.
Definition 2.5.4 (Type 2). In this situation, we take G l = 91 and G2 to be a subgroup
of 9 which is not equal to either 91 or 92. We set PI = PI and for convenience we set
P2 = kPI + P2· There is an efficient algorithm to cryptographically hash arbitrary bit
strings into G1, but there is no way to hash bit strings into G2 (nor to generate random
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elements of G2 bar multiplying P2 by an integer). However, there is an efficiently computable
group isomorphism 'l/J : G2 ~ G l mapping P2 to PI, which is simply the trace map restricted
to G 2 .
Definition 2.5.5 (Type 3). In this situation, we take G l = 91 and ((;2 = 92, with generators
PI = PI and P2 = P2. There is an efficient algorithm to cryptographically hash arbitrary bit
strings into G l , and a slightly less efficient algorithm to hash bit strings into ((;2. However,
there is no known efficiently computable group isomorphism 'l/J : ((;2 ~ ((;1 mapping P2 tor;
Definition 2.5.6 (Type 4). In this situation, we take ((;1 = 91, but we select ((;2 to be the
whole group 9 which is a group of order p2. As in the Type 2 situation, we set PI = PI
and P2 = kPI + P2. There is an efficiently computable homomorphism 'l/J from ((;2 to ((;1
such that 'l/J(P2) = Pl. Hashing into ((;1 or ((;2 can be performed, although maybe not very
efficiently into ((;2. However, one cannot hash efficiently into the subgroup of ((;2 generated
by P2 . Note, that the pairing of a non-zero element in ((;1 and a non-zero element in ((;2
may be trivial in this situation.
To summarise, in all situations we have that PI is the generator of ((;1 and P2 is a fixed
element of G2 of prime order p, such that when there is a computable homomorphism 'l/J
from G2 to ((;1, we have 'l/J(P2) = Pl. In Type 3 curves, such an isomorphism does exist but
one is just unable to compute it efficiently. We will still refer to 'l/J in this situation but it
should be born in mind that one is unable to compute it efficiently.
2.6 Pairing-Related Complexity Assumptions
Below we list a number of assumptions, some of which have been widely used as the com-
plexity assumptions to construct cryptographic schemes. Each problem is assumed to be
defined for a given set of pairing parameters.
Assumption 2.6.1. (Diffie-Hellman (DH)) For a, b ER Zp (ER denotes randomly sam-
pling) and some values ofi,j, k E {I, 2}, given (aPi, bPj), computing abPk is hard.
Assumption 2.6.2. (f-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (f-DHI)) For a positive integer f,
and a ER Z;, given (aPi,a2pi, ... ,afPi), computing l/aPi is hard.
Theorem 2.6.1. (Mitsunari et al. (128jj DH and l-DHI are polynomial time equivalent,
i. e. if there exists a polynomial time algorithm to solve DH, then there exists a polynomial
time algorithm for l-DHI, and if there exists a polynomial time algorithm to solve l-DHI,
then there exists a polynomial time algorithm for DH.
2-1
Assumption 2.6.3. (f.-Strong Diffie-Hellman (f.-SDH)) For a positive integer £, and
0' ER Z;, given (aPi, 0'2 Pi , '" ,O'fpd, computing (h, O:~hPi) for some ti « Z; is hard.
It is easy to show that the the £-DHI problem is easier than the DH problem and £-SDH is
considered to be a weaker problem than f.-DH!. To gain the confidence on these assumptions,
Boneh and Boyen [11] proved a lower bound on the computational complexity of the £-SDH
problem in the generic group model [145]: By assuming that the best DL algorithm on the
chosen groups is the general DL algorithm, at least .;pre group operations are required to
solve the £-SDH problem when £ < o(05).
Assumption 2.6.4. (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)) For a, b, c ER Zp, given (aPi,
bPj, CPk), for some values ofi,j, k E {I, 2}, computing e(P1 , P2)abc is hard.
It is trivial to show that the BDHi,j,k assumption implies the Diffie-Hellman assumption
DHi,j,k l when k -# k'. Verheul provided evidence that it is likely that the BDH problem is
strictly easier than the DH problem on the elliptic curves [159, 110].
There are some other variants of the BDH assumption have been used in the literature.
Assumption 2.6.5. (Bilinear Inverse DH (BIDH)) For a, b ER Zp, given (aPi, bPj)
for some values ofi,j E {1,2}, computing e(P1,P2)b/a is hard.
Assumption 2.6.6. (f.-BDHI) For a positive integer t, and 0' ER Z;, given (aPi, 0'2 Pi,
'" ,00fPi) for some value i E {1,2}, computing e(p1,p2)I/o: is hard.
Theorem 2.6.2. l-BDHh, BIDH2,2 and BDH2,2,2 are polynomial-time equivalent.
Proof: First, we prove that if there is a polynomial time algorithm A to solve the 1-BDHI2
problem, we can construct a polynomial time algorithm B to solve the BDH2,2,2 problem.
Given an instance ofBDH2,2,2 problem (PI, P2, aP2, bP2,CP2), B works as follows to compute
e(Pl, P2)abc.
1. (a) Set d = l/(a + b+ c), which B does not know.
(b) Set Q2 = (a + b+ C)P2, Ql = 'I/J(Q2) and dQ2 = P2·
(c) Pass A the 1-BDHI2 challenge (Q1, Q2, dQ2), and get
T - ~(Q Q )1/d - e~(P D )(a+b+c)31 - e 1, 2 - 1, £2 .
2. Follow item 1 (a) - (c) to get T2 = e(Pl,P2)a3, T3 = e(Pl,p2):3, T4 = e(P1,P2)C3,
Ts = e(P1 , p2)(a+b)3, T6 = e(P1 , p2)(a+c)3 and T7 = e(P1, p2)(b+c) .
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3. Compute e(Pl P2)abc = (Tl·T2·T3·T4 )1/6.
, T5·T6 ·T7
Second, we prove that if there is a polynomial time algorithm A to solve the BDH2 . kbl ,J,pro em, we can construct a polynomial time algorithm B to solve the BIDH2 . problem for
j,k E {1,2}. Given an instance of BIDH2,j problem (P1,P2,aP2,bPj), B wo:ks as follows
to compute e(P1, P2)b/a.
1. Set a' = l/a, b' = bfa, c' = Y]«, which B does not know.
2. Set Q2 = aP2, Ql = 'Ij;(Q2)'
3. Pass A the BDH2,j,k challenge (Q1, Q2, a'Q2 = P2, b'Qj = bPj, C'Q2 = P2) if k = 2
or (Q1, Q2, a'Q2 = P2, vo, = bPj, C'QI = PI) if k = 1, and get e(Ql, Q2)a'b'c' =
e(P1, P2)b/a.
Third, it is easy to show if there is a polynomial time algorithm A to solve the BIDHi,j
problem, then a polynomial time algorithm B to solve the 1-BDHli can be constructed
as follows: Given the 1-BDHli challenge (PI, P2, aPi ) , pass the problem (PI, P2, aPi, PI) if
j = 1 or (PI, P2, «r; P2) if j = 2 to get e(P1, P2)I/a.
This completes the proof. 0
The following is another assumption closely related to f-BDHI.
Assumption 2.6.7. (Bilinear Collision Attack Assumption (f-BCAA1)) For a
positive integer f, and a ER Z;, given (aPi, ha, (hI, hl~QPj), ... , (he, he~QPj)) for some
values of i, j E {I, 2} where hi ER Z; and different from each other for 0 < i < f, computing
e(P1, P2)1/(Q+ho) is hard.
Theorem 2.6.3. If there exists a polynomial time algorithm to solve (f-l)-BDHh, then
there exists a polynomial time algorithm for f-BCAAl i,2. If there exists a polynomial time
algorithm to solve (f-l)-BCAAli,2, then there exists a polynomial time algorithm for f-
BDHh·
Proof: If there is a polynomial time algorithm A to solve the (f-1)-BDHI2 problem, we
can construct a polynomial time algorithm B to solve the f-BCAA1i,2 problem as follows.
Given an instance of the f-BCAA1 i,2 problem
1 1
(Gl, G2 , 'Ij;, Ql, Q2, yQi, be, (hI, hI + y Q2),.'" (he, he + Y Q2)),
B works as follows to compute e(Q1, Q2) 1/(y+ho).
1. Set x = y + ha which B does not know, and
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2. For j = 0, ... ,f - 1, B computes
. fjp. (y + ho)J L C"X 2 = Q2 - ~J Q(y + hI) ... (y + he) - i=1 Y + hi 2
where Cij E Zp are computable from hi's.
3. Set PI = 'ljJ(P2).
4. Pass A the (f-1)-BDHI2 challenge,
(G 1 , G2 , 'ljJ, PI, P2, XP2, ... ,xf - 1P2),
and get T = e(PI, P2)I/x.
5. Set
f f
f (z) = II(z + hi - ho) = L diZ i
i=1 i=O
where d; is computable from hi's and do =I- 0 because hi are different.
6. Note that
e
Q2 = f(x)P2 = L dixiP2
i=O
and
7. Compute
e(~'ljJ(Q2)' Q2)
x
e
e(L dixi-1'ljJ(P2), Q2)
i=O
f f
T d6 . e(doPI, L diXi- 1P2) . e(L di'ljJ(xi- 1P2), Q2)'
i=1 i=1
If there is a polynomial time algorithm A to solve the (f-1)-BCAA1i,2 problem, we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm B to solve the f-BDHI2 problem as follows.
Given an instance of the f-BDHI2 problem
(G 1 , G2 , 'ljJ, PI, P2, XP2, x2P2 , .. . , x f P2 ) ,
B works as follows to compute e(P1 1P2)I/x.
1. Randomly choose different ho, ... , he-l E Z; and set y = x - ho which B does not
know.
2. Let f(z) be the polynomial
e-l e-l
f(z) = IT (z + hi - ho) = L c.z",
i=1 i=O
The constant term Co is non-zero because hi'S are different and Ci is computable from
hi'S.
3. Compute
e-l
Q2 = L CixiP2 = f(X)P2
i=O
and
e-l
yQ2 = L Ci xi+1P2 - hoQ2 = Xf(X)P2 - hoQ2.
i=O
4. Compute
e-2
Ji(z) = f(z) = '"' djz j
z+ h· - ho ~
t j=O
and e-:
1 1 '"' .
--Q2 = f(X)P2 = Ji(X)P2 = Z:: djxJ P2
Y + hi X + hi - ho j=O
for 1 < i < f - 1.
5. Set Ql = 'ljJ( Q2)'
6. Pass the following instance of the (f-1)-BCAA1i,2 problem to A
1 1 Q)) 'f' 1((;I, «;2, 'ljJ, Ql, Q2, 'ljJ(yQ2) , ho, (hI, y + hI Q2),"" (he-I, y + he-l 2 1 1, =
or
to get
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7. Note that
Set
e-l
T ' - '" . i-I D _ f (x) - Co n
- L CtX '<2 - '<2·
. 1 Xt=
Then,
Compute
o
Sometimes, the decisional or the gap variants of above assumptions are used.
Assumption 2.6.8. (Decisional BDH (DBDH)) For a, b,c, r ER Zp, differentiating
(aPi, bPj, CPk, e(P1, P2)abc) and (aPi, bPj, CPk, e(P1, P2f),
for some values ofi,j,k E {1,2}, is hard.
Assumption 2.6.9. (Decisional BIDH (DBIDH)) For a, b, r ER Zp, differentiating
(aPi, bPj, e(Pl, P2)b/a) and (aPi, bPj, e(P1, P2f),
for some values of i, j E {I, 2}, is hard.
Assumption 2.6.10. (Gap BDH (GBDH)) For a, b, c, r ER Zp, given (aPi, bPj, CPk)
for some values of i,j, k E {1,2} and the algorithm of DBDH, computing e(Pl, P2)abc is
hard.
Assumption 2.6.11. (Gap BCAAl (f-GBCAA1)) For a positive integer f, and a ER
Z;, given (aPi, ho. (hI, hl~aPj), ... , (he, he~aPj)) for some values of i,j E {1,2} where
hi ER Z; and different from each other for 0 < i < t, and the algorithm of DBIDH,
computing e(P1, p2)1/ (a+ho) is hard.
In the case where one has a computable isomorphism 'ljJ : G2 ~ G 1 , the existence of
the pairing e : G 1 x G2 ~ G t , implies that the DR assumption in G2 is in fact a gap
assumption. We can use the pairing to construct an efficient decisional algorithm, which
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Whilst a particular scheme may not require the computable homomorphism to imple-
ment it, the computable homomorphism may be required in the security proof. If no such
morphism exists, we are creating a relativised security proof, namely relative to an ora-
cle which can compute 'ljJ. We denote the corresponding relativised hard problem by a
superscript-w, as in DHt2,1' BDH~,l,2' f-BDHI~, f-BCAA1t,2' etc.
To quantify the efficiency of an algorithm, we define (t, E)-advantage of an algorithm
for a computational problem as the probability E of computing the correct value when the
algorithm runs in time t, and define (t, E)-advantage of an algorithm for a decisional problem
with the value E, which is the absolute value of the probability of correctly differentiating
the input minus 1/2, when the algorithm runs in time t.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced the pairing and the pairing-related computational com-
plexity assumptions and the provable-security paradigm. Using pairing as the basic tool,
in the following chapters we will construct a number of cryptographic schemes including
efficient IBEs, CL-PKEs and identity-based two-party key agreement protocols. We will
formally analyse the security of these schemes based on the pairing-related assumptions in
the random oracle model.
Chapter 3
Efficient Identity-Based Encryption
Since Boneh-Franklin's pioneering work on identity-based encryption from pairings, there
have been a number of IBEs proposed in the literature, which have proved security and have
practical implementation. In this chapter, we present another secure IBE scheme: SK-IBE
and then extend it to two identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms. These schemes
make use of the Sakai-Kasahara's key construction and perform with the highest efficiency
with regards to both computation and communication cost among the existing IBEs. We
also investigate the impact of Cheon's algorithm of the strong Diffie-Hellman problem on
the proposed schemes.
3.1 Introduction
To counter the impersonation attack, in the traditional public key cryptography, certificates
are used to authenticate one's ownership of a claimed public key. And such a system has
to include the infrastructure to issue certificates and one has to verify others' certificates to
obtain authentic public keys. This type of system can be very complicated and difficult to
manage and tedious to use.
In 1984 Shamir proposed a new public key cryptography paradigm: identity based
cryptography (IBC) [138] to simplify the management of public keys. In IBC the public
and private key pair is set up in a special way, i.e. the public key is the identifier (an
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arbitrary string) of an entity, and the corresponding private key is created by using an
identity-based key extraction algorithm, which binds the identifier with a master secret of
a trusted authority, called the key generation center (KGC). As the identifier is used as the
public key, Bob can immediately encrypt messages to Alice by using string "Alice" as the
public key, hence a certificate is no longer necessary.
The lBC significantly simplifies the system construction and management, and authen-
ticating the public key of an entity becomes trivial. However, it appears that the first
public-key cryptography problem (see Section 2.1), i.e. designing the cryptographic primi-
tive has become more difficult. Shamir presented an identity-based signature (lBS) scheme
based on the RSA problem immediately after proposing the lBC notion [138]. But con-
structing a practical identity-based encryption (lBE) scheme had remained an open problem
for many years.
An lBE scheme following Shamir's proposal consists of four algorithms:
1. Setup algorithm generates a master public/secret key pair.
2. Extract algorithm uses the master public/secret key pair to generate a user private
key corresponding to an arbitrary identity string.
3. Encrypt algorithm encrypts a message using the master public key and the recipient
identifier as the public key.
4. Decrypt algorithm decrypts the message using the user private key and the master
public key.
The Setup and Extract algorithm together is called an lD key construction.
After nearly twenty years since Shamir proposed the notion, Cocks [42)' Boneh and
Franklin [19], and Sakai et al. [153] independently presented three lBE solutions in 2001.
The Cocks solution is based on the quadratic residuosity problem. Both the Boneh-Franklin
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solution and the Sakai et al. solution are based on the bilinear pairings on elliptic curves.
Importantly Boneh and Franklin defined a well-formulated security model for IBE. Both
pairing-based schemes are efficient in practice, and the Boneh-Franklin scheme (BF-IBE for
short) received much attention owing to the fact that it was the first IBE scheme having
a security proof in an appropriate model. After BF-IBE, there were several other IBE
proposals constructed from pairings based on various complexity assumptions and with
security proofs in Boneh-Franklin's model, e.g. [10, 12, 162, 82, 9].
In this chapter, we present three other IBE schemes, a full IBE III Section 3.4 and
two ID-KEMs in Section 3.5. Using the Sakai-Kasahara ID key construction [151], these
three schemes perform with the highest efficiency with regards to both computation and
communication cost among the existing lBEs.
3.2 IBE Model
Following Shimir's proposal, we formally define the lBE. For an lBE scheme we define the
message, ciphertext and randomness spaces by MID ('), C ID (.) and lR ID (.). These spaces
are parametrised by the master public key Mpe, and hence by the security parameter k,
The scheme itself is specified by four polynomial time algorithms:
• Setup GID(1 k): On input 1k, the probabilistic algorithm outputs the master public
key Mpe and the master secret key Mse·
• Extract XID(Mpe, Mse, IDA): The probabilistic algorithm takes as the input Mpe, Mse
and the identifier string IDA E {0,1}* for entity A, and outputs the private key DA
associated with IDA·
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• Encrypt ]EID(Mp~, IDA, m; r): The algorithm takes Mp~, IDA, the message m E
M ID(Mp~) and the randomness r E IR ID(Mp~) as the inputs, and outputs the ci-
phertext C E C ID(Mp~).
We may also use the interface ]EID(Mp~, IDA, m) by assuming that the random r is
sampled in the algorithm.
• Decrypt JI))ID(Mp~, IDA, D I DA, C): The deterministic algorithm takes Mp~, IDA, DA
and C as input, and outputs the plaintext m or a failure symbol .L if C is invalid.
To cope with probabilistic ciphers, we will require that not too many choices for r
encrypt a given message to a given ciphertext. To formalize this concept we let -)'(Mp~) be
the least upper bound such that
for every ID, m E M ID(Mp~) and C E C ID(Mp~). Our requirement is that the quantity
'Y = IlR ~~~A,;;t )1 is a negligible function of the security parameter.
Following the Boneh and Franklin IBE security formulation [19] we can define various
security notions for an IBE scheme. All are based on one of the two-stage games in Table 3.1
between an adversary A = (AI, A2) of the encryption algorithm and a challenger.
In the games, S is some state information and OlD are oracles to which the adversary
has access. There are various possibilities for these oracles depending on the attack model:
• CPA Model: In this model the adversary only has access to a private key extraction
oracle, which on input of ID =I=- ID* will output the corresponding value of DID'
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Table 3.1: IBE Security Formulation
ID-OW Adversarial Game ID-IND Adversarial Game
1. (Mpt, Mst)f-GID(lk). 1. (Mpt, M st )f- GI D(1 k).
2. ( *) AVID (* ) AVIDs,ID f- 1 (Mpt). 2. s,ID ,mo, ml f- 1 (A1pt).
3. mf-M ID(Mpt), rf-}R ID(Mpt). 3. bf-{O, I}, rf-}R ID(Mpt).
4. C*f-JEID(Mpt, ID*, m; r). 4. C*f-JEID(Mpt, ID*, mi: r).
5. m'f-A~ID(Mpt, C*, s, ID*). 5. b'f-A~ID (Mpt, C*, s, ID*, mo, md·
• CCA2 Model: In this model the adversary has access to the private key extraction
oracle as above and it also has access to a decryption oracle with respect to any identity
ID and ciphertext C of its choice. The decryption oracle outputs the decryption of C
using the private key associated with ID. There is one restriction on how the adversary
uses this oracle: In the second phase A2 is not allowed to query the decryption oracle
with the pair (ID*, C*).
Let MOD denote the mode of attack, either CPA or CCA2. The adversary's advantage
in the first game is defined to be
Advig-oW-MOD(A) = Pr[m' = m],
while, the advantage in the second game is given by
Advig-IND-MOD (A) =1 2 Pr[b' = b] - 1 I .
An IBE algorithm is considered to be secure, in the sense of a given goal and attack
model (ID-IND-CCA2 for example) if, for all PPT adversaries, the advantage in the relevant
game is a negligible function of the security parameter k.
In [56], Canetti et al. proposed a weaker security model, called selective identity IBE. In
this model, the adversary has to commit to the identity ID* that it intends to attack at the
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beginning of the game, even before it is given the system parameters. Similar to the above
lD-IND game, we can define the security models of sID-IND-CPA and sID-IND-CCA2.
3.3 Several Influential Key Constructions in IBE
After Cocks and Boneh-Franklin's pioneering works, based on various complexity assump-
tions there are a number of IBE schemes constructed with or without random oracles. In [9],
the exiting lBEs are categorised into four classes. Following this categorisation, we recall
an influential lD key construction in each class. Some of these key constructions have been
used in other identity-based cryptographic mechanisms.
Quadratic residuosity IBE. In 2001, Cocks published an lBE [42], which does not
use pairings. The scheme uses the following key construction.
• Setup. Randomly sample two primes PI, P2 with PI, P2 = 3 mod 4 as the master
secret key and publish N = PI . P2 as the master public key.
• Extract. Given an identifier ID E {O, 1}*, compute the associated private key as
if H(I D) is a square mod N
if -H(ID) is a square mod N
where H is universal hash function with the codomain JN defined by
a
IN = {a Ia E 'lLN and Jacobi symbol (N) = 1}.
The key construction relies on the hardness of the square root problem, i.e. given a compos-
ite modulus N = PI 'P2 (a Blum number) and a quadratic residue x E 'lLN, computing y with
y2 = x mod N. We note that the security of the full Cocks' lBE relies on the quadratic
residuosity assumption, i.e. given a composite modulus N = PI . P2 and a modular residue
x E 'lLN, determining if x is a square is hard. Cocks' lBE is not very efficient with com-
munication because it has big ciphertext expansion: For an {'-bit message, the ciphertext is
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f log2 N -bit long if H (ID) is known to be a square modulo N, otherwise the ciphertext size
has to be doubled.
Full domain hash IBE with pairings. In 2000, Sakai et al. published an identity-
based non-interactive key establishment with pairings [152]. In this work, the authors
proposed an ID key construction, which we call the SDK ID key construction, working as
follows.
• Setup. Randomly sample s E Zp as the master secret key and publish (P, sP) with
other parameters as the master public key, where P is a generator of a pairing group
G of order p on an elliptic curve.
• Extract. Given an identifier ID E {O, 1}*, compute the associated private key DID =
sH(ID), where H is a uniformly distributed hash function with codomain G, i.e.
H : {O, 1}* -t G.
The construction relies on the DR assumption. Later the same approach was adopted
independently by Boneh-Franklin and Sakai et al. to construct IBEs [19, 153]. This ID key
construction has been widely used in other identity-based cryptographic mechanisms such
as the IBS [93, 45] and the IB-KAPs [143, 63, 161]. The full domain hash method has a
shortcoming: The operation to embed an arbitrary string on the chosen pairing group could
be expensive; for some pairing groups, the operation could be too costly to be applied in a
practical implementation.
Exponent inversion IBE with pairings. In 2003, Sakai and Kasahara published
another category of identity-based cryptographic schemes [151]. These schemes make use
of a different key construction, which we call the SK ID key construction, and the idea can
be tracked back to the traitor tracing work in 2002 [128]. Instead of using the expensive
full domain hash method, the SK key construction works as follows:
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• Setup. Randomly sample an integer s E Z; as the master secret key and publish
(P, sP) with other parameters as the master public key, where P again is a generator
of a pairing group G of order p.
• Extract. Given an identifier string ID E {O, I} *, generate the associated private key
as DID = (s+H1(I D))P, where H is a universal hash function with codomain Z;.
The key construction relies on the hardness assumption that given (P, xP), computing the
inversion 11xP is hard, or more accurately the f-SDH assumption. Later some variants
of the construction were used in other lBEs [10, 82]. The SK key construction has been
used in other identity-based primitives including lBS [25] and lD key agreements [125]. The
security of these schemes rely on a stronger assumption f-BDHl or its variant.
Commutative blinding IBE with pairings. To demonstrate the constructibility of
lBE in the standard model (without random oracles), in [12] Boneh and Boyen presented
a selective identity lBE [56] using a new approach to constructing the Setup and Extract
algorithm, which Boyen referred to as "commutative blinding" [9]. Later, Waters used a
variant of the key construction to fully solve the problem of constructing lD-lND-CCA2
secure lBE without random oracles. The Water's lD key construction works as follows:
• Setup. First randomly sample 0: E Zp, PEG, P2 E G and set o:P2 as the master secret
...
key. Next, pick n random elements Ui E G to form an n-length vector U =< U, >
, ...
and another random U' E G and compute PI = o:P. Publish (P, PI, P2, U ,U) as the
master public key.
• Extract. For an identifier ID E {O, I}" = (61'" 6n ) with 6i E {O, I}, randomly choose
r E Zp and output the private key
n
DID = (o:P2 + r(U' + L 6i Ui), rP).
i=1
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This key construction has been used in other schemes such as IBEs [66, 131, 108] and
IBS [136]. Recently, Boyen proposed another variant of the key construction but using
a hash function H modeled as a random oracle on an arbitrary identifier string [9] (see
Section 4.6.2 for details).
3.4 SK-IBE
In this section, we present an IBE using Sakai-Kasahara ID key construction and analyse
its security. We choose the simplest variant of the Sakai-Kasahara IBE scheme [151] as the
basic version of SK-IBE. To achieve security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, we
make use of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [73] in the same way that it was used in
BF-IBE [19].
3.4.1 The Scheme
Following the formulation defined in Section 3.2, SK-IBE is specified by four polynomial
time algorithms:
Setup GrD (1k). On input 1k, the algorithm works as follows:
1. Generate three cyclic groups G1, G2 and G t of prime order p, an isomorphism 'l/J from
G2 to G1, and a bilinear pairing map e : G 1 x G2 ~ G t · Pick a random generator
2. Pick a random s E Z; and compute Ppub = S P1·
3. Pick four cryptographic hash functions
H 1 : {O, I}* ~ Z;,
H2 : G t ~ {O, l }",
H3 : {O, l}n x {O, l}n ~ Z;,
H4 : {O, l}n ~ {O, l}n,
for some integer n > O.
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4. Output the master public key Mpe = (G 1 G2 G t p e .t, n P P, D H H
' , '" 'f/, , 1 , 2,.rpub, 1 , 2 ,
H 3 , H 4 ) and the master secret key Mse = s.
The message space is M = {a, I}", the ciphertext space is C = Gj x {a, I}" x {O,l}n,
and the randomness space is IR = {O, I} ",
Extract XID(Mpe, Mse, IDA). Given an identifer string IDA E {a, 1}* of entity A, Mpe and
Mse, the algorithm returns D A = 1 P,2
s+H1(ID A ) .
Encrypt JEID(Mpe, IDA, m). Given a message m E M, IDA and Mpe, the following steps
are performed.
1. Pick a random CJ E {a, I}" and compute r = H3(CJ, m).
Decrypt ]]J)ID(Mpe,IDA,DIDA,C). Given a ciphertext C = (U,V,W) E C, IDA, DA and
Mpe, follow the steps:
3. Compute QA = H1(IDA)P1 + Ppub. If U i= r'QA, output 1-, else return m' as the
plaintext.
A few optimisations can be applied in SK-IBE. (1) In the Encrypt algorithm, the pairing
9 = e(PI, P2 ) is fixed and can be pre-computed. It can further be treated as a system public
parameter. Therefore, no pairing computation is required in Encrypt. If the optimization of
fixed-based multiplication in G1 is available, then rQA can be computed as rH1(IDA)P1+
r Ppub. (2) In the Decrypt algorithm, the last step involves the operation to compute the real
public key of the decrypting party QA = H(IDA)P1 + Ppub, which can be pre-computed to
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save a multiplication in G 1 . (3) The isomorphism 'IjJ is not required to implement the scheme.
Hence PI can be randomly sampled from Gi instead and we know that an isomorphism
which may not be efficiently computable always exists. As the schemes does not require a
hash operation to neither G 1 nor G2 , the scheme is very flexible and can be implemented
with all four types of pairing defined in Section 2.5.3.
3.4.2 Security Analysis of SK-IBE
Now we evaluate the security of SK-IBE. We prove that the security of SK-IBE can reduce
to the hardness of the f-BCAA1 problem (so the f-BDHI problem by Theorem 2.6.3).
Theorem 3.4.1. SK-IBE is secure against ID-IND-CCA2 adversaries provided that Hi (1 <
i < 4) are random oracles and the f-BCAAI assumption is sound. Specifically, suppose there
exists an ID-IND-CCA2 adversary A against SK-IBE that has advantage E(k) and running
time t( k). Suppose also that during the attack, A makes at most at: decryption queries and
at most qi queries on Hi for 1 < i < 4 respectively. Then there exists an algorithm B to
solve the (ql -1)-BCA Ah,2 problem with advantage Adv[3(k) and running time t[3(k) where
Adv(ql-1)-BCAA11,2(k) > l-q2/2n [(E(k) + 1)(1- ~)qD _ 1][3 2(q3+q4) ql p ,
t[3(k) < t(k)+O((q3+q4)·(n+log2P)),
where p is the order of G1 and n is the length of (5, Note that HI can be queried directly by
A or indirectly by an extraction query, a decryption query or the challenge operation.
Proof: The theorem follows immediately by combining Lemma 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. The
reduction with three steps can be sketched as follows. First, we prove that if there exists an
ID-IND-CCA2 adversary, who is able to break SK-IBE by launching the adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks as defined in the security model of Section 3.2, then there exists an
IND-CCA2 adversary to break the BasicPubhy scheme defined in Lemma 3.4.2. Second,
if such an IND-CCA2 adversary exists, then we show (in Lemma 3.4.3) that there must
be an OW-CPA adversary that breaks the corresponding BasicPub scheme. Finally, in
Lemma 3.4.4 we prove that if the BasicPub scheme is not secure against an OW-CPA
adversary, then the corresponding f-BCAA1 assumption is flawed. 0
Lemma 3.4.2. Suppose that HI is a random oracle and that there exists an ID-IND-CCA2
adversary A against SK-IBE with advantage E(k) which makes at most qi distinct queries to
HI. Then there exists an IND-CCA2 adversary B which runs in time O(time(A)) against
the following BasicPubhy scheme with advantage at least E(k)/ql' Note that HI can be
queried directly by A or indirectly by an extraction query, a decryption query or the challenge
operation.
BasicPubh y is specified by three algorithms: keygen, encrypt and decrypt.
keygen: On input 1k, the parameter generator takes the following steps.
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1. Identical with Step 1 in Setup algorithm of SK-IBE.
2. Pick a random s E Z; and compute Ppub = sP1 . Randomly choose different elements
hi E Z; and compute hi~s P2 for 0 < i < Ql.
3. P~ck three cryptographic hash functions: H2 : Gt ~ {O, l}n, H3 : {O, l}n x {O, l}n ~
Zp and H4 : {O, I}" ~ {O, l ]" for some integer n > O.
The message space is MI = {o,l}n, the ciphertext space is C = Gi x {O,1}n X {o,l}n
and the randomness space is lR = {O I}". The public key is K b = (G 1 G2 G p e 0/'P P. pI' 1 pu, , t s , ,0/,
n, 1, 2, pub, be, (hI, h1+SP2), ... , (hi, h+sP2), ... , (hq1- 1 , h 1 + P2), H2, H3, H4)
, q1 -1 s
and the private key is K priv = ho~sP2' Note that e(hOP1 + Ppub, K priv) = e(P1 , P2).
encrypt: Given a plaintext m E MI and the public key K pub, the algorithm proceeds as
follows:
1. Pick a random 0- E {O,l}n and compute r = H3(0-,m), and gr = e(P1,P2r.
2. Set the ciphertext to C = (r(hoP1 + Ppub), 0- EB H2(gr), m EB H4(0-)).
decrypt: Given a ciphertext C = (U, V, W), K pub, and the private key K priv, the algorithm
takes the following steps.
1. Compute gr' = e(U, K priv) and 0-' = V EB H2(gr').
2. Compute m' = WEB H4(o-' ) and r' = H3(o-' ,m').
3. If U =f- r'(hOP1 + Ppub) , reject the ciphertext, else return m' as the plaintext.
Proof: We construct an IND-CCA2 adversary B that uses A to gain advantage against
BasicPubhy. The game between a challenger C and the adversary B starts with the
challenger first generating a random public key K pub by running algorithm keygen of
BasicPubhy (log2 qi is part of the security parameter of BasicPubhy). The result
is K pub = (GI, G2, G t , p, e, sb, n, PI, P2, Ppub, ho,(h1 , h1~S P2), ... , (hi, hi~S P2), ... ,
(hq1-1 , h 1 + P2), H2, H3, H4), where Ppub = sP1 with s E Zp*, and the private keyq1 -1 S
K priv = ho~sP2' The challenger passes Kpub to adversary B. Adversary B mounts an
IND-CCA2 attack on the BasicPubhy scheme with the public key Kpub with the help of
A as follows.
B randomly chooses an index I with 1 < I < ql and simulates the algorithm Setup
of SK-IBE for A by supplying A with the SK-IBE master public key Mpe = (G1, G2, Gil
p, e, 'l/J, n, PI, P2, Ppub, HI, H 2, H3, H4) where HI is a random oracle controlled by B . The
master secret key Mse for this cryptosystem is s, although B does not know this value.
Adversary A can make queries on HI at any time.
• HI (IDd: B maintains a list of tuples (IDi, hi, di) indexed by IDi as explained below.
We refer to this list as Hi ist which is initially empty. When A queries the oracle HI
at a point IDi, B responds as follows:
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- If 1Di already appears on the Hiist in a tuple (IDi, hi, dd, then B responds with
HI(IDd = hi.
Otherwise, if the query is on the I-th distinct ID and 1- is not used as d; (this
could be inserted by the challenge operation specified later) by any existing tuple,
then B stores (IDf, n«, 1-) into the tuple list and responds with HI(IDf) = ho.
Otherwise, B selects a random integer hi(i > 0) from Kpub which has not been
chosen by B and stores (IDi, hi, hi~SP2) into the tuple list. B responds with
HI(IDd = hi.
• Phase 1: A launches Phase 1 of its attack, by making a series of requests, each of
which is either an extraction or a decryption query. B replies to these requests as
follows.
- Extractionf In.): B first looks through list Hiist . If 1Di is not on the list, then
B queries HI(IDi). B then checks the value d( if d; =I 1-, B responds with di ;
otherwise, B aborts the game (Event 1).
- Decryptionf In., Ci): B first looks through list Hiist . If 1Di is not on the list,
then B queries HI (IDi). If di = 1-, then B sends the decryption query C, =
(U, V, W) to C and simply relays the plaintext got from C to A directly. Other-
wise, B decrypts the ciphertext by first computing gr/ = e(U, dd, then querying
(= H2(gr/) (H2 is controlled by C ), and computing (J' = VEB(,m' = WEBH4((J')
and r' = H3((JI, m /). Finally B checks the validity of C, as Step 3 of algorithm
decrypt and returns m', if C; is valid, otherwise the failure symbol 1-.
• Challenge: At some point, A decides to end Phase 1 and picks ID* and two messages
(mo, mI) on which it wants to be challenged. Based on the queries on HI so far,
B responds differently.
- If the I-th query on HI has been issued,
* if IDf = ID* (and so D1D* = 1-), B continues;
* otherwise, B aborts the game (Event 2).
Otherwise,
* if the tuple corresponding to ID* is on list Hiist (and so D 1D* =I 1-), then
B aborts the game (Event 3);
* otherwise, B inserts the tuple (ID*, ho ,1-) into the list and continues (this
operation is treated as an HI query in the simulation).
Note that after this point, it must have HI (ID*) = ho and D1D* = 1-. B passes
C the pair (mo, mI) as the messages on which it wishes to be challenged. C randomly
chooses b E {O, I}, encrypts mb and responds with the ciphertext C* = (U', V', W').
Then B forwards C* to A.
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• Phase 2: B continues to respond to requests in the same way as it did in Phase 1.
Note that following the rules, the adversary will not issue the extraction query on ID*
(for which D 1D* = -1) and the decryption query on (ID*, C*). And so, B always can
answer other queries without aborting the game.
• Guess: A makes a guess b' for b. B outputs b' as its own guess.
Claim: If the algorithm B does not abort during the simulation then algorithm A's view
is identical to its view in the real attack.
Proof: B's responses to HI queries are uniformly and independently distributed in Z* asp
in the real attack because of the behavior of algorithm keygen in the BasicPubhy scheme.
All responses to A's requests are valid, if B does not abort. Furthermore, the challenge
ciphertext C* = (U', V', W') is a valid encryption in SK-IBE for ttu, where b E {O, I} is
random.
The remaining problem is to estimate the probability that B does not abort during
simulation. Algorithm B could abort when one of the following events happens: (1) Event
1: A queried a private key which is represented by -1 at some point. Recall that only one
private key is represented by -1 in the whole simulation which could be inserted in an HI
query (as the private key of IDI) in Phase 1 or in the challenge phase (as the private key of
ID*). Because of the rules of the game, the adversary will not query the private key of ID*.
Hence, this event happens only when the adversary extracted the private key of IDI -# ID*,
meanwhile dI = -1, i.e. IDI -# ID* and HI (IDI) was queried in Phase 1; (2) Event 2: the
adversary wants to be challenged on an identity ID* -# IDI and HI(IDI) was queried in
Phase 1; (3) Event 3: the adversary wants to be challenged on an identity ID* -# IDI and
HI (ID I) was queried in Phase 2.
Notice that all the three events imply Event 4 that the adversary did not choose IDI
as the challenge identity. Hence we have
Pr[B does not abort] = Pr[Event 1 /\ Event 2 /\ Event 3J > Pr[Event 4J > 1/qI·
So, the lemma follows. o
Lemma 3.4.3. Let H3, H4 be random oracles. Let A be an IND-CCA2 adversary against
BasicPubhy defined in Lemma 3.4.2 with advantage E(k). Suppose A has running time
t(k), makes at most qD decryption queries, and makes q3 and q4 queries to H3 and H4
respectively. Then there exists an OW-CPA adversary B against the following BasicPub
scheme, which is specified by three algorithms:keygen, encrypt and decrypt.
keygen: On input 1k, the parameter generator follows the steps.
1. Identical with step 1 in algorithm keygen of BasicPubh y.
2. Identical with step 2 in algorithm keygen of BasicPubh y.
3. Pick a cryptographic hash function H2 : G t --* {O, I}" for some integer n > 0.
The message space is M = {a, I}", the ciphertext space is C = Gi x {O,1}n and the
randomness space is lR = Zp*. The public key is K b = (G 1 G2 G p e .t. n P t»1 pu "t", 'f', , 1, -'2,
Ppub, ho, (hI, hl+SP2), ... , (hi, h~sP2), ... , (hq1- 1, h 1 + P2), H2) and the private keyl q1 -1 S
is K priv = ho~s P2. Again it has e(hoP1+ Ppub, K priv) = e(P1, P2).
encrypt: .Given a plaintext m E M and the public key Kpub, choose a random r E Z; and
compute ciphertext C = (r(hoP1+ Ppub) , m EB H2(gr)) where gr = e(P1, P2r.
decrypt: Given a ciphertext C = (U, V), K pub, and the private key K priv, compute gr' =
e(u, K priv) and plaintext m = V EB H2(gr').
with advantage q(k) and running time tl(k) where
El(k) > 2(q3~q4) [(E(k) + 1)(1 - ~)qD - 1],
tl(k) < t(k) + O((q3 + q4)' (n + log2P)),
where p is the order of G 1 and n is the length of (J.
Proof: This lemma follows from the result of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [73]. 0
Lemma 3.4.4. Let H2 be a random oracle. Suppose there exists an OW-CPA adversary
A against the BasicPub defined in Lemma 3.4.3 which has advantage E(k) and queries H2
at most q2 times. Then there exists an algorithm B to solve the (ql - 1)-BCAAh.2 problem
with advantage (1 - q2/2n)E(k) and running time O(time(A)).
Proof: Algorithm B is given as input a random (Ql-1)-BCAA11,2 instance (G1,G2,Gt,P,
E, 7/;, PI, P2, XPI, b«, (hI, h1~XP2), ... , (hi, hi~XP2)' ... , (hq1- 1, hq1!1+XP2)) where x is a
random element from Z;. Algorithm B finds e(P1, P2)I/x by interacting with A as follows:
Algorithm B first simulates algorithm keygen of BasicPub by setting K pub = (Gl, G2,
G t , p, E, 7/;, PI, P2, XP1, ho, (hI, h1~XP2)' ... , (hi, hi~XP2)' ... , (hq1- 1, hq1!1+XP2), H2), i.e.
setting Ppub = xP1 and H2 is the random oracle controlled by B . Hence K priv = ho~x P2.
Now B starts to respond to queries as follows.
• H2(Xi): At any time algorithm A can issue queries to the random oracle H2. To
respond to these queries B maintains a list H~ist. Each entry in the list is a tuple of
the form (Xi, (i) indexed by Xi. To respond to a query on Xi, B does the following
operations:
- If on the list there is a tuple indexed by Xi, then B responds with (i.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses a string (i E {a, l ]" and inserts a new tuple
(Xi, (i) into the list. It responds to A with (i.
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• Challenge: B chooses a random string V* E {O, I}" and a random element r E Z*
and computes U* = rPl. B sets C* = (U*, V*) and gives C* as the challenge to A ~
Observe that the decryption of C* is
m* = V* $ H2(e(U*, K priv ) ) = V* $ H2(e(rPI , 1 P2)).
x + ho
• Guess: After algorithm A outputs its guess m', B responds to the ql-BCAA1 chal-
lenge as follows:
- B computes (* = m' $ V*.
- B goes through H~ist to find tuples (Xi, (*).
If no tuples or more than one tuple is found, B fails the game (Event 1).
- B returns T = X i
l/r
as the response to the ql-BCAA1 challenge.
Event 1 implies that X* = e(rPI , x";hoP2) has not been queried on H2 at some point
during the simulation above. As H 2 is a random oracle, if Event 1 happens, m* = m' can
only happen with negligible probability 1/2n. Again as H2 is a random oracle, H2(X') =
H2(X*) = (* for X' =1= X* in the simulation happens with probability at most Q2/2n.
Overall, we have
Pr[B wins] ~ (1 - Q2/2n)E(k).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.1.
3.5 SK-KEM
o
SK-IBE like many other schemes such as BF-IBE is suitable for encrypting short messages.
A natural way to process arbitrarily long messages is to use hybrid encryption. A hybrid
encryption scheme consists of two basic operations. One operation uses a public-key encryp-
tion technique (a so-called key encapsulation mechanism or KEM) to derive and encrypt a
shared key; the other operation uses the shared key in a symmetric-key algorithm (a so-
called data encapsulation mechanism or DEM) to encrypt the actual message. Cramer and
Shoup [65] formalised the notion of hybrid encryption and presented sufficient conditions
for a KEM and a DEM to construct IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption. Recently,
Bentahar et al. [20] extended the KEM concept to the identity-based setting. The idea is
to construct an ID-IND-CCA2 secure IBE scheme from an ID-IND-CCA2 secure ID-KEM
and a secure DEM.
46
In this section we present two efficient ID-KEMs using the SK ID key construction.
We first present a simple ID-KEM: SK-KEM1, with a succinct construction as ECIES-
KEM [101]. However, like ECIES-KEM the scheme has to base its security on a gap
assumption: f-GBCAAl. To recover from this weakness, we further construct another ID-
KEM: SK-KEM2. SK-KEM2 is slightly slower than SK-KEM1 and has a larger ciphertext,
but bases its security on the f-BCAA1 assumption as SK-IBE.
3.5.1 Identity-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism
Before presenting concrete schemes we first formally describe ID-KEM and DEM, and then
introduce the combination theory that a full IBE scheme can be constructed by combining
an ID-KEM with aDEM.
For an ID-KEM scheme we define the key, encapsulation and randomness spaces by
lK ID-KEM ('), C ID-KEM (.) and IR ID-KEM (.). These spaces are parametrised by the master
public key M pe, and hence by the security parameter k. The ID-KEM scheme is specified
by four polynomial time algorithms:
• Setup GID-KEM(1 k): The algorithm is the same as GID(1 k).
• Extract XID-KEM(Mpe, Mse, IDA): The algorithm is the same as XID(Mpe, Mse, IDA)'
• Encapsulate lEID-KEM(Mpe, IDA; r): This algorithm takes as input Mpe, IDA and
the random r E IR ID-KEM(Mpe), and outputs a key K E lK ID-KEM(Mpe) and the
encapsulation of the key C E C ID-KEM(Mpe).
We may also use the interface lEID-KEM(Mpe, IDA) by assuming lEID-KEM samples
randomness r in the algorithm.
• Decapsulate JD)ID-KEM(Mpe, IDA, DA, C): This deterministic algorithm takes as in-
put Mpe, IDA, DA and C, and outputs the encapsulated key K in C or a failure symbol
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.L if C is an invalid encapsulation.
Consider the two-stage game in Table 3.2 between an adversary A = (AI, A2) of the
ID- KEM and a challenger.
Table 3.2: ID-KEM Security Formulation
ID-IND Adversarial Game
1. (Mpt, Mst)+--(GID-KEM(1 k).
2. (8, ID*)+--A~ID-KEM(Mpt).
3. (Ko, C*)+--IEID-KEM(Mpt, ID*).
4. Kl +--JI( ID-KEM(Mpt).
5. b+-- { 0, 1}.
6 b' +--AOID-KEM (M C* ID* K )
. 2 pt" 8, ,b·
In the games 8 is some state information and (JID-KEM denotes oracles to which the
adversary has access. We will be interested in the CCA2 attack model where the adversary
has access to two oracles:
1. A private key extraction oracle which, on input of ID =1= ID*, will output the corre-
sponding value of DID'
2. A decapsulation oracle which, on input an identity ID and encapsulation of its choice,
will return the encapsulated key. This is subject to the restriction that in the second
phase A2 is not allowed to call this oracle with the pair (C*, ID*).
The adversary's advantage is defined to be
Advig=~~~-CCA2(A) =1 2 Pr[b' = b] - 1 I .
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An ID-KEM is considered to be ID-IND-CCA2 secure, if for all PPT adversaries A, the
advantage in the game above is a negligible function of the security parameter k.
In the hybrid encryption, we also need a DEM which is a symmetric-key encryption. As
the DEM uses a different key derived by the KEM to encrypt each message, we only need
a one-time symmetric-key encryption with proper security properties.
A one-time symmetric-key encryption consists of two deterministic polynomial-time al-
gorithms with the key, message and ciphertext spaces defined by OC SK(1 k), M SK(1 k) and
CSK(lk) given the security parameter k:
• lESK(K, m): The encryption algorithm takes a secret key K E OC SK (1k) and a message
mE MSK(1k) as input, and outputs the ciphertext C E C SK(1k).
• IDlSK(K, C): Given a secret key K and a cipertext C, the algorithm outputs the
plaintext m or a failure symbol -1.
(m or -1) f- I/J)SK(K, C)
The two algorithms satisfy IDlSK(K,lESK(K,m)) = m for m E MSK(1k) and K E OCSK(lk).
We define the security of one-time encryption by the Find-Guess (FG) game in Table 3.3
between a challenger and an adversary A of a pair of PPT algorithms (AI, A2):
In the game ma and ml are of equal length from the message space and s is some
state information. aSK is the oracle that the adversary can access depending on the attack
model. For our interest, the following model is required.
• CCA Model. In the model, the adversary has the access to a decryption oracle which
on input a ciphertext C returns I/J)SK(K, C) with K chosen in Step 3 in the game.
The adversary's advantage in the game above is defined to be
AdV~~MCCA(A) =1 2 Pr[b' = b] - 1 I .
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Table 3.3: DEM Security Formulation
FG Adversarial Game
1. (s, (mo, mI)) ~ Al (1k).
2. b~ {a, I}.
3. K ~ lK SK(1k).
4. C*~lESK(K, mb).
I CJSK5. b~A2 (C*,s,mo,mI).
A one-time encryption is consider to be FG-CCA secure, if for any PPT adversary A,
the advantage in the game above is a negligible function of the security parameter k. The
FG-CCA secure one-time encryptions are easy to get, such as the one-time pad encryption
with a secure message authentication code algorithm [65].
Similar to the hybrid public-key encryption, a hybrid IBE £ = (G 1D, XID, lE1D, ][j)ID)
construction consists of combining an ID-KEM £1 = (GID-KEM, XID-KEM, lEID-KEM' Jl)ID-KEM)
with a standard DEM £2 = (lESK' Jl)SK) as described below. We assume that the key-space
of the ID-KEM is the same as the key-space of the associated DEM. To generate M pe, for
the hybrid IBE scheme, the algorithm GID-KEM(1 k) is run. The key extraction for E is
simply the key extraction of £1. The encryption and decryption algorithm of E are defined
in Table 3.4.
Similar to the result of hybrid encryption in [65], Bentahar et al. obtained the following
theorem concerning the security of hybrid IBE.
Theorem 3.5.1. (Bentahar et al. (20}) Let A be a PPT ID-IND-CCA2 adversary of the
lBE scheme £ above. There exists PPT adversaries Bl and B2, whose running time is
essentially that of A, such that
Adv§g-IND-CCA2(A) < 2Adv§g=f~~-CCA2(Bl) + AdVb~MCCA(B2)'
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Table 3.4: Hybrid lBE
IEID(Mpt, ID, m)
• (K, G1)~IEID-KEM(Mpt,ID)
• G2~IESK(K, m)
• Return G = (G1 , G2 )
3.5.2 SK-KEMI
lDJID(Mpt, ID, DID, G)
• Parse G as (G1 , G2 )
• K ~lDJID-KEM(Mpt, ID, DID, G1 )
• If K =1-, return 1-
• Return m
Now we present the first KEM: SK-KEM1, based on the SK lD key construction. SK-KEM1
consists of following algorithms:
Setup G I D-KEM(lk). On input 1k, the algorithm works as follows:
1. Generate three cyclic groups G1, G2 and G t of prime order p, an isomorphism 'l/J from
G2 to G1, and a bilinear pairing map e : G1 x G2 ~ G t . Pick a random generator
2. Pick a random s E Z; and compute Ppub = sP1 ·
3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions HI : {O, 1}* ~ Z;, H2 : G t ~ {O, 1}£ for some
integer f > 0.
4. Output the master public key Mpt = (G1, G2, G t , p, e, 'l/J, f, PI, P2, Ppub, HI, H2)
and the master secret key Mst = s.
Extract XID-KEM(Mpt, Mst, IDA). Given an identifer string IDA E {O, 1}* of entity A, Mpt
and Mst, the algorithm returns D A = s+Hl~IDA) P2·
Encapsulate IEID-KEM(Mpe, IDA)' Given the master public key Mpt and the recipient
identity IDA, the algorithm works as follows:
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1. Randomly choose r E Z;.
4. Return (K, C).
Decapsulate IJ})ID-KEM(Mpe, IDA, DA, C). Given the master public key M pe, the recipient's
identity IDA, private key D A and the encapsulation C, the algorithm works as follows:
Similar to SK-IBE, the isomorphism 'l/J is not required in the implementation of the
scheme.
The security of the scheme can be summarised by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.2. SK-KEMl is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks provided
that the q-GBCAAh,2 assumption is sound, and HI and H2 are random oracles.
Specifically, suppose there exists an ID-IND-CCA2 adversary A against SK-KEMl that
has advantage E(k) and running time t( k). Suppose also that during the attack A makes
at most ql queries on HI and o» Decapsulation queries. Then there exists an algorithm
B to solve the (ql - 1)-GBCAAh,2 problem with advantage and time
Adv~ql-1)-GBCAAl1,2(k)
tB(k)
> £(k)
Ill'
< t(k) + O((ql + qD)X),
where X is time of the DBIDH algorithm.
Proof: Given an instance of the (ql - 1)-GBCAA11,2 problem (xP1 , b«. (hI, h1~XP2),
... , (hq1-1, h 1 +x P2)) with a set of pairing parameter where hi E R Z; for 0 < i < ql - 1q1 -1
and the DBIDH1,1 oracle 0 DBIDH, B simulates GID-KEM to generate the system parameters
(G1, G2, G t , p, E, 'l/J, f, PI, P2, xP1 , HI, H2), i.e. using x as the master secret key, which it
does not know. HI and H 2 are two random oracles controlled by B .
B randomly chooses 1 < I < ql and interacts with A in the following way:
• HI (IDi): B maintains a list of tuples (IDi, hi, Di) as explained below. We refer to
this initially empty list as Hiist. When A queries the oracle HI at a point on IDi,
B responds as follows:
If IDi already appears on the Hiist in a tuple (IDi, hi, Dd, then B responds with
H1(IDd = hi'
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Otherwise, if the query is on the I -th distinct ID, then B stores (IDI l ho,.l) into
the tuple list and responds with HI (IDI) = ho.
Otherwise, B selects a random integer hi(i > 0) from the (qI - 1)-GBCAAl1.2
instance which has not been chosen by B and stores (ID· h· -I-F2) into the. t, t, iu-vx
tuple hst. B responds with HI (IDi) = hi.
• H2.(Xd: To respond to these queries, B maintains an initially empty list of pairs called
H~tst. Each entry in the list is a pair in the form (Xi, Zi) indexed by Xi. To respond
to a query on Xi, B does the following operations:
If a pair (Xi, Zd is on the list, then B responds with Zi.
Otherwise, for each pair (Gj , K j ) on list LD (a list maintained in the Decap-
sulation specified later), B queries ODBIDH with ((h o + x)PI , Gj , Xd. Once
oDBIDH returns 1 for one pair, B inserts the pair (Xi, Kj ) into H~ist, mean-
while removes the pair (Gj , K j ) from L D and returns K]. For other situations,
B continues.
B randomly chooses a string Zi E {O, l}£ and inserts a new pair (Xi, Zd into the
list. It responds to A with Zi.
• Ext.ract.ionf Ip.): B looks through list Hiist. If IDi is not on the list, B queries
HI(IDd· B checks the value of Di: if D, =I ..1, then B responds with D i ; otherwise,
B aborts the game (Event 1).
• Decapsulat.ionj jp., Gi ) : B maintains an initially empty list, denoted by LD, of pairs
in the form (Gi , K i ) . To respond to the query, B first looks through list Hiist. If IDi
is not on the list, then B queries HI (IDi). Depending on the value of D; for IDi on
Hiist, B responds differently.
1. If o, =I ..1, then B first computes gT = tic; D i ) , and then queries z, = H2(gT).
B responds with Zi.
2. Otherwise iD; = ..i), B takes following actions:
(a) For every pair (Xj , Zj) in H~ist, B queries ODBIDH with ((ho+x)Pl, Ci, Xj).
If ODBIDH returns 1 for one query, then B returns the corresponding Zj.
(b) Otherwise, B randomly chooses K E {O, I} £ and inserts (Gi , K) into the list
L D. Finally B returns K .
• Challenge: At some point A's first stage will terminate and it will return a challenge
identity ID*. If A has not called HI with input ID* then B does so for it. If the corre-
sponding value of DI D* is not equal to ..1 then B will terminate (Event 2). B chooses
a random value of r E fZ* and a random value K* in {O, l}£, and returns (K*, r Pd as
PI'the challenge. For simplicity, if (ID*, r PI) has been queried on the Decapsu ation
query, B tries another random r .
• Guess: Once A outputs its guess, B answers the qI-GBCAAII,2 challenge in the
following way.
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1. For each tuple ix; Zj) in H~ist, B queries ODBIDH with ((ho+ x)P1, rPI , Xj).
If 0 DBIDH returns 1, B outputs X j as the answer to the challenge.
2. If no tuple found on the list, B failed (Event 3).
Claim: If algorithm B does not abort during the simulation, then algorithm A's view is
identical to its view in the real attack.
Proof: B's responses to HI queries are uniformly and independently distributed in Z* as
. p
III the real attack because of the behavior of the Setup phase in the simulation. H2 is
modeled as a random oracle which requires that for each unique input, there should be only
one response. We note that the simulation substantially makes use of the programmability
of random oracle and the access to the DBIDHI,I oracle to guarantee the unique response
for every H 2 query. There are two subcases in the simulation.
• The adversary queries the Decapsulation oracle on (ID*, Ci). Although B cannot
compute K = e(Ci , ho~xP2) (note that if the game does not abort, D 1D* = ho~xP2)'
B makes use of ODBIDH to test if K has been queried to H 2 as an input Xi. If K
has been queried, B uses the existing response. Otherwise, B randomly generates the
response and keeps a record in LD. .
• The adversary queries on H2(Xi). If (Xi) has not been queried before on H2, B should
make sure that the response must be consistent with the possible existing response gen-
erated in the Decapsulation queries. Again, B exploits the access to the DBIDHI,I
?
oracle. By testing e(Cj, ho~xP2) . Xi for all Cj's in LD and, if the equation holds,
returning the corresponding response in LD, B guarantees that the output in this
query is consistent with the one in the Decapsulation query.
The responses in other types of query are valid as well. Hence the claim is founded.
We now evaluate the probability that B does not abort the game. Event 3 implies that
the value e(C* _1_P,2) which is the encapsulated key in the challenge encapsulation, is
, ho+x '
not queried on H2 in the simulation. Since H2 is a random oracle, Pr[A winsllivent 3] = ~.
We have
Pr[A wins] Pr[A winsllsverrt 3] Pr[Event 3] + Pr[A winslEvent 3] Pr[Event 3]
111
< Pr[Event 3] + 2(1 - Pr[Event 3]) = 2 + 2 Pr[Event 3].
Pr[A wins] > Pr[A winslliverrt 3] Pr[Event 3]
1 1 1
2(1 - Pr[Event 3]) = 2 - 2 Pr[Event 3].
So, we have Pr[Event 3] > E(k). We note that Event 2 implies Event 1 because of the
rules of the game. Overall, we have
=---:--~] E(k)Pr[B wins] = Pr[Event 31\ Event 2 > --.
- ql
D
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We note that as the proof is based on the gap assumption, in principle the reductions
requires the queried encapsulation Cj to be in G 1.
3.5.3 SK-KEM2
If one is not willing to accept the gap assumption used by SK-KEM1, here we present
another KEM: SK-KEM2, which has a security reduction based on f-BCAAl. We will first
construct an ID-OW-CPA secure IBE, then apply a generic ID-KEM conversion to obtain
SK-KEM2.
By using the SK key construction, we construct an ID-OW-CPA secure IBE referred to
as Basic-SK-IBE, which is specified by the following four algorithms:
Setup GID(lk). On input 1'; the algorithm works as follows:
1. Generate three cyclic groups Gl, G2 and G t of prime order p, an isomorphism 'l/J from
G2 to Gl, and a bilinear pairing map e : Gl X G2 ~ G t · Pick a random generator
2. Pick a random s E Z; and compute Ppub = S Pl·
3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions HI : {a, 1}* ~ z;, H2 : G t ~ {a, I}" for some
integer n > 0.
and the master secret key M st = s.
The message space is MI = {a, I}", the ciphertext space is C = Gi x {a, I}", and the
randomness space is ~ = Zp.
Extract XID(Mpt, Mst, IDA). Given an identifer string IDA E {a, 1}* of entity A, Mpt and
Mst, the algorithm returns DA = s+HlhD A ) P 2 .
Encrypt lEID(Mpt, IDA, m; r). Given a message m E MI, IDA, M pt and the randomness r,
the following steps are performed.
3. Set the ciphertext to C = (U, V).
Decrypt JI))ID(Mpt , IDA, D A, C). Given a ciphertext C = (U, V) E C, IDA, DA and A/pt ,
the algorithm outputs
V E9 H2(e(U, DA)).
We have the following security result of the scheme.
Theorem 3.5.3. Basic-SK-IBE is secure against ID-OW-CPA adversaries provided that HI
and H2 are random oracles and the f-BCAAl assumption is sound. Specifically, suppose that
there is an algorithm A which breaks the scheme in terms of ID-OW-CPA with advantage
E(k), and let ql and q2 be the number of queries that A makes to HI and H2 respectively.
Then there is an algorithm B essentially in time ofO(time(A)) to solve the (q-1)-BCA Ah,2
problem with the advantage
Adv~1-1)-BCAA11,2(k) ~ (1 - q2/ 2n ) . E(k).
ql
Proof: Algorithm B is given as input a random (ql-1)-BCAA11,2 instance (G1,G2,Gt,P,
e, 'lj;, n, PI, P2, xP1, be, (hI, h 1+ P2), ... , (hi, h 1+ P2), ... , (hq1- 1, h 1 +xP2)) where x1 x l X q1 -1
is a random element from Z;. Algorithm B finds e(P1, P2)1/(x+ho) by interacting with A as
follows:
Algorithm B first simulates algorithm GID(lk) by setting M pt = (G1, G2, Gt , p, e,
'lj;, PI, P2, xP}, H}, H2), i.e. setting Ppu b = XPI and HI and H2 are the random oracles
controlled by B . Now B randomly choose 1 < I < qI and starts to respond to queries as
follows .
• HI (IDi): B maintains an initially empty list of tuples (IDi, hi, di ) indexed by IDi as
explained below. We refer to this list as Hi ist. When A queries the oracle HI at a
point IDi, B responds as follows:
- If IDi already appears on the Hi ist in a tuple (IDi, hi, di), then B responds with
HI (IDi) = hi·
- Otherwise, if the query is on the I-th distinct ID, then B stores (IDf, ha,1-) into
the tuple list and responds with HI(ID/) = lus-
- Otherwise, B selects a random integer hi(i > 0) from (qI - l)-BCAAI challenge
which has not been chosen by B and stores (IDi, hi, hi~XP2) into the tuple list.
B responds with HI (IDi) = lu,
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• H2(Xd: .At any time algorithm A can issue queries to the random oracle H2 . B maintains
l' t H ltst . ha IS 2 WIt tuples of the form (Xi, (d indexed by Xi. To respond to a query on
Xi, B does the following operations:
- If a tuple indexed by Xi is on the list, then B responds with (i.
- Otherwise, B randomly chooses a string (i E {O,1}n and inserts a new tuple
(Xi, (i) into the list. It responds to A with (i.
• Extraction( IDd: B first looks through list Hiist. If 1Di is not on the list, then
B queries HI (IDi)' B then checks the value di : if di -=I ..1, B responds with di ; other-
wise, B aborts the game (Event 1) .
• Challenge: At some point A's first stage will terminate and it will return a challenge
identity ID*. If A has not called HI with input ID* then B does so for it. If the
corresponding value of D 1D* is not equal to ..1 then B will terminate (Event 2).
Algorithm B chooses a random value of T' E Z; and a random value V* in {O, l }". It
computes U* = T'PI and sets the challenge ciphertext to be
C* = (U*, V*).
Note that because D1D* should be ho~xP2' for a genuine challenge ciphertext we
should have
This challenge ciphertext is now passed to algorithm A's second stage. Note, due
to the rules of the game, B will not terminate unexpectedly when responding to
extraction queries made once A has been given the challenge ciphertext.
• Guess: At some point algorithm A responds with its guess as to the value of the
underlying plaintext m'. B does the following operation to respond to the (qI - 1)-
BCAAI challenge.
- Compute (* = m' E9 V* .
- Go through H~ist to find tuples (Xi, (*).
If no tuple or more than one tuple is found, fail the game.
_ Return T = x:" as the response to the (qI - l)-BCAAI challenge.
t
By the rules of the game, Event 2 implies Event 1. Hence if A indeed chooses the I-th
queried identifier on HI as the challenge identity, then the game won't abort. We have
Pr[B does not abort] = Pr[Event 2] > l/qI.
Let Event 3 be that in the game X* = e(U*, D 1D*) is queried on H2· As H2 is a
random oracle, we know that A has advantage at most 1/2n if Event 3 does not happen.
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Again as H 2 is random oracle, in the game that there are two tuples with X' =I X* such
that H2 (X') = H2(X*) = (* happens with probability at most Q2/2n.
Overall, we have
. (1 - Q2/2n)E(k)Pr[B wms] ~ .
Ql
o
To get a secure ID-KEM, we now apply a generic conversion which transforms an ID-
OW-CPA secure probabilistic lEE into an ID-IND-CCA2 secure ID-KEM.
The generic conversion [20] works as follows: Let the lEE algorithm be denoted IEID(Alpr,
ID, m; r) and the decryption algorithm be denoted lIJ)ID(Mpr, ID, DID, C), where DID is
the output from the extraction algorithm XID(Mpr, Msr, ID). We assume the message space
of IEID is given by M ID(Mpr) and the space of randomness is given by IR ID(Mpr). The
construction uses two cryptographic hash functions:
for fEZ: the length of the resulting keys. Using this we construct an ID-KEM as follows.
Table 3.5: A Generic ID-KEM Conversion
IEID_KEM(Mpr,ID)
• mf-M ID(Mpr)
• rf-H3(m)
• Cf-IEID(Mpr, ID, m; r)
• Kf-H 4(m)
• Return (K, C)
lIJ)ID-KEM(Mpr, ID, DID, C)
• mf-lIJ)ID(Mpr, ID, DID, C)
• If m =1-, return 1-
• rf-H3(m)
• If C =I IEID(Mpr, ID, m; r), return 1-
• Kf-H4(m)
• Return K
From [20] we have the following theorem concerning the security of the construction
above.
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Theorem 3.5.4. IflE ID is an ID-OW-CPA secure ID-based encryption scheme and H3 and
H4 are modeled as random oracles then the construction above is secure against adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack. Specifically, if A is a PPT algorithm that breaks the ID-KEM
construction above using a chosen ciphertext attack, then there exists a PPT algorithm B,
with
AdvID-IND-CCA2(A) < 2(q + + ) . Ad ID-OW-CPA(B) + 2qD"((Mpr)
ID-KEM - 3 q4 qo V 1D IlRID(Mpr ) I'
where q3, q4 and qD are the number of queries made by A to H3, H4 and the decryption
oracle respectively.
When we instantiate this generic construction with Basic-SK-IBE, we have
"((Mpr) "-J 1
IlR ID(Mpr) I "-J p'
and the Encapsulate and Decapsulate algorithm of the full secure ID-KEM: SK-KEM2,
are detailed in Table 3.6. As SK-IBE, the computation QID in JI))ID-KEM can be pre-
Table 3.6: SK-KEM2
lEID-KEM(Mpr, IDA)
• m+-{O,l}n
• r+-H3(m)
• QA+-Ppub + H1(IDA)P1
• G1=rQA
• G2 = m EB H2(e(P1, P2)T)
• K+-H4(m)
• Return (K, (G1' G2))
JI))ID-KEM(Mpr, IDA, DA, C)
• Parse C as (Cll C2)
• a+-e(C1,DA)
• m=C2EB H2(a)
• r+-H3(m)
• QA+-Ppub + Hl(IDA)Pl
• U+-rQA
• If C1 =I U, return 1-
• Return K
computed.
By combining Theorem 3.5.3 and Theorem 3.5.4, we have the following result regarding
the security of SK-KEM2.
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Theorem 3.5.5. SK-KEM2 is secure against ID-IND-CCA2 adversaries provided that
H i (1 < i < 4) are random oracles and the f-BCAAl assumption is sound. Specifically, sup-
pose there exists an ID-IND-CCA2 adversary A against SK-KEM2 that has non-negligible
advantage E(k). Suppose also that during the attack A makes at most qo decryption queries
and at most qi queries on Hi for 1 < i < 4 respectively (note that Hi could be queried directly
by A or indirectly by an extraction query, a decryption query or the challenge operation).
Then there exists a PPT algorithm B to solve the (ql -1)-BCAAh,2 problem with advantage
Adv(ql- l)-BCAA1 1•2(k) > l-q2/2n [E(k) _ 2QD ] .
l3 - 2Ql(Q3+Q4+QD) p
A few points are worth mentioning. First, by including rQA in H 2 we can get a more
efficient reduction for both SK-KEM1 and SK-KEM2. Second, we can slightly tweak SK-
KEM2 to SK-KEM2', which then is a generalised PSEC-KEM [101] in the identity-based
KEM setting, as in Table 3.7 with
The security analysis of SK-KEM2' essentially follows the same strategy as SK-KEM2:
Table 3.7: SK-KEM2'
lEID-KEM(Mpt, IDA)
• mf-{O,l}n
• rIIKf-HHm)
• QAf-Ppub + Hl(IDA)Pl
• Gl=rQA
• G2 = m EB H~(Gl, e(Pl, P2)T)
• Return (K, (Gl, G2))
lIJ)ID-KEM(Mpt, ID, DA, G)
• Parse G as (G l , G2)
• Qf-e(Gl,DA)
• m = G2 EB H~(Gl, Q)
• rilKf-H~(m)
• QAf-Ppub + Hl(IDA)Pl
• Uf-rQA
• If G l -# U, return .1
• Return K
First, by a very similar reduction as Theorem 5 [20], one can prove that the generic PSEC-
KEM can convert an ID-OW-CPA secure ID-based encryption to an ID-IND-CCA2 secure
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ID-KEM. Then, by Theorem 3.5.3, we prove the security of SK-KEM2'.
3.6 Efficiency Discussion and Comparison
Owing to the SK key construction, the SK-IBE and SK-KEMs are very efficient on compu-
tation cost and bandwidth overhead. In the following, by comparing the two schemes with
other IBEs in the literature, we demonstrate that SK-IBE in Section 3.4 and SK-KEMs
in Section 3.5 are the most efficient ones in terms of operation among the existing IBEs
in the literature. Before giving the factual comparison details, we explain the rationale of
choosing the compared schemes.
1. A chosen scheme should have a valid proof in the standard model or with resorting
to random oracles.
2. As efficiency is our main focus and a scheme constructed in the standard model is less
efficient than the corresponding variant of using random oracles with same parameter
size, for simplicity we only give detailed comparison of those schemes with random
oracles, but informatively compare those schemes secure in the standard model.
We choose the following schemes for comparison.
• BF-IBE. This is the Boneh-Franklin IBE [19], which uses the Fujisaki-Okamoto con-
version to achieve ID-IND-CCA2 security in the random oracle model. This is a "full
domain hash" scheme.
• BBI-IBE. This is the first Boneh-Boyen scheme in [10] but with using hash functions
on the identifier and ciphertext. The scheme was first detailed in a submission to
IEEE P1363.3 [9] and achieves ID-IND-CCA2 security in the random oracle model.
This is an efficient "commutative blinding" scheme.
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• Gentry-IBE. This is an IBE scheme using an "exponent inversion" -type key con-
struction [82]. The scheme has a tight security reduction in the standard model but
based on a stronger assumption f-DABDHE [82] than f-BDHI.
• SK-IBE. This is the scheme presented in Section 3.4, which is also an "exponent
inversion" scheme.
• BF-KEM. This is the KEM adaptation of BF-IBE. The construction is also applying
the Bentahar et al. 's generic transformation on the basic ID-IND-CPA secure BF-
IBE (BasicIdent) [19] as SK-KEM does in Section 3.5. We note that the trivial
KEM construction from the basic BF-IBE like ECIES-KEM [101] will achieve higher
efficiency but with a security proof in the random oracle model based on the stronger
GBDH assumption than BDH [117].
• BB1-KEM. This is the KEM adaptation of BB1-IBE first shown in [9] with security
proof in the random oracle model.
• SK-KEM2. This is the ID-KEM in Section 3.5.3. It's easy to find out that SK-KEM1
has shorter ciphertext and is slightly faster than SK-KEM2.
There are a few IBEs and ID-KEMs with security proofs in the standard model. Most of
those IBEs including Waters-IBE [162], CS-IBE [66] and Naccache-IBE [131] use Waters' ID
key construction or its variant. The last two are the improvements of Waters' scheme. All of
these "commutative blinding" IBEs are less efficient than BBI-IBE from the same category.
Boneh and Boyen presented a second IBE, called BB2-IBE in [10], using an "exponent
inversion" -type key construction. They formally proved that the scheme is a sID-IND-CPA
secure IBE in the standard model. To achieve sID-IND-CCA2 security [56] in the standard
model, one has to apply some other inefficient transformation such as a zero-knowledge
construction. In [9], a BB 2-IBE variant with random oracles was briefly mentioned but no
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scheme details and security analysis was given". BMW-KEM [39] and Kiltz-KEl\!I [108] are
two ID-KEMs constructed using the variant of Waters' key construction with security proofs
in the standard model. However, none of them are of better efficiency than BB 1-KEM from
the same category.
Below we provide the extensive comparison data regarding the chosen schemes' compu-
tation efficiency of the Extract, Encrypt/Encapulate and Decrypt/Decapsulate algorithm,
and the communication bandwidth including the size of the system parameters, the master
secret key, the private key and the ciphertext/capsulation.
We choose the 80-bit security level with the Type-1 pairing and the 128-bit security
level with the Type-3 pairing as the comparison bed. We choose the 80-bit and 128-bit
security level because the first is commonly adopted currently and the latter is believed
to be necessary in the future and the Type-1 (resp. Type-3) pairings are generally faster
than the other three types on the 80-bit (resp. 128-bit) security level. Although there is no
efficient isomorphism 'IjJ : ((;2 ~ ((;1 for Type-3 pairings, this is not an obstacle to implement
the chosen schemes, though the Gentry-IBE has to be slightly modified by choosing an extra
generator in ((;2.
Although formal security reductions are of great importance to validate the security
of a cryptographic scheme, as discussed in Section 2.3, a loose reduction cannot suggest
meaningful parameters for a fixed security level in practice. Because all the chosen schemes
to be compared have a loose security reduction except the Gentry's scheme which has a
tight reduction but based on a stronger assumption, we follow the recommendation from
NIST for comparing ECC and RSA key sizes [132] to choose the system parameters. The
same approach is also adopted in the IEEE P1363.3 submissions [9, 14].
lBy applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion like BF-lBE and SK-lBE or adopting the MAC-tag con-
struction like BBl-lBE, the enhance scheme is secure in the random oracle model based on the £-BDHl
assumption. However, the new scheme is about 50% (resp. 20%) slower in encryption with Type-l (resp.
Type-3) pairings, and is about 40% slower with Type-l pairings and, if full optimization is unavailable, 20%
slower with Type-3 pairings in decryption than SK-lBE. The scheme has larger system parameter, private
key and ciphertext than SK-lBE.
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As in [9, 52, 14], we will compare the schemes in terms of computation efficiency by
reference to the cost of a multiplication in G 1. We assume pairing-friendly curves [28] are
used and the point compression technique is applied.
Table 3.8: Relative Cost of Operations and Bandwidth in Pairing-Based Schemes
Type 1(1) Type 31 21
Security Level 80 128
Size of Elements
E Gl 512 bits 256 bits
E G2 512 bits 512 bits
E G t 1024 bits 3072 bits
Relative Cost of Operation
Mul in Gl 1 1
Fix-base Mul in Gl (3) 0.2 0.2
Mul in G2 1 3
Fix-base Mul in G2(3) 0.2 0.6
Exp in c, 0.2 3
Fix-base Exp in G t(3) 0.05 0.6
Pairing 2.1/1(4) 20
Double-Pairing 3.7/1.6(4) 28(5)
Hash in Gl 2.2 free
Hash in G2 2.2 3
1. We assume the Tate pairing with the embedding degree 2 is used.
2. We assume the Tate pairing with the embedding degree 12 is used.
3. We assume that the fix-base multiplication or exponentiation uses 20% time of a general multiplication
or exponentiation in G1, G2 or G t respectively.
4. The pre-computation is used to speed-up pairings.
5. We use the result of optimising pairing product in [90].
The computation performance is compared in Table 3.9 and the communication band-
width is compared in Table 3.10. Both comparisons show that SK-IBE and SK-KEM2 are
the most efficient ones in terms of operation and bandwidth requirement. The SK schemes
are significantly faster in Encrypt algorithm than the BF schemes. When the cost ratio of
pairing and multiplication in Gl is small, for example on the chosen Type-1 pairing group,
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Table 3.9: Relative Computation Efficiency of lBEs from Pairings
£ BDHI
SK-KEM2
BDH
BF-KEM
£ BDHI
SK-IBEGentry-IBE
£ DABDHEBDHBDH
BF-IBE
Hard Problem
- - -
Private Key
Generation
Hash to G2 1 1
Mul in G2 1 2(1) 6 I 1 "2 I
Type-l
Relative Cost 3.2 2 6 1 3.2 2 1
Optimised Cost(2) 3.2 0.4 1.2 0.2 3.2 0.4 0.2
Type-3
Relative Cost 6 6 6 3 6 6 3
Optimised Cost(2) 6 1.2 3.6 0.6 6 1.2 0.6
Encrypt/
Encapsulate
Hash to G2 1 1
Mul in G1 1+1 3 2 "2 1+1 3 "2
Exp in G t I 4 I I I
Pairings 1 1
Type-l
Relative Cost 6.3 3.2 2.8 2.2 6.3 3.2 2.2
Optimised Cost(2) 4.4 0.65 0.6 0.45 4.4 0.65 0.45
Type-3
Relative Cost 25 6 14 5 25 6 5
Optimised Cost (2) 24.2 1.2 2.8 1.0 24.2 1.2 1.0
Decrypt/
Decapsulate
Mul in G1 I I I I I
Mul in G2 I
Exp in G t I 2
Pairings 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
Type-l
Relative Cost 3.1 4.9 5.6 3.1 3.1 3.7 3.1
Optimised Cost (2) 1.2 1.85 4.8 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.2
Type-3
Relative Cost 21 31(4) 49 21 21 28 21
Optimised Cost(2) 20.2 28.6(4) 46.2 20.2 20.2 28 20.2
1. Symbols m and n denote m fix-based multiplications or exponentiations and n general operations
respectively.
2. The cost has considered the optimisation of fix-based multiplication or exponentiation.
3. BB1-KEM was claimed in [9] to be secure based on the BDH assumption. However, no proof is given.
On the other hand, one can certainly prove the security of the scheme based on the GBDH assumption
by adopting the technique in [10]. The same technique is used in Theorem 4.6.1 in Section 4.6.2.
4. It appears with Type-3 pairings, BB1-IBE performs slightly better by checking the validity of the
ciphertext with (C1,CO) ~ (93g~(ID)s,gs) [9].
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Table 3.10: Communication Bandwidth of IBEs from Pairings
BB1-lBE Gentry-lBE SK lBE I BF KEM BBl KEM SK KEM2 IBF-lBE - - - -
System
Parameters
# elts. in G l 2 3 2 2 2 3 2
# elts. in G 2 0 0 3+1 (1) 0 0 0 0
# elts. in G t 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Paramo Size
Type-I 1024 2560 2560 1024 1024 2560 1024
Type-3 512 3840 2560 512 512 3840 512
Master Secret
# elts. in G l 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
# elts, in Zp 1 3 1 1 1 3 1
Secret Size
Type-1 160 992 160 160 160 992 160
Type-3 256 1024 256 256 256 1024 256
Private Key
# elts. in G 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 1
# elts. in Zp 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
Key Size
Type-1 512 1024 2016 512 512 1024 512
Type-3 512 1024 2304 512 512 1024 512
Cipher Text
Fixed-len. Part
# elts. in G l 1 2 1 1
# elts. in G t 0 0 3 0
# elts. in Zp 0 1 0 0
Ciphertext Size
Type-1 512+r(2)+n(3) 1184(4) 3584(4) 512+r+n
Type-3 256+r + n 1024(4) 9472(4) 256+r+n
KEM Capsule
Fixed-len. Part
# elts. in Gl 1 2 1
# elts. in Zp 0 0 0
Capsule Size
Type-1 512+r 1024 512+r
Type-3 256+r 512 256+r
1. In Gentry-lBE with the Type-3 pairings, an extra generator 92 E G2 should be chosen and hID,; =
(hi9;rID, i )l/(a-ID) with hi E G2 for i = 1,2,3 [82].
2. r is the size of the used randomness.
3. n is the size of the message.
4. The message must be securely embedded in G t and so cannot be longer than the size of Gt .
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the BB I schemes, the Gentry scheme and SK schemes have similar performance when op-
erations are fully optimised and the SK schemes are the fastest. While, when the ratio is
large, for example on the chosen Type-3 pairing group, SK-IBE and SK-KEM2 are much
faster than the BB I schemes and Gentry-IBE in decryption. SK-IBE and SK-KEM2 have
the same bandwidth efficiency as the BF scheme, while is more economical than the BB I
schemes. Gentry-IBE has very large ciphertext size.
3.7 On Cheon's Attack
As observed by Moni Naor that an ID key construction is in fact a signature scheme, the
result of the Extract algorithm is a signature D A on the message IDA signed under the
master secret key. For the security of an IBE, the basic requirement is that the adversary
itself should not be able to generate a private key associated with an identifier, i.e. the
signature scheme should be existentially unforgeable under the chosen-message attack [91].
The SK ID key construction has been proven to be a secure signature in the sense of
existential unforgeability provided that the £-SDH assumption is sound in ((;2 [169].
As discussed in Section 2.6, the £-SDH problem is not as hard as the DH problem.
Recently Cheon presented an algorithm showing that the computational complexity of £-
DHI (and £-SDH) can be reduced by O(Vf) from that of the discrete logarithm problem [41].
Here we restate Cheon's two main results:
Theorem 3.7.1. Let P be an element of prime order p in an Abelian group. Suppose that
£ is a positive divisor of p - 1. If P, PI := ccI? and Pi := ai Pare given, a can be computed
in 0 (log p . ( J (p - 1)/ £ + Vf)) group operations using 0 (max{ J (p - 1)/ £, Vf}) memory.
Theorem 3.7.2. Let P be an element of prime order p in an Abelian group. Suppose that
£ is a positive divisor of p + 1. If Pi := a i P for i = 1,2, ... ,2£ are given, a can be computed
in O(logp· (J(p + 1)/£ + f)) group operations using O(max{ J(p + 1)/£, 2€}) memory.
Now we investigate the possible impact of Cheon's algorithm on the implementation
of SK-IBE and SK-KEMs. We will look at this issue from two aspects, one regarding the
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direct threat to the system in practice and another regarding the implication on the security
proof in theory.
For the real threat, we have to assume that the adversary can obtain private keys
because the adversary can be internal parties of a system and may also compromise other
parties' private key. By assuming a single adversary A has gathered £ pairs of public/private
keys (hi, S~hi P2) with hi = HI (IDi) and hi is different from each other, by using Cheon's
algorithm A can try to recover the master secret key in the following manner.
• Randomly sample ho E Z; different from hi for 1 < i < £.
• Set Q = 8 + ho which A does not know, and
1Q= P2·(8 + hd ... (8 + he)
• For j = 0, ... ,£ - 1, A computes
where Cij E Zp are computable from hi'S.
• Given QjQ for 0 < j < £ - 1, use Cheon's algorithm to compute ex and so 8 = ex - ho·
By Theorem 3.7.2 the complexity of the above attack to recover the master secret
key 8 in SK-IBE/KEMs is with O(logp . h/2(p + 1)/£ + £/2)) group operations using
O(max{ J2(p + 1)/£, £}) memory. Note that if there is a divisor d of p - 1 with d < £
and d ~ f, then the attack is still workable with similar computational complexity by
Theorem 3.7.1.
The value £ in the above attack is restricted by two factors in practice: the compromised
private keys by a single adversary and the divisors of p + 1 or p - 1 for the chosen prime
order p of Gl. Our observation of this attack is that it does not pose a serious threat to a
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practical deployment of SK-IBE/KEMs. First, we note that in a secure IBE system, each
user has to be authenticated by the KGC before extracting his private key corresponding
to its identifier. Hence, for a practical system with a proper safeguard, it should be im-
possible for an adversary to gather a very large number of private keys and the number
of the compromised keys should be upper-bounded by the number of users in the system.
Normally, for an enterprise-scale system, the number of users hardly exceeds 230 . Second,
for a system allowing £ private keys to be compromised at the same time requiring strict
2k-bit DL equivalent security level, i.e. at the k-bit security level by assuming DL, DH and
BDH have the same computational complexity in the chosen groups, one can choose a larger
group to compensate the complexity deduction due to the attack. By the Boneh-Boyen's
lower bound on £-SDH, 2k + log2 i-bit size group is enough for security compensation in
general if £ < {!2 2k . Regarding the concrete security parameter k > 80, if £ < 230 , 2k + 30-
bit P is sufficient to maintain the k-bit security against the Cheon's attack in general. In
practice, we can properly choose pairing parameters such that the system can have better
performance at the same time allow more keys to be compromised.
For a SK-IBE/KEMs system requiring the 80-bit security at the same time allowing up
to 254 private keys to be compromised against the Cheon's attack, one can use following
parameters with a supersingular curve such as
• Example 1. Supersingular curve defined over IFq with the embedding degree 2 where
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q is a 512-bit prime.
q =
P
p-1
p+1
9958606129947669321992689282779203537196941427385817665570945\
0860698536439968953609396513046575941510715245760020286771760\
07477021088661653591499430532203
2180 + 211 - 1
2 . 9643 . 800113 . (a 54 bit prime) . (a 93 bit prime)
211.3.2731. (a 63 bit prime)· (a 94 bit prime)
An implementation of SK-lBE/KEMs in Example 1 uses groups whose order is only
20-bit larger than the commonly chosen group order (160-bit) for other schemes based
on the BDH assumption. A SK-lBE/KEM in Example 1 is about 10% slower than the
implementation with 160-bit groups of curves defined over a 512-bit base field, and the
bandwidth is only 20 bits larger (SK-KEM1 retains the same ciphertext size). On the
other hand, even using this larger parameter, SK-lBE/KEMs is still slightly faster than
BB1-IBE/KEM and much faster than BF-lBE in encryption and Gentry-lBE in decryption
when those scheme are implemented with 160-bit groups of the same curve defined over a
same size field. Moreover, if a single adversary cannot compromise more than 220 keys, which
is very likely to happen in practical systems, by the Boneh-Boyen's lower bound on t'-SDH,
SK-lBE/KEMs in Example 1 could guarantee a higher security level than BB1-IBE/KEM.
Similarly for higher security level, proper parameter can also be selected, for example the
following one in Example 2, with which SK-lBE/KEMs can maintain the 128-bit security
level against the Cheon's attack, when t' < 254 .
• Example 2. Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve y2 = x 3 + b over lFq with the embedding
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degree 12 at the 143-bit security level (p is a 286-bit prime).
q =
b
p
p-l
p+l
6993608012012624673525798314110418968360118882115586443437\
5523406941335516530644150803
2001607249344134058604599308965863529476698521029198611793\
8730615333486994618246636432
6993608012012624673525798314110418968360118045837641498539\
1834436547507293123567863309
22.3.11.17.571 ·9001· (a 54 bit prime)· (a 199 bit prime)
2·5·7· (a 29 bit prime)· (a 109 bit prime)· (a 142 bit prime)
We remark that the Cheon's algorithm requires nontrivial amount of storage, which may
become another hurdle to cross for the algorithm's application in the distant future. This
is more obvious at high security levels such as the 112-bit or 128-bit security. For example,
consider the following curve parameters:
• Example 3. BN curve curve with the embedding degree 12 at the 112-bit security
level (p is a 224-bit prime) from [28].
p =
p-l
p+l
2695994666714920575838346973692169024271887820057153102974923\
5996909
22 ·3· (a 22 bit prime) . (a 25 bit prime) . (a 27 bit prime}
(a 38 bit prime) . (a 73 bit prime)
2 . 5 . 72 . 29 . 59 . 3361 . 6491 ·44449 . (a 34 bit prime}
(a 42 bit prime) . (a 90 bit prime)
p+l
p-l
p =
• Example 4. BN curve with the embedding degree 12 at the 128-bit security level (p
is a 256-bit prime) from [28].
1157920892373149368726885612444717420580355959888402685844\
88757999429535617037
22 .3.72 . 189239· (a 25 bit prime) . (a 33 bit prime}
(a 36 bit prime) . (a 137 bit prime)
2.38113·39563· (a 98 bit prime)' (a 127 bit prime)
71
In Example 3, if f ~ 242 , the memory required by the algorithm will be at least 296 bytes.
For less memory cost, f has to be bigger, which requires more keys to be compromised and
the next targeted f has to be 273 . In Example 4, the algorithm requires 2116 bytes storage
if f ~ 236 or at least 2105 bytes storage if f > 298 .
Now we look at the impact of the attack on the security proof. As explained in Sec-
tion 2.3, we take the asymptotic view on the reductions in this thesis. SK-IBE/KEMs are
asymptotically secure by assuming f-BDHI is hard. f is upper bounded by the number of
compromised private keys, which is a constant number in practice. An interesting point
of the reductions in Section 3.4 and 3.5 is that the concrete complexity of the underlying
assumption f-BDHI is changing with the bound f. Moreover, such f is linked with the query
number on HI. In the reductions, for a fixed p, the more queries are issued on HI (so the
greater f), the less complexity the underlying problem has. This problem arises because for
simplicity the reductions does not differentiate the direct queries on HI from those indirect
HI queries trigged by the Extract query, which will really affect the bound f in practice.
However, in practice the adversary cannot threaten the security of the master secret key
by merely executing the hash function HI. This demonstrates that part of a reduction in
the random oracle model does not necessarily coincide with the corresponding attacking
behavior in practice.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we first constructed a complete IBE (SK-IBE) using the Sakai-Kasahara's
identity key construction and formally analyse the scheme's security in the Boneh-Franklin
IBE model. To encrypt arbitrary long messages, we then proposed two ID-KEMs (SK-
KEMI and SK-KEM2) with the same key construction. Through the detailed comparison,
we demonstrated that these schemes offer the best performance among the existing IBEs.
Finally we investigated the impact of Cheon's algorithm of f-DHI on the proposed schemes
-')
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and concluded that the three schemes can maintain the required security level and at the
same time work with high performance by using proper pairing parameters in practice.
Chapter 4
Efficient Certificateless Public Key
Encryption
In last chapter, we have presented a number of practical IBEs. These IBEs following
Shamir's proposal have the inherent key escrow property. As the key escrow property may
not be desirable in some environments, it is natural to ask whether a secure cryptographic
system without the key escrow property and at the same time as IBE without certificates is
constructible. In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced a new public key paradigm called
certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) which is exactly such type of system.
After the certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) was introduced, there have been a
number of constructions. Some of them are not very efficient and some others are insecure
against certain attacks. In this chapter, we first revisit various CL-PKE security models
and define a strong security notion for this type of encryption. Then by making a simple
observation on some IBEs and PKEs, we propose a general approach to build efficient CL-
PKEs from IBEs and following this approach we construct three efficient concrete CL-PKE
schemes and formally analyse their security in the defined strong security model.
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4.1 Introduction
To address the threat of the impersonation attack on PKC, a common strategy is to in-
troduce into the system an authority trusted by all users. With the interventions of the
authority, the impersonation attack launched by a malicious user can be thwarted by dif-
ferent methods.
One method is that the authority explicitly provides a guarantee that one user's own-
ership of a claimed public key is authentic. The certificate-based public key cryptography
takes this approach. Each user obtains from the authority a certificate which securely binds
the user identity with the user's public key by a signature generated by the authority. By
this approach, an infrastructure to issue certificates has to be constructed and also one has
to verify certificates to obtain others' authentic public keys. Such infrastructure can be very
complicated and faces many challenges in practice, such as the efficiency and scalability of
the infrastructure.
The second method is that users use their identity directly as their public keys and
so the public key authenticity problem is trivial and certificates are no longer necessary.
Each user's private key has to be generated by the authority. This is the approach taken
by the IBC. However, in this type of system, the authority knows every user's private key,
i.e. the system has the inherent key-escrow function, and no method can prevent a curious
authority from decrypting users' ciphertexts or impersonating a user.
Though the IBC paradigm offers great advantage of simplicity over the certificate-based
PKC, the key escrow property is not desirable in some settings. The natural question arises
that whether a public key system as IBC certificate-free and at the same time as PKC
key-escrow-free is constructible. In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson brought forth the notion
of "Certificateless Public Key Cryptography" (CL-PKC) [5] to respond to this challenge. In
the CL-PKC, a user has a public key generated by himself and his private key is determined
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by two pieces of secret information: one secret associated with the user's identity is passed by
the authority and the other associated with the public key is generated by the user himself.
Moreover, one secret is not computable from the other, so the authority cannot compute
the private key corresponding to a user's public key. Hence the CL-PKC is key-escrow-free.
The approach against the impersonation attack in the CL-PKC is not to prove authen-
ticity of a public key by a certificate. Instead, a CL-PKC guarantees that even if a malicious
user successfully replaces a victim's public key with its own choice and so could know the
secret associated with the public key but not the other secret obtained by the victim user
from the authority, it still cannot generate a valid signature or decrypt the message en-
crypted under the false public key and the victim's identifier. This will certainly reduce the
interest of launching the impersonation attack.
Since the CL-PKE was introduced, there have been a number of general and concrete
constructions. As intended by CL-PKE to combine the advantage of both IBE and PKE,
most of these schemes integrate an IBE with a PKE in some ways. However some were
later found to be insecure and some others are not very efficient. In this chapter, we make a
heuristic observation on some constructions of IBE and PKE, and based on the observation
we propose a general approach to constructing CL-PKEs and develop three efficient concrete
CL-PKEs and formally analyse their security.
4.2 CL-PKE Model
Here we first specify the CL-PKE algorithms and then revisit various CL-PKE security
models and define a strong security notion for this type of encryption.
For a CL-PKE scheme we define the public key, message, ciphertext and randomness
spaces by IF' CL (.), MI CL (.), C CL (.) and IR CL (.). These spaces are parametrised by the
master public key Mpe, and hence by the security parameter k. A CL-PKE scheme consists
of following algorithms:
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• CL.Gen(lk). On input 1k, the probabilistic algorithm generates the master secret
key Mst and the master public key Mpt.
• CL.PartiaIKey(Mst, Mpt, IDA). The probabilistic algorithm takes Afst, Jl.fpt and an
arbitrary identity string IDA E {O, I} * of entity A as input and returns a partial
private key D A corresponding to IDA.
D A f- CL.PartiaIKey(Mst, Mpt, IDA).
• CL.SecretVal(Mpt, IDA). The probabilistic algorithm takes Mpt and the identity
string IDA as input and returns the secret value XA associated with the entity A.
• CL.PrivateKey(Mpt, D A, XA). The deterministic algorithm takes Mpt, D A and X A
as input and outputs the private key SA of entity A.
• CL.PublicKey(Mpt, XA, IDA). The deterministic algorithm takes Mpt and XA as
input and outputs the public key PA of the entity A .
• CL.Encrypt(Mpt, IDA, PA, m; r ). The algorithm takes Mpt, IDA, PA, a message m E
MCL(Mpt) and the randomness r E IRCL(Mpt) as input and returns the ciphertext C E
CCL(Mpt) of the message m. We also use the interface CL.Encrypt (Mpt, IDA, PA, m)
by assuming that r is sampled in the algorithm when the context is clear.
C f- CL.Encrypt(Mpt, IDA, PA, m; r}.
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• CL.Decrypt(Mpt , IDA, PA, SA, C). The deterministic algorithm takes Mpt , IDA, SA
and a ciphertext C as input, and outputs the value of the plaintext m or a failure
symbol 1-.
Similar to lEE and PKE, to cope with probabilistic ciphers, we will require that not too
many choices for r encrypt a given message to a given ciphertext. To formalize this concept
we let ')'(Mpt ) be the least upper bound such that
for every ID, PI D E lP' CL(Mpt ) , m E M CL(Mpr ) and C E C CL(Mpr ) . We say a CL-PKE is
')'-uniform if ')'(Mpr ) / I IRCL(Mpt ) 1< ')'.
Following Al-Riyami-Patersori's CL-PKE security formulation, we can define various
security notions for this type of encryption. These security notions are defined by two
games. Game 1 is conducted between a challenger and a Type-I adversary AI of two
PPT algorithms (All' AI2)' A Type-I adversary does not know the master secret key
and can replace an entity's public key with its choice. This type of adversary simulates
those who may impersonate a party by providing others with a false public key. Game
2 is conducted between a challenger and a Type-II adversary AlI of two PPT algorithms
(AlII' AII2)' A Type-Il adversary knows the master secret key (so every entity's partial
private key). This type of adversary simulates a malicious KGC adversary which eavesdrops
the communications between two of its subscribers or may publish false public keys. And
a CL-PKE against Type-Il adversaries also naturally achieves the forward secrecy of the
master secret key, i.e. the compromise of the master secret key would not reveal those
messages encrypted under authentic public keys before the leakage of the master secret key.
In the games above, s is some state information and 0CL are the oracles that the
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Table 4.1: CL-IND-PKE Games
Game 1: Type-I Adversarial Game 2: Type-Il Adversarial
1. (Mpt, Msr)<- CL.Gen(Ik). 1. (Mpt, Mst)<- CL.Gen(Ik).
2. (. ) GCL (. GCLs, ID ,mo, m1 <-AI -1 (Mpt). 2. s,lO , mo, ml )<-AI I-I (Mpt, Mst).
3. b<-{O, I}, r<-1RcdMpt). 3. b<-{O, I}, r<-IRCdMpt).
4. C· <-CL.Encrypt(Mpt, ID·, PID-, mb; r). 4. C· <-CL.Encrypt(Mpt, ID·, PID-, mbj r).
5. b'<-A~.9}(s, Mpt, C·, ID·, PID-, mo, mI). 5. b'<-A~I~~(S, Mpt, Mst, C·, ID·, PID-, mo, ml).
Table 4.2: CL-OW-PKE Games
Game 1: Type-I Adversarial Game 2: Type-II Adversarial
1. (Mpt, Msr)<- CL.Gen(Ik). 1. (Mpt, Mst)<- CL.Gen(I k ) .
2. (s, ID·)<-A~.9f(Mpt). 2. ( .) GCLs,ID <-AII - 1 (Mpt, Mst).
3. m-McdMpt), r<-IRcdMpt). 3. m<-M cdMpt), r<-IRCdMpt).
4. C·<-CL.Encrypt(Mpt, ID*, PIO-' rn; r). 4. C*<-CL.Encrypt(Mpt, ID*, PID-, rn; r).
5. m' <-A~.9}(s, Mpt, C*, ID*, PI O-)' G5. m'<-AI I~L2(s,Mpt, Mst, C*, 10*, PI O-)'
adversary can access during the game. Depending on the security model, these oracles may
include the following:
• a public key broadcast oracle Public-Key-Broadcast, which takes as input an identi-
fier and returns the associated public key. If necessary, the oracle will execute the
CL.PublicKey algorithm first.
• a partial key exposure oracle Partial-Private-Key-Extract, which returns the partial
private key associated with an identity. If necessary, the oracle will execute the
CL.PartialKey algorithm first. This oracle is only useful to Type-I adversaries,
as a Type-II adversary can compute every partial private key using the master secret
key.
• a secret value exposure oracle Secret- Value-Extract, which reveals the secret value of
entity whose public key was not replaced. If necessary, the algorithm will execute
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algorithm CL.SecretVal first.
• a public key replace oracle Public-Key-Replace, which takes as input an identifier and
a public key from the public key space and replaces the current public key associated
with the identifier with the provided key. This oracle is designed to simulate the
situation that a party (the sender of a message) will not verify another party (the
receiver of the message)'s ownership of a claimed public key and an adversary may
replace anyone's public key with a false one in CL-PKE.
• a strong decryption oracle DecryptS, which takes as input a ciphertext and an identifier
and outputs the decryption of the ciphertext using the the current private key associ-
ated with the identifier. Note that in the games, the adversary may have replaced the
public key associated with an identity, and this decryption oracle is required to output
the correct decryption, which can be a failure symbol as well, using the private key
corresponding to the current public key even if it may not know the corresponding
secret value. As this oracle may not reflect practice, a normal decryption oracle is
defined as follows:
• a decryption oracle Decrypt!, which takes as input a ciphertext and an identifier and
outputs the decryption of the ciphertext using the the original (before any Public-
Key-Replace query) private key associated with the identifier. Though this query
reflects the common practice that given a ciphertext a party uses its own private
key to decrypt it, some attacks of conceptional interest are not simulated (see the
attack on the Al-Riyami-Paterson CL-PKE [6] in Section 4.5.4). Another conceptional
decryption oracle shown below is used in some formulations .
• a decryption oracle DecryptC , which takes as input a ciphertext, an identifier, a pub-
lic key and the secret value corresponding to the given public key and outputs the
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decryption of the ciphertext using the private key determined by the partial key cor-
responding to the identifier and the given secret value in the query. If the secret value
is not given in the query, then the oracle works as Decrypt?
For each type of adversary, we define two attack models in which the adversary is allowed
to access different oracles.
For Type-I adversaries, we define the following two attack models .
• CCA2 model. In this model, the adversary is allowed to access the Public-Key-
Broadcast, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Secret- Value-Extract, Public-Key-Replace and
Decrypts oracles. However, there are a few restrictions on the adversary.
If Public-Key-Replace has been issued on an identity, then Secret- Value-Extract
on the identity is disallowed.
P artial-Private- K ey- Extract on ID* is disallowed.
DecryptS on (ID*, C*) is not allowed in AI-2 when ID*'s current public key PID*
is the same as when the challenge query is issued.
• CPA model. In this model, the adversary has the access to the similar oracles as in
the CCA2 model, but the Decrypts oracle is disallowed.
As the strong decryption oracle Decrypts may not reflect the practice, we can define
two weaker CCA2 models Type-I? and Type-IC in which the adversary is allowed to access
the Decrypt? and DecryptC oracle instead of Decrypts respectively.
For Type-II adversaries we define the following two attack models .
• CCA2 model. In this model, the adversary is allowed to access the Public-Key-
Broadcast, Secret- Value-Extract, Public-Key-Replace and Decrypts oracles. Again,
there are a few restrictions on the adversary.
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If Public-Key-Replace has been issued on an identity, then Secret- Value-Extract
on the identity is disallowed.
Public-Key-Replace on ID* is disallowed.
Secret- Value-Extract on ID* is disallowed.
DecryptS on (ID*,C*) is not allowed in AII-2.
• CPA model. In this model, the adversary has the access to the similar oracles as in
the CCA2 model, but the Decrypts oracle is disallowed.
Similarly, we can define a weaker CCA2 model Type-Il" In which the adversary is
allowed to access the Decrypt? oracle instead. There is no interest of defining Type-lIe
security as it requires the adversary to know both the partial key (because of the knowledge
of the master secret key) and the secret value which implies the adversary can decrypt the
ciphertext on its own.
If we let MOD denote the mode of attack, either CPA or CCA2, the adversary's advan-
tage in the indistinguishability-based game is defined to be
Advgt-IND-MOD(A) =1 2Pr[b' = b] - 1 I,
while, the advantage in the one-way game is given by
Advgt-OW-MOD(A) = Pr[m' = m].
A CL-PKE algorithm is considered to be secure, in the sense of a given goal and attack
model (CL-IND-CCA2 for example) if, for any PPT Type-I (and Type-II) adversary, the
advantage in the relevant game is a negligible function of the security parameter k.
There are two main differences between the model defined above and the Al-Riyarni-
Paterson's CL-PKE security model [5, 6]. First in the Al-Riyami-Paterson model a private
key exposure oracle which returns the private key of an entity is used, while, here we provide
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the adversary with the secret value exposure oracle instead. As in CL-PKE each entity has
two pieces of secret information, it is natural to provide the adversary with an exposure
oracle for each secret. Because the entity private key is determined by two secrets: the
partial private key and the secret value, the Secret- Value-Extract oracle with the Partial-
Key-Extract oracle certainly can simulate the private key exposure oracle. On the other
hand, in the AI-Riyami-Paterson model given a private key and the corresponding partial
key the adversary may not be able to recover the related secret value if the CL.PrivateKey
algorithm is a one-way function such as the algorithm used in [5]. We think it is useful to
design a model, which considers the possibility of leaking the secret value, for several reasons.
First, the implementation of the CL.SecretVal or CL.PrivateKey algorithm may not be
secure enough and the secret value may be compromised in the process. Second, it is
possible that the partial private key or the secret value is stored after the private key has
been generated for some reasons. The partial private key maybe is stored for degeneration
to an lBE if the key can be used as an identity-based private key, and the leak of it and
the private key may result in the compromise of the secret value. The secret value may
be stored also for flexibility. If one wants to keep his public key unchanged but with an
updated identifier, which corresponding to a new partial private key, from his previous
identifier, then he needs the current secret value to compute the new private key. The
Secret- Value-Extract oracle provides the adversary the capability to compromise the secret
value.
The second difference is that in Game 2 the adversary can access the Public-Key-Replace
oracle and the strong decryption oracle Decryptf (this formulation has been adopted in a
number of other works [118, 68, 3]), while, in the Al-Riyami-Patersori's model the Public-
Key-Replace oracle is disallowed and the decryption oracle Decrypt? is used instead. A
trivial Type-Il attack applicable in the enhanced model on the Al-Riyami-Paterson CL-
PKE [6] (see Section 4.5.4) shows that the new formulation defines a stronger model of
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Type-Il adversaries in theory.
On the relation of different security formulations, the Type-I (resp. Type-Il) security
is certainly stronger than the Type-I" and Type-I'< (resp. Type-Ilf ) security. Because of
the behavior of DecryptC , the Type-IC security is at least as strong as the Type-I P one.
The Type-I'< attack on the Al-Riyami-Paterson PKE [6] shows that the Type-IC security
is indeed stronger than Type-If'.
Recently, Au et al. [3] made an interesting observation that a malicious KGC may
generate the master public/secret key pair in a special way to help it decrypt some user's
ciphertext. And they presented such an attack against the Al-Riyami-Paterson CL-PKE [5].
The attack shows that it is meaningful to let a Type-If adversary generate the master keys
in Game 2. The enhanced Type-II adversary of three PPT algorithm (AIl-I, AIl-2, AIl-3)
launches the following Game 2' with a challenger, where s', s are some state information.
Table 4.3: CL-IND-PKE Game 2'
Type-II+ Adversarial
1. (s, Mpr, Msr)+-AIl-I (1k).
2. (s', ID*, mo, ml)+-A~~~(s, Mpr, Msr).
3. b+-{O, I}, r+-IRCL(Mpr).
4. C*+-CL.Encrypt(Mpr, ID*, PI D*,mb; r).
5. b'+-A~C!3(s', Mpr, Msr, C*, ID*, PI D*,mo, ml)'
However, it remains an open question that a secure CL-PKE against both Type-I and
Type-Il" adversaries is constructible in the standard model. We also note that in Game
2' the adversary generates the master public key, so a question arises that who controls
any random oracle included in the master public key in the random oracle model. In [3], a
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generic CL- PKE scheme is claimed to be secure in this strong model. However, no proof is
given and it is unclear who (the challenger or the adversary) controls the random oracles.
As the random oracle model implies that the adversary cannot make use of any special
structure of a hash function in the attack. This suggests that the adversary should choose
"standard" cryptographic hash functions or should demonstrate that a chosen hash function
has no hidden trapdoors in practice.
On the other hand, Au et ai.'s attack can be defeated by requiring the KGC to demon-
strate the randomness of the choice of parameters. In particular, the attack against the
Al-Riyami-Paterson CL-PKE [5] requires the adversary to choose from the used group a
specific generator P, which supposes to be random. For its innocence the KGC can show a
witness of the randomness of the generator such as a public string S with P = H (S) for a
cryptographic hash function H. One can refer to IEEE P1363 and ANSI X9.62 standards
for examples of methods used to generate verifiably random parameters.
In this chapter, we adopt the enhanced Al-Riyami-Paterson formulation (the Type-
I+Type-II security model) and conduct the security analysis of the proposed schemes in
the random oracle model. However, the security reductions with random oracles cannot
guarantee that when the schemes are instantiated in practice with hash functions in place
of random oracles, the same security strength can be maintained. In fact it looks unwise to
suggest such strong security of the presented schemes for any practical purpose.
4.3 Some Related Work
Since the CL-PKE notion was introduced, there have been a number of generic or concrete
constructions. In [2], Al-Riyami presented three general constructions of CL-PKE. They
are the sequential or parallel composition of a secure IBE with a secure PKE to encrypt
a message m. Yum and Lee proposed yet another generic construction but by double-
encryption with two secure IBEs [165].
85
CL-Gen1: IBE.Encrypt(Mpt, IDA, PKE.Encrypt(PA, m))
CL-Gen2: PKE.Encrypt(PA, IBE.Encrypt(Mpt, IDA, m))
CL-Gen3: (PKE.Encrypt(PA, m'), IBE.Encrypt(Mpt, IDA, m ED m'))
CL-Gen4: IBE.Encrypt(Mpt, IDA, IBE.EncrYPt(M~e'IDA, m))
In CL-Gen3, m' is a random message from the message space. To decrypt the message m,
PKE.Decrypt and IBE.Decrypt are applied on the two parts of the ciphertext respectively
to recover m' and m ED m', and so finally m is recovered. In CL-Gen4, the user generates
the master public/secret pair (M~t, M~e) and M~t is treated as the user's public key.
Unfortunately, none of those generic constructions is secure in the sense of the CL-IND-
CCA2 security. CL-Gen1 is insecure against a Type-lIP adversary which given the challenge
ciphertext C* on message tru, generates C'=IBE.Encrypt(Mpe, ID*, IBE.Decrypt(Alpe, ID*,
D I D*,C*)) and queries the DecryptP oracle on (ID*,C') to recover the challenge message
nu; Note that the Type-Iff adversary can compute the partial key D ID* of ID* and C' =I- C*
because IBE.Encrypt is a probabilistic algorithm. Similarly, CL-Gen4 is insecure against
Type-lIP adversaries and CL-Gen2 is vulnerable to a Type-IP adversary. Both Type-IP
and Type-lIP adversaries can break CL-Gen3. It appears a simple solution that links the
message with the message recipient's identifier and public key and the randomness used in
both encryptions can rescue the above constructions [118]. In [20], Bentahar et ol. extended
the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) to the CL-PKE setting and proposed a generic
construction from an IBE and a PKE. There have been a couple of general constructions in
the standard model as well [70, 99]. All of these general constructions are not very efficient
regarding both computation and communication cost. They all need double-encryption with
either two IBEs or one IBE with a PKE, and the ciphertext of these schemes are longer
than the used IBE or PKE's.
In [118], Libert and Quisquater showed that with slight modification the second Fujisaki-
Okamoto conversion [74] can convert a CL-IND-CPA secure CL-PKE to a CL-IND-CCA2
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secure scheme. In the next section we will demonstrate a similar result on the first Fujisaki-
Okamoto conversion [73].
On the concrete construction, In [5] Al-Riyami and Paterson presented a CL-PKE,
referred to as AP-CL-PKE1, based on a stronger assumption than BDH. The CL.Encrypt
algorithm of the scheme requires three pairing operations which are very costly. Moreover,
the scheme is vulnerable to the malicious KGC's attack [3], which in turn requires a verifiable
random parameter generation process. In [6], an improved scheme referred to as AP-CL-
PKE2 was constructed by integrating the BF-IBE with the EIGamal encryption enhanced
by the Fujisaki-Okamotom conversion. However, as pointed out in [168], the scheme is
insecure against Type-IO adversaries. A trivial Type-II attack can break the scheme as
well (see Section 4.5.4)1. In [150, 118], two constructions based on the SK-IBE [46] were
presented. These schemes rely on a stronger f-BDHI assumption than BDH.
Several other works are worth mentioning. In [29], the authors proposed a CL-PKE-like
scheme without using pairing, which is more efficient than those schemes based on pairings.
However, the scheme requires a user to execute CL.PartialKey first before generating the
public key. This makes it more like a self-certified public key scheme [76] instead of CL-
PKE. Moreover, the scheme unlike other CL-PKE proposals based on IBEs cannot work
compatibly with exiting IBEs, i.e. the scheme cannot degenerate smoothly to an IBE.
Gentry proposed a closely related security notion "Certificate-Based Encryption" (CBE)
and a concrete CBE scheme [81]. The CBE security notion shares very much the similarity
with CL-PKE. Al-Riyami and Paterson had attempted to construct CBE from CL-PKE by
giving a specific conversion [6]. Recently, Liu et at. introduced a new notion "self-generated-
certificate" PKE [104], which intends to address the so-called Denial-of-Decryption (DoD)
attack. The authors considered that the adversary may replace an entity's public key with
1In 2005, we independently presented a CL-PKE [46], which shares similarity with AP-CL-PKE2. But
the scheme is immune to the attacks against AP-CL-PKE2. A slight variant of the scheme is to be presented
in Section 4.5.
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a false one to prevent the entity from decrypting messages encrypted under the false public
key. However, the threat of the DoD attack is arguable and their proposal does not solve the
problem either. In particular, their solution requires an entity to publish a public encryption
key with a signature generated with its certificateless private signature key. The sender first
verifies the recipient's certificateless signature on the claimed public encryption key. Only if
the signature is valid, the public key is used to encrypt messages to the recipient. But, the
authors did not consider that the adversary may use an expired or revoked public encryption
key, which has a publicly known valid signature, to launch the DoD attack. To address this
issue, a public key may have to be accompanied by an expiry time and a revocation list of
revoked public keys has to be maintained securely. However, it appears that with this extra
management, the system will end up very much like a PKI.
4.4 Heuristic Approach to CL-PKE
Now we explain our heuristic approach to constructing CL-PKE. This approach is based
on a simple observation of some existing IBEs and PKEs.
The encryption schemes based on the DH assumption or its variants essentially take the
same general approach as the EIGamal encryption [72] as follows:
PKE ciphtext=(DH token(s), Hiding(message; DH value))
The encrypter generates one or more DH tokens and uses the DH token(s) and the de-
crypter's public key to compute the DH value. Then the DH value is used as the secret
to hide messages in a message hiding algorithm. The decrypter uses its private key and
the DH token(s) in the ciphertext to compute the DH value and so to recover the conveyed
message.
As shown in Chapter 3, most of the existing IBE schemes [19, 48, 9] make use of pairing
and base their security on the BDH assumption or its variants which are the descendants of
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the DH assumption. This explains that those lBE encryptions essentially adopts the same
approach as those PKEs based on the DR assumption:
lBE ciphtext=(pairing-DH token(s), Riding(message; pairing-DR value))
The encrypter first computes one or more tokens which we call the pairing-DH tokens. Then
the encrypter computes a value (we call it the pairing-DH value) which can be computed
through pairings by the decrypter with its private key, the pairing-DR token(s) and possibly
the system parameters as well. The pairing-DR value is used as the secret to hide the
message by the encrypter in a message hiding algorithm and to recover the conveyed message
by the decrypter.
We can see that pairing-based lBEs and DR-based PKEs have a common structure and
some message hiding algorithms such as the data encapsulation mechanism and the Fujisaki-
Okamoto transformation can be used in both the PKE [65, 73, 74] and the lBE [20, 114, 167].
Based on the above observation, it seems natural to use a hash function to integrate a secure
lBE scheme with a secure PKE scheme to achieve a secure CL-PKE scheme, which can be
presented as follows:
CL-PKE ciphtext= (PKE.DR-tokens(s), lBE.pairing-DH token(s),
Hiding' (message; H(DR value, pairing-DR value)))
where H is a hash function. When the PKE.DH-token(s) and lBE.pairing-DR token(s)
have tokens that can be generated in the same way, then one token generated with the
same randomness can be used instead. The message hiding algorithm might need to be
slightly modified as the input secret value is no longer a DR or pairing-DR value but a hash
value. And if those DH or pairing-DR values are only used in the hash functions in the
Hiding algorithm then H is unnecessary.
An intuitive view on the security of the above construction as a CL-PKE2 is that to
2The idea of using hash function to integrate an lBE with a PKE to construct a CL-PKE was first
proposed and demonstrated in work [46J.
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recover the message, one has to obtain the hash on the DR value and the pairing-DH
value which in turn requires one to know both values. While, a Type-I adversary cannot
compute the pairing-DH value if the underlying IBE is secure and a Type-II adversary
cannot compute the DR value if the underlying PKE is secure. Similarly, one can construct
CL-KEM with the same approach.
We mention that this approach is only based on the heuristic observation. A CL-PKE
or CL-KEM constructed with this approach might not be necessarily secure in the model
defined in Section 4.2. On the other hand, following this approach that using hash function
on the DR and the pairing-DR values to tightly integrate an IBE with a PKE, we indeed
are able to construct highly efficient and secure CL-PKEs. In the following part, we will
present three concrete CL-PKEs constructed in this way.
4.5 CL-PKEI
In this section, we present a CL-PKE which using a hash function integrates the BF-IBE
with the ElGamal-like PKE enhanced with the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [73]. A slightly
simpler version of the scheme, which strictly follows the general approach in Section 4.4,
was first shown in an early draft of the work [46]. Here for the ease of the security analysis,
we will adopt a generic construction which introduces minor extra computation overhead.
4.5.1 A Generic Conversion
Fujisaki and Okamoto [73] proposed a generic conversion to transform a weak PKE to a
strongly secure PKE. Here we demonstrate that a slightly modified conversion can also be
applied in the CL-PKE setting to convert a CL-OW-CPA secure CL-PKE to a CL-IND-
CCA2 secure CL-PKE.
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Let II be a CL-PKE scheme with the encryption algorithm E and the decryption algo-
rithm'D. Define a CL-PKE scheme II with the encryption algorithm E as
where
and other algorithms essentially the same as II.
II shares the same parameters with II except M pr , the master public system parameters
of II which includes Ills master public system parameters M pr and two extra hash functions
Gland G2 defined as follows:
G1 : Mn(Mpr) x Mn(Mpr) x [Il, 1}* x IP'n(Mpr) ~ lRn(Mpr)
G2 : Mn(Mpr) ~ Mn(Mpr)
Theorem 4.5.1. Suppose II is a ,-uniform CL-PKE secure scheme against CL-OW-CPA
attacks, then II is a CL-IND-CCA2 scheme. More specifically, suppose that a Type-I (resp.
Type-II) CL-IND-CCA2 adversary A has advantage E(k) against II with running time t(k),
making ao decryption queries and qc, < 2lMn (Mpd l and qC2 random oracle queries on G1
and G2 respectively. Then there exists a Type-I (resp. Type-II) CL-OW-CPA adversary B
with advantage
over II in running time
where i£ is the cost of E.
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Proof: W~show how to make use of Type-I (resp. Type-II) CL-IND-CCA2 adversary
A against II to construct a Type-I (resp. Type-II) CL-OW-CPA adversary B again II.
The challenger T starts a Type-I (resp. Type-Il) CL-OW-CPA game by passing B the
master public key M pe and providing with the oracle access including the possible random
oracles, Public-Key-Broadcast, Public-Key-Replace, Secret- Value-Extract and for Type-I B
with Partial-Private-Key-Extract as well. In the Type-II game, T also gives !lIse to B.
B forwards Mpe with C1 and C2 as the master public key Mpe of II to A where C 1 and
C2 are two random oracles controlled by B. In the Type-II game, B also passes !lIse to A.
B provides A with the oracle access as follows, and for simplicity of presentation we assume
that A will abide by the rules defined in the models in Section 4.2.
• B forwards to its CL-OW-CPA challenger T the queries on oracles including Public-
Key-Broadcast, Secret- Value-Extract, Public-Key-Replace, and for Type-I T Partial-
Private-Key-Extract as well, and relays the answers from the challenger to A.
• B forwards to its challenger T the queries on the possible random oracles provided by
the challenger and relays the answers to A.
• C 1(mi, ai, 1Di, Pd: To respond to these queries B maintains a list «r Each entry
in the list is a tuple of the form (mi, ai, 1Di, Pi, ri, cf, C~) indexed by (mi, a.; 1Di, Pd·
To respond to a query, B does the following operations:
If on ciist a tuple indexed by irtu, ai, 1Di, Pd exists, then B responds with the
corresponding rio
Otherwise,
* B randomly chooses a string r, E lRn(Mpe).
* B computes cf = £(Mpe, 1Di, Pi, ai; ri) and C~ = G2(ai) EB ttu,
* B inserts a new tuple (mi, ai, 1Di, Pi, rt- cf, C~) into the list and responds to
A with rio
• C2(a i): To respond to these queries B maintains a list «r Each entry in the lis~ is
a tuple of the form (ai, hi) indexed by ai. To respond to a query, B does the followmg
operations:
_ If on the list there is a tuple indexed by ai, then B responds with the correspond-
ing lu.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses a string hi E M n (Mpe) and inserts a new tuple
(ai, hi) into the list. It responds to A with hi·
• Decrypt ' (IDi, Ci): B takes the following steps to respond to the query:
B queries its challenger the current public key Pi associated with 1Di by issuing
Public- K ey-Broadcast(1Di)'
B parses C, as (CLC~) and searches ciist to find tuples (*,*, I Di , Pi,*,CLC2)·
and
92
- If no such a tuple is found, then a outputs 1-.
If more than one tuple is found, then a outputs .L,
- a outputs m; in the only found tuple .
• Challenge: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs identity 10* and two
messages ma, ml on which it wishes to be challenged.
a queries T with the Public-Key-Broadcast(10*) to get the current public key
P* associated with 10*.
a forwards 10* as the challenge ID to T and gets the challenge ciphertext as Ci·
a randomly samples C2 E MI IT(Mpr) and replies A with C* = (Ci, C2) as the
challenge ciphertext in the CL-IND-CCA2 game.
• Guess: Once A outputs its guess b'. a randomly chooses a a from Giist or G~ist and
outputs a as the answer of the CL-OW-CPA game.
Now we analyse a's probability of outputting the correct response a to T. We define
two events.
• Event 1 is that in the game A queries G 1(*, V( Mpr, 10*, P*, S*,Ci),10*, P*) or
G2(V(Mpr, 10*, P*, S*, Ci)) where S* is the private key associated with 1D* when the
challenge is issued.
• Event 2 is that in the game A differentiates a from a real world before Event 1
happens.
Now we look at the possibility that C* = (Ci, C2) is a valid ciphertext of ttu, for
b E {O, I}. For C* to be a valid challenge ciphertext, it is required that
V(Mpr, 10*, P*, S*, Cn = a'
£(Mpr, 10*, P*, a'; Gl (mb' a', 1D*, P*)) = Ci·
As C2is randomly sampled from MI IT (Mpr), C2is valid for ma or ml with equal proba-
bility. And as a' is randomly sampled by T and G1 is a random oracle, Ci is valid for ma
or ml with equal probability as well. Hence, given C*, A either finds that C* is not a valid
ciphertext for either ma or ml, or (C* is a valid ciphertext for either ma or ml with equal
probability) to win the game, outputs b if C* is a valid ciphertext for mi;
Here we conceptually force the adversary A to immediately output a random b' E {O, 1}
if it finds that C* is an invalid challenge ciphertext. This change does not affect A's chance
of winning the game. As Gl and G2 are random oracles,
Pr[A win IEvent 1] = 1/2.
Pr[A wins]
Pr[A wins]
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Then we have that
Pr[A winsllivent 1] Pr[Event 1] + Pr[A winslEvent 1] Pr[Event 1]
< Pr[Event 1] + ~(1 - Pr[Event 1]) = ~ + ~ Pr[Event 1].
> Pr[A winslEvent 1] Pr[Event 1]
~(1 - Pr[Event 1]) = ~ - ~ Pr[Event 1].
So we have Pr[Event 1] > E(k). Now we estimate the probability of Event 2. In
the game, A will notice the difference between the simulation and the real world only if
B rejects a valid Decrypts query or A finds that C* is an invalid challenge ciphertext. As
argued above, the latter event happens only if Event 1 occurs. So we only investigate the
rejection of valid decryption query which occurs when
• Case 1. A queries Decrypts (IDi, (Ci, C~)) such that ci = £(Mpe, 1Di, Pi, (Ji; Gl (mi, (Ji,
1Di, Pi)) and C~ = G2((Ji) EB tn; without querying G1(mi, (Ji, 1Di, Pi) where Pi is the
public key currently associated with 1Di, or
• Case 2. A queries Decrypts (IDi, (CL C~)) such that there are at least two tuples
(ma,(Ja,IDi, Pi,ra,CL C~) and (mb,(Jb,IDi,Pi,rb,CLC~)in «r: First this case
cannot happen if (Ja = (Jb; otherwise m.; = G2((Ja) EB C~ = G2((Jb) EB C2 = mb, and
(ma, o«, 1Di, Pi) uniquely defines a tuple in Giist. Hence Case 2 happens only if (Ja =I=- (Jb
which implies ci = £(Mpe, 1Di, Pi, (Ja; ra) = £(Mpe, 1Di, Pi, (Jb; Tb)'
Case 1 happens with probability at most "( because E is -y-uniforrn and Gl is truly
random so G 1(mi, ai, 1Di, Pi) is valid for (Mpe, 1Di, Pi, at, cD with probability at most "t-
Now we consider the probability of Case 2. Because E is -y-uniforrn and G1 is truly
random so one query G1(mb, (Jb, 1Di, Pi) is valid for (Mpe, 1Di, Pi, os, cD with probability
at most "( where ci is determined by ci = £(Mpe, 1Di, Pi, (Ja; ra). Note that for a fixed C~
there are 2IMn(Mpt)1 pairs of (mb, (Jb)' For so, queries 'sc, < 2IMn(Mpdl), Case 2 happens
with probability at most 1 - (1 - "()qCl.
And if Case 1 happens, Case 2 won't happen. It comes that
Overall, we have that
AdvB(k)
o
In Section 4.5.4, we will see that including the message recipient's identifier and public
key in Gl is necessary for the construction to work in general.
9-1
4.5.2 The Concrete Scheme
The CL-PKE1 scheme is based on BF-IBE, a full domain hash IBE with pairing. The
scheme consists of following algorithms:
CL.Gen(lk ) . On input 1k , the algorithm works as follows.
1. Generate three cyclic groups G1 , G2 and Gt of prime order p, an isomorphism 'ljJ from
G2 to G}, and a bilinear pairing map e : G1 x G2 ---+ Gt . Pick a random generator
P2 E G2 and set PI = 'ljJ(P2). Note that the implementation of the scheme does not
need the isomorphism 'ljJ, hence PI can be a random generator of G 1.
2. Pick a random s E Zp and compute Ppub = sP1.
3. Pick four cryptographic hash functions:
HI : {a, 1}* ---+ G2,
H 2 : G t x G1 ---+ {a, I}",
H 3 : {O, I}n X {O, I}n X {O, I}* x G1 ---+ Zp,
H4 : {a, l}n ---+ {a, ij-,
for some integer n > 0.
4. Output the master public key M pr = (G1 , G2, Gil p, E, 'ljJ, n, PI, P2, Ppub, HI, H 2,
H3 , H4 ) and the master secret key Msr = s.
The message space is M = {a, I}", the ciphertext space is C = Gl X {a, l ]" x {O,l}n
and the randomness space is IR = {O, I} n .
CL.PartiaIKey(Msr, Mpr, IDA). Given a string IDA E {O,l}* of entity A, Mpr and Msr,
the algorithm computes QA = H1(IDA) E G2, DA = SQA and returns DA·
CL.SecretVal(Mpr, IDA)' Given a string IDA and Mpr, the algorithm outputs a random
XA E Zp.
CL.PrivateKey(Mpr, D A, XA)' Given Mpr, D A and XA, the algorithm outputs SA
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CL.PublicKey(Mpt , X A, IDA). Given Mpt and XA, the algorithm outputs PA = XAPI .
CL.Encrypt(Mpt , IDA, PA, m). Given a plaintext m E {o.ij-, the identity IDA of entity
A, the system parameters M pt and the public key PA of the entity, the following steps are
performed.
1. Pick a random a E {O, l ]" and compute r = H 3 (a , m, IDA, PA).
3. Set the ciphertext to C = (rPI , a EB H2(~, f), m EB H4(a)).
CL.Decrypt(Mpb IDA, PA, SA, C). Given a ciphertext C = (U, V, W) E C, the private key
SA = (DA, XA), the identifier IDA and M pt , the algorithm takes the following steps:
3. If U i= r' PI, output -1, else return m' as the plaintext.
4.5.3 Security Analysis of CL-PKEI
To prove the security of CL-PKE1, we will first prove that the following Basic-CL-PKE1 is
CL-OW-CPA secure, then apply Theorem 4.5.1 to obtain the security result.
Basic-CL-PKE1 shares most of the algorithms with CL-PKE1 except the following two
(the hash functions H3 and H4 in CL.Gen of CL-PKE1 are unnecessary in Basci-CL-
PKE1).
CL.Encrypt(Mpt , IDA, PA, m; r). Given a plaintext m E {O, l }", the identity IDA of entity
A, the system parameters Mpt and the public key PA of the entity, the following steps are
performed.
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2. Set the ciphertext to C = (rPI,mffi H2(~,f)).
CL.Decrypt(Mpt , IDA, PA, SA, C). Given a ciphertext C = (U, V), the private key SA =
(DA, XA), the identifier IDA and Mpt , the algorithm takes the following steps:
1. Compute ( = etu, DA) and f' = XAU.
2. Return m ' = V ffi H2((, f') as the plaintext.
Lemma 4.5.2. Basic-CL-PKEl is secure in the sense of CL-OW-CPA against Type-I ad-
versaries provided that HI and H 2 are modeled as random oracles and the BDJt!: assump-
. . . 2,2,2
tion is sound. Specifically, assume there exists a Type-I adversary A breaks Basic-CL-PKEl
with CL-OW-CPA attacks with advantage E(k), and in the attack A runs in time t(k) and
makes qn, and qH2 queries on HI and H2 respectively. Then there exists an algorithm B to
solve the BDJ!f,2,2 problem with advantage and time as follows:
BDHl:Adv 2,2,2
B
tB(k)
> (1 - q:;?) E( k )/ qH l'
< t(k) + O(qH2 . T),
where T is the time of a pairing.
Proof: Given a BDHt2,2 challenge (aP2, bP2, CP2) with pairing parameters. Algorithm
B simulates algorithm CL.Gen of Basic-CL-PKEI to create the master public key Mpt =
(GI, G2, Gt, p, e, 'l/J, n, PI, P2 , 'l/J(aP2), HI, H2) and sets the master secret key Mst = a which
B does not know. HI, H2 are random oracles controlled by B . Algorithm B passes Mpt to
A and randomly selects 1 < I < qn, and responds to queries as follows (for simplicity, we
assume that the adversary abides by the rules of the CL-OW-CPA game) .
• HI(IDi): B maintains a list Hiist of tuples (IDj, Qj, hj ) as explained below. The list
is initially empty. When A makes a query at a point IDi' B responds as follows:
- If IDi already appears on Hiist in a tuple (IDi' Qi, hi), then B responds with Qi.
Otherwise, if the query is on the I -th distinct ID, then B stores (IDI, bP2 , J..)
into the tuple list and responds with HI(IDI) = bP2·
Otherwise, B selects a random integer hi E Zp, computes Qi = hiP2, and stores
(IDi' Qi, hi) into the tuple list. B responds with HI (IDi) = Qi .
• Public-Key-Broadcast(IDi): B maintains a list p 1ist with tuples of (IDi' Ui, Xi)
and responds to the queries as follows:
- If a tuple exists for IDi' then B returns the corresponding Ui.
Otherwise, B randomly samples Xi E Zp and inserts a tuple (IDi' Xi PI ,Xi) into
the list and returns XiPI.
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• Public-Key-Repiace(ID1 , P): B replaces the tuple on p1ist for 1Di with a new tuple
(IDi, P, .1).
• Partiai-Private-Key-Extract(IDd: B first searches Hiist for the tuple with 1Di. If
no such a tuple is found, then HI (IDi) is queried. If in the found tuple hi = 1-, then
B aborts the game. Otherwise, B returns hi aP2 .
• Secret-Value-Extractf jp.): B searches p1ist for 1Di, if no tuple is found, then
Public-Key-Broadcast(IDi) is queried first. B returns Xi found on p 1ist with 1Di.
• H2(Ki, Fi): To respond to the query, B maintains a list H~ist with tuples of the form
(Ki , Fi, (i). On the query, B does the following operations:
- If a tuple (Ki , Fi, (d is on the list, then B responds with (i.
- Otherwise, B randomly chooses (i E {a, l }" and adds the tuple (Ki, Fi, (i) to the
list. It responds to A with (i .
• Challenge: Once A decides that Phase 1 of the game is over, it outputs ID* on which
it wishes to be challenged. B queries HI(ID*) and if h* on Hiist for ID* is not .1, then
B aborts the game (for simplicity). Otherwise B randomly samples C2E {a, I}" and
returns C* = ('lj;(CP2), C2) as the challenge ciphertext. Note that the plaintext m* of
the C* is
m* = C~ tf) H2(e('l/J(cP2), abP2) , cP*)
where P* is the current public key on p 1ist for ID* .
• Guess: Once A decides Phase 2 of the game is over, it outputs m'. B does the
following to respond to the BDH challenge.
- B computes (* = m' tf) C2·
- B goes through H~ist to find tuples with (Ki, Fi, (*) with e(Fi, P2) = e(P*, cP2)·
- If no such a tuple or more than one tuple is found, B fails the game.
- B returns K; from the found tuple to the BDH challenge.
We define following events: Event 1 is that B aborts the game prematurely. Event 2
is that H2(e(PI, P2)abc, cP*) is queried at some point during the simulation above. ~vent
3 is that more than one tuple (Ki, Fi, (*) with e(Fi , P2) = e(P*, cP2) is found in H~tst.
Through a standard argument, we have
Pr[Event 1] > 1/an,
Pr[Event 2] > E(k)
Pr[Event 3] < qH2/2n
Overall we have
Adv~DH2,2,2(k)> Pr[Event 1/\ Event 2/\ Event 3] ~ (1- QH2/2n)E(k)/qHl'
o
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Lemma 4.5.3. Basic-CL-PKEl is secure in the sense of CL-OW-CPA against Type-II
adversaries provided that H 2 is modeled as random oracle and the DE!! assumption is
d S 'ft II 1,2,1soutui. pee: ca y, assume there exists a Type-II adversary A breaks Basic-CL-PKEl with
CL-OW-CPA attacks with advantage E(k), and in the attack A runs in time t(k) and gets
qp entity public keys. Then there exists an algorithm B to solve the Dnt 2 1 problem with
advantage and time as follows: 1 1
DH!'Adv 1,2,1
e
ts(k)
> E(k)/qp,
< t(k) + O(qH2 • T),
where T is the time of a pairing.
Proof: Given a DHt 21 challenge (aPI, bP2) with pairing parameters, algorithm B simulates, ,
algorithm CL.Gen of Basic-CL-PKEI to create the master public key Mpe = (G 1 , G2, Gt,
p, e, 'I/J, n, PI, P2, sP1 , HI, H 2) and sets the master secret key Mse = s which is randomly
sampled by B from Zp. HI is a hash function and H2 is a random oracle controlled by B .
Algorithm B passes Mpe with Mse to A and randomly selects 1 < I < qp and responds to
queries as follows (for simplicity, we assume that the adversary abides by the rules of the
CL-OW-CPA game).
• H2(Ki, Fi): To respond to the query, B maintains a list H~ist with tuples of the form
(Ki , Fi, (i). On the query, B does the following operations:
- If a tuple (Ki , Fi, (d is on the list, then B responds with (i.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses (i E {O, l}n and adds the tuple (Ki , Fi, (i) to the
list. It responds to A with (i .
• P'ublic-Key-Br-oadcastf Ip.}: B maintains a list p 1ist with tuples of (IDi' Ui, Xi)
and responds to the queries as follows:
- If a tuple exists for 1Di' then B returns the corresponding Ui .
Otherwise, if the query is on the I -th distinct ID, then B stores (I DI, aPI, .1.)
into the tuple list and responds with aPI.
Otherwise, B randomly samples Xi E Zp and inserts a tuple (IDi' Xi PI ,Xi) into
the list and returns X iP1 .
• Public-Key-Replacet D., P): B replaces the tuple on plist for 1Di with a new tuple
(IDi' P, .1.).
• Secret-Value-Extract (IDi): B searches p 1ist for 1Di' and if no tuple is found, then
Public-Key-Broadcast(IDi) is queried first. B returns Xi found on p hst with 1Di.
• Challenge:. Once A decides that Phase 1 of the game is over, it outputs ID* on which
it wishes to be challenged. B queries Public-Key-Broadcast(IDd and if U* =f aP1 on
p 1ist for ID*, then B aborts the game (for simplicity). B randomly sample C:; E {O, l ]"
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and returns C* = ('l/J(bP2) , C2) as the challenge ciphertext. Note that the plaintext
m* of the C* is
m* = C:; ffi H 2(e('l/J(bP2), sHI(ID*)), abPI).
• Guess: Once A decides Phase 2 of the game is over, it outputs m'. B computes
~* = m' ffi c,.:; and goes through H~ist to find a tuple of (e( bPI, sHI (ID*), Fi, (*) with
e(Fi, P2) = e(aPI, bP2). If no such a tuple is found, then B fails the game. Otherwise
B responds to the DR challenge with Fi,
Similar to Lemma 4.5.2 we define following events: Event 1 is that B aborts the game
prematurely. Event 2 is that H 2(e(bPI, sHI(ID*), abPI) is queried at some point during
the simulation above.
Through a standard argument, we have
Pr[Event 1] > 1/qp
Pr[Event 2] > E(k)
Overall we have
AdvgH 1,2(k) > Pr[Event 1/\ Event 2] = E(k)/qp.
o
Following from Theorem 4.5.1 and Lemma 4.5.2 and 4.5.3, we have the following security
result of CL-PKEl. Note that Basic-CL-PKE1 is 2~ -uniform.
Theorem 4.5.4. CL-PKEl is secure against Type-I adversary with CL-IND-CCA2 attacks
provided Hi (1 < i < 4) are modeled as random oracles and the BDIt!;,,2,2 assumption is
sound. CL-PKEl is secure against Type-II adversary with CL-IND-CCA2 attacks provided
Hi (2 < i < 4) are modeled as random oracles and the ou; 2 I assumption is sound.
, ,
Specifically, assume a Type-I adversary AI breaks CL-PKEl with CL-IND-CCA2 attack
with advantage E(k) in time t(k) and in the attack AI makes ao decryption queries and qi
queries on Hi for 1 < i < 4 and q3 < 2n , then there exists an algorithm BI to solve the
BDltf 22 problem with following advantage and time
, ,
BDH!:Adv 2,2,2(k) >BI -
tBI(k) <
where tc is the cost of Basic-CL-PKEl and r is the time of a pairing.
Assume a Type-II adversary AIl breaks CL-PKEl with CL-IND-CCA2 attack with ad-
vantage E( k) in time t(k) and in the attack AIl makes qp public key queries and qi queries
on Hi for 2 < i < 4 and q3 < 2n , then there exists an algorithm BII to solve the DItf,2,1
problem with following advantage and time
DB'!'Adv 1,2,1 (k) >BIl
tBIl(k) <
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4.5.4 On the AI-Riyami-Paterson's Second CL-PKE
Independent of our work [46], Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a CL-PKE [6], which we call
AP-CL-PKE2. The scheme shares most the algorithms with CL-PKEI except CL.Encrypt
and CL.Decrypt. And AP-CL-PKE2 uses the hash functions HI, H~, H~, H~, H4 where
HI, H4 are just as of CL-PKEI and H~, H~, H~ are defined as follows:
H~ : Gtx ~ {O, I}",
H~: GIX ~ {O, I}",
H~ : {O, l}n x {O, l}n ~ Zp,
AP-CL-PKE2's encryption and decryption algorithm are as follows:
CL.Encrypt(Mpe, IDA, PA, m). Given a plaintext m E {O, l }", the identity IDA of entity
A, the system parameters Mpe and the public key PA of the entity, the following steps are
performed.
1. Pick a random a E {O, l }" and compute r = H~(a, m).
3. Set the ciphertext to C = (rPI, a E9 H~(~) E9 H~(f), m E9 H4(a)).
CL.Decrypt(Mpe, IDA, PA, SA, C). Given a ciphertext C = (U, V, W) E C, the private key
SA = (DA, XA), the identifier IDA and Mpe, the algorithm takes the following steps:
1. Compute e= e(U,DA)' I' = XAU and a' = V E9 H~(e) E9 H~(f')·
2. Compute m' = W E9 H4(a') and r' = HHa', m').
3. If U =I=- r' PI, output .1, else return m' as the plaintext.
Though AP-CL-PKE2 bears the very similarity with CL-PKEl, the scheme suffers from
two attacks: a Type-IC attack and a Type-II attack.
An adversary A launches the Type-IC attack as follows:
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1. A randomly chooses ID* and two messages mo, mI, and passes them to the challenger
T to get the ciphertext C* = (U*, V*, W*) of ttu, for bE {O, I}.
2. A issues Secret- Value-Extract(ID*) to get the secret value X*.
3. A randomly chooses X' E Zp and issues Public-Key-Replace(ID*, X' PI)'
4. A generates a ciphertext C' = (U*, V* EB H~(X*U*) EB H~(X'U*), W*). Note that C'
is a valid ciphertext of mb for ID* with the public key X'Pl.
5. A issues DecryptC (ID*, C', X') to get the plaintext rtu, to win Game 1.
Note that in Al-Riyami-Paterson's CL-PKE formulation [6], the oracle Secret-Value-Extract
does not exist. But the attack still works by A first choosing X* E Zp and replacing ID*'s
public key with X* PI before issuing the challenge [168}. It is easy to see merely adding the
message recipient's identifier in H~ does not defend the attack.
An adversary A can launch a trivial Type-If attack as follows:
1. A issues Public-Key-Broadcast(ID*) to get the public key value P*.
2. A randomly chooses two messages mo, mb and passes ID* and the messages to the
challenger T to get the ciphertext C* = (U*, V*, W*) of ttu, for bE {O, I}.
3. A randomly chooses ID' and issues Public-Key-Replace(ID', P*).
4. A generates a ciphertext C' = (U*, V* EB H~(e) EB H~(~"), W*) with e= e(U*, DI D*)
and ~" = e(U*, DID') where D ID*,DID' are the partial keys of ID*, ID' respectively.
A can compute both values with the master secret key Mgt· Note that C' is a valid
ciphertext of ttu, for ID' with the public key P*.
5. A issues Decrypts (ID', C', X') to get the plaintext mb to win Game 2.
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Note that the Al-Riyami-Paterson's CL-PKE formulation [5, 6] does not consider this type
of attack. It is easy to find out that merely adding the message recipient's public key in H~
does not prevent the attack.
By applying Theorem 4.5.1 it is straightforward to prove that including the message
recipient's identifier and public key in H~ as CL-PKE1 does, the modified scheme is secure.
4.6 CL-PKE2
In this section, we construct a CL-PKE (referred to as CL-PKE2) strictly following the
heuristic approach in Section 4.4. The scheme is based on BBI-IBE [9], a commutative
blinding IBE.
4.6.1 The Scheme
CL-PKE2 consists of following algorithms:
CL.Gen(1k): On input 1k, the algorithm works as follows:
1. Generate three cyclic groups Gl, G2 and G t of prime order p and a bilinear pairing
map e:G 1 X G2 ~ G t . Pick random generator P2 E G2 and PI E Gl·
2. Randomly sample a, band c E Zp. Set Ql = aPI, Q2 = bPI, Q3 = CPl E G1, and
c. = aP2,Q2 = bP2,Q3 = cP2 E G2· Compute Vo = e(Ql,Q2) = e(PI,P2)ab.
3. Pick three cryptographic hash functions:
HI : {a, 1}* ~ Zp,
H2: G t X Gl ~ {0,1}n,
H3 : G t X Gl X {a, l }" x Gl X Gl ~ Zp,
for some integer n > 0.
4. Output the master public key Mpt = (Gl, G2, G t , p, e, n, PI, Ql, Q3, vo, HI, H2,
H3) and the master secret key Mst = (P2, a, b,c).
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The message space is MI = {O, l}n, the ciphertext space is C = {O, I}" x ((;1 X ((;1 X 'Zp
and the randomness space is IR = 'Zp.
CL.PartialKey(Msr, Mpr, IDA). Given a string IDA E {O, 1}* of entity A, !llpr and !lIst,
the algorithm randomly picks t E 'Zp and outputs
We note that P2 in Msr can be disclosed, in particular, on Type-1 pairings PI = P2.
Given M pr with P2, one can verify if DAis a signature on IDA.
CL.SecretVal(Mpt, IDA). Given a string IDA and Mpt, the algorithm returns a random
XA E 'Zp.
CL.PrivateKey(Mpr,DA,XA). Given Mpr, DA and XA, the algorithm outputs SA
CL.PublicKey(Mpt, XA, IDA). Given Mpr and XA, the algorithm outputs PA = XAP1 ·
CL.Encrypt(Mpt, IDA, PA, m). Given a plaintext m E MI, the identity IDA of entity A,
the system parameters Mpt and the public key PA of the entity, the following steps are
performed.
2. Compute ~ = va, f = rPA and Co = m EB H2(~, f)·
CL.Decrypt(Mpt, IDA, PA, SA, C). Given a ciphertext C = (Co, C1, C2, (7) E C, the pri-
vate key SA = (D A = (D 1 , D2), XA), the identifier IDA and Mpt, the algorithm takes the
following steps:
c! e(Cl,Dl) d f' - X C1. Compute I" = e(Cz,Dz) an - A 1·
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3. Compute m' = Co E9 H2 (e ,1') and return m' as the plaintext.
4.6.2 Security Analysis of CL-PKE2
Before we formally analyse the security of CL-PKE2, we generalise the BDH assumption as
follows:
Assumption 4.6.1. (General BDH) For a, b, c ER Zp, given (aPI, cPl, aP2, bP2) with
the pairing parameters, computing e(Pl, P2)abc is hard.
We note that if an efficient isomorphism 'ljJ : G2 ~ Gl exists, then the BDHi ,2,2 assump-
tion for i E {I, 2} implies the general BDH assumption.
CL-PKE2's security is summarised by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6.1. CL-PKE2 is secure against Type-I adversary with CL-IND-CCA2 attacks
provided Hi (1 < i < 3) are modeled as random oracles and the general BDH assumption is
sound. CL-PKE2 is secure against Type-II adversary with CL-IND-CCA2 attacks provided
Hi (i = 2,3) are modeled as random oracles and the DHl,l,l assumption is sound.
Specifically, assume a Type-I adversary AI breaks CL-PKE2 with CL-IND-CCA2 attack
with advantage E(k) in time t(k) and in the attack AI makes qo decryption queries and qi
queries on Hi for 1 < i < 3, then there exists an algorithm 81 to solve the general BDH
problem with following advantage and time
where ti for i = 1,2,3 is the cost of operation in GIl G2, G t respectively.
Assume a Type-II adversary AlI breaks CL-PKE2 with CL-IND-CCA2 attack with ad-
vantage E(k) in time t(k), and in the attack AlI makes qp public key queries and qi queries
on Hi for i = 2,3, then there exists an algorithm 8lI to solve the DHl,l,l problem with
following advantage and time
Proof: We first deal with the Type-I adversary AI. Given a general BDH problem
(PI, aPI, i I'», P2, aP2, bP2), we can construct an algorithm 81 to compute e(Pl' P2) abr by
making use of AI as a subroutine. 81 randomly chooses 1 < I < ql and starts to simulate
the CL-IND-CCA2 Game 1 as follows:
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• CL.Gen: 8] simulates CL.Gen as follows:
Set Ql = aPI, Ql = aP2, Q2 = bP2,
Randomly sample u, h E 'Zp and set c = h - ua mod p and compute Q3
hP1 - ua.P, = cP1 and Q3 = hP2 - uaP2 = cP2.
Compute Vo = e(aP1 , bP2) = e(P1 , P2)ab.
Output the master public key Jlvlpt = (G 1, G2, Gt, p, e, n, PI, Ql, Q3. vo, HI,
H2, H3) where Hi are random oracles controlled by 8] and set the master secret
key M st = (P2 , a, b, c).
• HI(IDd: 8] maintains a list Hiist of tuples (IDj,uj) as explained below. The list is
initially empty. When A] makes a query on 1Di' 8[ responds as follows:
- If 1Di already appears on Hiist in a tuple (IDi' Ui), then 8] responds with Ui.
- Otherwise, if the query is on the I-th distinct ID, then 8[ stores (ID], u) into
the tuple list and responds with u.
- Otherwise, 8] selects a random integer ii; E 'Zp and stores (IDi' Ui) into the tuple
list. 8] responds with Ui.
• Public-Key-Broadcastf Ip.): 8 1 maintains a list plist with tuples of the form
(IDi' Ui, Xi) and responds to the queries as follows:
- If a tuple exists for 1Di' then 8[ returns the corresponding Ui,
Otherwise, 8[ randomly samples Xi E 'Zp and inserts a tuple (IDi' Xi PI , Xi) into
p1ist and returns X iP1 .
• P'ubtic-Key-Replacef Ili., P): 8] replaces the tuple on plist for 1Di with a new tuple
(IDi' P, 1-).
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract(IDi): 8[ responds to the query as follows
8] first searches Hi ist for the tuple with 1Di. If no such a tuple is found, then
HdIDd is queried. Assume Ui is on the found tuple in Hiist for 1Di.
If Ui = U, 8 [ aborts the game.
- 8] randomly samples ti E 'Zp and sets ti = ti - b/(Ui - u) and computes
8[ outputs (Db D 2 ) as the answer.
• Secret-Value-Extractf Ip.}: 81 searches p 1ist for 1Di' and if no tuple is found, then
Public-Key-Broadcast(IDi) is queried first. 8] returns Xi found on p1ist with 1Di·
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• H2(Ki, Fi): To respond to the query, BI maintains a list H~ist with tuples of the form
(Ki , Fi, (i). On the query, BI does the following operations:
- If a tuple (Ki , Fi, (i) is on the list, then BI responds with (i.
- Otherwise, BI randomly chooses (i E {O,l}n and adds the tuple (Ki , Fi , (i) to
the list. It responds to AI with (i.
• H3(Ki, r; ci: Cf, C~)~ T~ re~pond to the query, BI maintains a list H~ist with tuples
of the form (Ki, Fi' Co, C1, C2,~i). On the query, BI does the following operations:
If a tuple (Ki , Fi , C6, cL C~, ~i) is on the list, then BI responds with ~i.
Otherwise, BI randomly chooses ~i E Zp and adds the tuple (Ki , Fi , ci, C~, C~, ~i)
to the list. It responds to AI with ~i.
• Decryptf (IDi' Ci ) : BI takes the following steps to respond to the query
BI queries the current public key Pi associated with 1Di by Publie-Key-Broadeast(IDi).
B~ parses c. as (C6, Cf, C~, O"i) and searches H~ist to find tuples uc; r; ci, cL
C2,~i) and puts them into set So.
If So is empty, then BI outputs 1-.
For each tuple in So,
* Compute r, = O"i - ~i mod p.
* If ci = riP!' C~ = riQ3 + riHI (IDi)QI, tc, = V~i and r; riPi, then
BI returns Co EB H2(Ki, Fi ).
- If no tuple is found to pass the above check, then BI outputs 1-.
• Challenge: Once AI decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs identity ID* and two
messages rna, ml on which it wishes to be challenged.
- If HI (ID*) =I u, then BI aborts the game.
- BI randomly samples 0"* E Zp and Co E {O, I} ". BI sets Ci = r PI and C2
rePI + ruaP, = hr Pl.
BI returns C* = (Co, Ci, C2,0"*) as the challenge ciphertext .
• Guess: Once AI outputs its guess b'. BI randomly chooses a K, from H~ist or H~ist
and outputs K, as the answer of the general BDH problem.
Now we analyse BI's probability of outputting the correct answer to the general BDH
problem. We define three events. Event 1 is that BI aborts the game prematurely
which could happen when ID* =I IDI or HI(IDi) = u with 1Di =I IDI. Event 2 is that
H2(e(PI, P2)abr, *) or H3(e(PI, P2)abr, *, *, *, *) is queried at some point during the simu-
lation above. Event 3 is that in the game AI differentiates BI from a real world before
Event 2 happens.
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Through a standard argument, we have
Pr[Event 1] > (1 - qdp)ql/ql
Pr[Event 2] > E(k)
Pr[Event 3] > (1 - l/p)qD
Overall we have
Adv~?H(k) > 1 Pr[Event 1/\ 112/\ Event 3] = (1 - ql/p)q1E(k) (1 _ l/p)qD.
q2 + q3 ql (q2 + q3)
Now we deal with the Type-Il adversary All. Given a DR problem (PI, xP1 , yPI), we
can construct an algorithm BII to compute xyP1 by making use of All as a subroutine.
BII randomly chooses 1 < I < qp and starts to simulate the CL-IND-CCA2 Game 2 as
follows:
• CL.Gen: BII simulates CL.Gen as follows:
Randomly sample a, b,c E Zp and a generator P2 E G2
Set Ql = aPl, (h = aP2, Q2 = bPI, Q2 = bP2, Q3 = cP1 , Q3 = CP2,
Compute Vo = e(aP1, bP2) = e(P1, P2)ab.
Output the master public key M pt = (G 1, G2, Gt, p, e. ti, PI, Ql, Q3, vo, HI,
H2, H3) where HI is a hash function and H2 and H3 are two random oracles
controlled by BII and set the master secret key Mst = (P2 , a, b,c).
Pass both M pt and M st to All .
• P'ublic-Key-Broadcastf Ib.}: BII maintains a list p list with tuples of the form
(IDi, Ui, Xi) and responds to the queries as follows:
- If a tuple exists for IDi, then BII returns the corresponding Vi.
- Otherwise, if the query is on the I-th distinct ID, then BII stores (ID], xP1 , 1-)
into the tuple list and responds with xPl .
- Otherwise, BII randomly samples Xi E Zp and inserts a tuple (IDi, XiPl, Xi)
into p list and returns XiPl .
• Secret-Value-Ext.ractf Ili.}: BII searches p list for IDi, and if no tuple is found, then
Public-Key-Broadcast(IDi) is queried first. BII returns Xi found on p list with IDi .
• H2(Ki, Fi): To respond to the query, BII maintains a list H~ist with tuples of the form
(Ki , Fi, (i)' On the query, BII does the following operations:
- If a tuple (Ki, Fi, (i) is on the list, then BII responds with (i·
Otherwise, BII randomly chooses (i E {O, l }" and adds the tuple (Ki, Fi, (i) to
the list. It responds to All with (i.
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• H3(Ki, Fi, ci, cL C~)~ To respond to the query, BII maintains a list H~ist with tuples
of the form (Ki , Fi , Co, CL C2,~i)' On the query, BII does the following operations:
- If a tuple (Ki, Fi ,Cb, cL C~, ~d is on the list, then BII responds with ~i'
- Otherwise, Bl] randomly chooses ~i E Zp and adds the tuple (K· F c: Ci c: c.)t, t, 0'1' 2,"-t
to the list. It responds to AII with ~i'
• Decryptf (IDi, Ci ) : BII takes the following steps to respond to the query
BII queries the public key Pi associated with 1Di by Public-Key-Broadcast(IDi)'
BII parses C, as (Cb,CLC~,Ui) and searches H~ist to find tuples (Ki,Fi,C~,ci,
c: C) h K e(q,Dt) . h h . 1k (. .)2' r.,i were i = e(C~,D2) WIt t e partia ey Di, D2 computed by algorithm
CL.PartialKey with Mst and 1Di, and puts them into set So·
If So is empty, then BII outputs ..1.
For each tuple in So,
* Compute ri = a; - ~i mod p.
* If ci = riPl, K; = V~i and F, = riPi, then BII returns COtBH2(Ki, Fi)' Note
that given ci, Dl, D~ and «; C~ is uniquely determined.
- If no tuple is found to pass the above check, then BII outputs 1.. .
• Challenge: Once A]] decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs identity ID* and two
messages mo, ml on which it wishes to be challenged.
_ BII queries Public-Key-Broadcast(ID*) and if U* =F xP1 on p 1ist for ID*, then
BII aborts the game.
BII randomly sample o" E Zp and Co E {O,l}n. BII sets C~ = xP1 and C2 =
eXPl + aHl(ID*)XP1'
BII returns C* = (Co,Ci,C2',u*) as the challenge ciphertext .
• Guess: Once AII outputs its guess b'. BII chooses Fi from H~ist or H~ist and outputs
K, as the answer of the DR problem.
Now we analyse BII'S probability of outputting the correct answer to the DR problem.
Similarly we define the following three events. Event 1 is that BII aborts the game prema-
turely. Event 2 is that H2(*, XyPl) or H3(*, XyPl, *, *, *) is queried at some point during
the simulation above. Event 3 is that in the game AII differentiates BII from a real world
before Event 2 happens.
Through a standard argument, we have
Pr[Event 1] > l/ql
Pr[Event 2] > E(k)
Pr[Event 3] > (1 - l/p)QD
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Overall we have
DH1 1 1 ( ) 1 E(k)Advs " k > Pr[Event 1/\ Event 2/\ Event 3] = (1 - l/p)QD.
II q2 + q3 qp(q2 + q3)
o
The check (e, C1 ) ? (vll' ,r'PI) in the CL.Decrypt algorithm is important as the re-
duction implicitly requires this operation when responding to the DecryptS queries.
We mention that, if a general DH problem is given as (Pl,XPl,yPl,P2,XP2), then
BII can make use of pairing as the decisional algorithm to test if e(Fi , P2) = e(y PI, XP2) to
find the correct response to the DH problem. In that case, the reduction is tighter as
Advg;Ineral DH(k) > Pr[Event 1/\ Event 2/\ Event 3] = E(k) (1 - l/p)QD.
qp
4.7 CL-PKE3
Shi et al. [150] and Libert and Quisquater [118] presented two CL-PKEs referred to as SLOS-
CL-PKE and LQ-CL-PKE respectively based on the same exponent inversion IBE: SK-IBE.
Here for completeness we present another scheme CL-PKE3 based on SK-IBE, which can
be faster than those two schemes when implemented with certain pairing parameters.
CL.Gen(lk). On input 1k, the algorithm works as follows.
1. Generate three cyclic groups G 1 , G2 and G t of prime order p, an isomorphism 'ljJ from
G2 to G 1 , and a bilinear pairing map e : G1 x G2 ---+ G t . Pick a random generator
P2 E G2and set PI = 'ljJ(P2)' Note that as SK-IBE, 'ljJ is only required in the proof.
In the implementation, one can randomly sample a generator PI from G 1.
2. Pick a random s E Z; and compute Ppub = sP1 ·
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3. Pick four cryptographic hash functions:
HI: {O, I} * --7 Z;,
H 2 : G t x G 1 --7 {O, l }",
H3 : {O, I}n X {O, I}n X {O, I}* x G1 --7 Zp,
H4 : {O, l}n --7 {O, l}n,
for some integer n > O.
4. Output the master public key Mpe = (G 1 , G2 , G t , p, e, 'ljJ, n, PI, P2 , Ppub, HI, H 2 ,
H3, H4) and the master secret key Mse = s.
The message space is M = {O, I}", the ciphertext space is C = Gi x {O,1}n X {O, I}"
and the randomness space is IR = {O, I} n .
CL.PartialKey(Mse, M pe, IDA). Given a string IDA E {O, 1}* of entity A, M pe and Mse,
the algorithm returns D A = s+HlhD
A
) P2 .
CL.SecretVal(Mpe, IDA). Given a string IDA and Mpe, the algorithm outputs a random
XA E Zp.
CL.PrivateKey(Mpe, DA, XA). Given Mpe, DA and XA, the algorithm outputs SA
CL.PublicKey(Mpe, XA, IDA). Given Mpeand XA, the algorithm computes QA = H 1(I DA)P1
+Ppub and outputs PA = XAQA·
CL.Encrypt(Mpe, IDA, PA, m). Given a plaintext m E {O, l}n, the identity IDA of entity
A, the system parameters Mpe and the public key PA of the entity, the following steps are
performed.
1. Pick a random 0' E {O, I}" and compute r = H3(0', m, IDA, PA).
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CL.Decrypt(Mpe, IDA, PA, SA, C). Given a ciphertext C = (U, V, W) E C, the private key
SA = (D A, XA), the identifier IDA and M pe, the algorithm takes the following steps:
3. Compute QA = H1(IDA)P1 + Ppub. If U ::I r'QA, output ..l, else return m' as the
plaintext.
The security analysis can adopt the same strategy as in CL-PKEI by first proving that
the basic version is CL-OW-CPA secure and then applying the modified Fujisaki-Okamoto
conversion. One can essentially follow the method in Theorem 3.5.3 to prove the basic
version against the Type-I adversary, and one can prove the security against the Type-II
adversary by following the method in Lemma 4.5.3.
Theorem 4.7.1. CL-PKE3 is secure against Type-I adversary with CL-IND-CCA2 attacks
provided Hi (1 < i < 4) are modeled as random oracles and the e-BCAAh,2 assumption is
sound. CL-PKEl is secure against Type-II adversary with CL-IND-CCA2 attacks provided
Hi (2 < i < 4) are modeled as random oracles and the DItf 21 assumption is sound.
, ,
Specifically, assume a Type-I adversary AI breaks CL-PKE3 with CL-IND-CCA2 attack
with advantage E(k) in time t(k) and in the attack AI makes qo decryption queries and q;
queries on Hi for 1 < i < 4 and q3 < 2n , then there exists an algorithm B I to solve the
(ql - 1)-BCA Ah,2 problem with following advantage and time
Adv~qI1-1)-BCAAh,2(k) > (1-q2/ 2n )E(k) (1 _ .1...)Q3qD
L.J q1 (q3+q4) 2n ,
tBI (k) < t(k) + O(q3 t£ + q2 T ) ,
where te is the cost of Basic-CL-PKE3 and T is the time of a pairing.
Assume a Type-II adversary All breaks CL-PKE3 with CL-IND-CCA2 attack with ad-
vantage E(k) in time t(k) and in the attack All makes qp public key queries and qi queries
on Hi for 2 < i < 4 and q3 < 2n , then there exists an algorithm BIl to solve the DItf,2,1
problem with following advantage and time
DH!'Adv 1,2,1 (k) >BII
tBII(k) <
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In [118], Libert and Quisquater did not present the security analysis of their scheme.
It appears that it is unlikely to prove the Libert-Quisquater scheme against the Type-II
adversary based on the DR assumption. Shi et al. analysed their scheme's security against
the Type-II adversary based on the BIDR assumption.
4.8 Efficiency Discussion and Comparison
We now assess the comparative efficiency of several concrete CL-PKE schemes. We only
consider schemes with proofs in a security model compatible with the one defined in Sec-
tion 4.2. As efficiency is the primary concern, we ignore any schemes designed in the
standard model because their performance is worse than those with random oracles.
Table 4.4 summarises the used IBE scheme, the type of key construction, computation
and ciphertext size of several CL-PKEs. The computation cost only counts the relevant
basic operations including Pairing, Multiplication in G1 and Exponentiation in G t .
Table 4.4: CL-PKE Efficiency Comparison
Schemes Based IBE Type of Key Construction Computation Ciphertext Size
AP-CL-PKE1 [5](1) BF-IBE Full Domain Hash =BF-IBE+2p l :l ) =BF-IBE
AP-CL-PKE2 [6](3) BF-IBE Full Domain Hash =BF-IBE+1M =BF-IBE
CL-PKE1 BF-IBE Full Domain Hash =BF-IBE+1M =BF-IBE
CL-PKE2 BBl-IBE Commutative Blinding =BB 1-IBE+1M =BBl-IBE
LQ-CL-PKE [118] SK-IBE Exponent Inversion =SK-IBE+1E =SK-IBE
SLOS-CL-PKE [150] SK-IBE Exponent Inversion =SK-IBE+1M(4) =SK-IBE
CL-PKE3 SK-IBE Exponent Inversion =SK-IBE+1M =SK-IBE
1. The scheme is enhanced by a verifiable random parameter generation algorithm.
2. The scheme requires two more pairings in the encryption algorithm than BF-IBE. The decryption
operation is of the same cost as BF-IBE.
3. The scheme is enhanced as suggested in Section 4.5.4.
4. The scheme requires the Weil pairing.
Among the schemes using the full domain hash IBEs, CL-PKE1 and AP-CL-PKE2 have
same performance and are faster than AP-CL-PKE1 in encryption. Note that AP-CL-PKE2
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employs the "exclusive-or" structure which make it suitable for security-mediated encryp-
tion where a security mediator can complete partial decryption [44]. Among the schemes
using the exponent inversion IBEs, LQ-CL-PKE and CL-PKE3 have similar computation
cost. CL-PKE3 can be slightly faster than LQ-CL-PKE with certain implementations where
the multiplication in G 1 is faster than the exponentiation in Gt, for example, using the Type-
3 pairing with the 128-bit security, the multiplication in G1 is three times faster than the
exponentiation in Gt according to Table 3.8. CL-PKE3 also has shorter public keys than
LQ-CL-PKE. SLOS-CL-PKE makes use of the Weil pairing. As the Weil pairing is slower
than the Tate pairing [87], SLOS-CL-PKE is slower than LQ-CL-PKE and CL-PKE3. Like
BB 1-IBE, CL-PKE2 enjoys security reductions based on weak complexity assumptions and
is efficient in encryption and relatively slow in decryption. CL-PKE3 and LQ-CL-PKE can
be easily modified to use the "exclusive-or" structure for security mediation.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we revisited various CL-PKE formulations and defined a strong security
notion for this type of encryption. By making a simple observation on some existing IBEs
and PKEs, we then proposed a heuristic approach to constructing efficient CL-PKEs from
IBEs. Following the approach, we presented three robust and efficient concrete CL-PKEs
using three types of IBE. As the schemes constructed from IBEs, they can smoothly degen-
erate to an IBE. Beside, we also demonstrated that a slightly modified Fujisaki-Okamoto
conversion can transform a weak CL-PKE to a CL-IND-CCA2 secure scheme.
Chapter 5
Identity-Based Key Agreement
Protocols
In this chapter we investigate another important cryptographic primitive: key agreement
protocols; in particular, we focus on the identity-based two-party key agreement protocols
constructed with pairings. We first enhanced the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model
to cover all the commonly required security properties. Then we formally analyse several
existing protocols including the enhanced Smart protocol, the enhanced Shim protocol and
the McCallugh-Barreto protocols in the enhanced model. The formal security analysis
can build confidence in the security of these schemes. Finally we present an identity-
based key agreement protocol with unilateral identity privacy which is suitable for certain
environments where identity privacy is important.
5.1 Introduction
Key Agreement Protocols (KAP) are the mechanisms by which two or more parties can
establish an agreed secret key over a network fully controlled by adversaries. Normally the
established key should vary on each execution (session) of the protocol. If in a protocol one
party is assured that no other party aside from the specifically identified party (or parties)
may gain access to the particular established secret key, then the key agreement protocol
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is said to provide (implicit) key authentication. A key agreement protocol which provides
mutual (implicit) key authentication between (or among) parties is called an Authenticated
Key agreement (AK). Although an AK provides key authentication, one party is not sure
whether the other party (or other parties) actually has possession of the established secret;
otherwise, the protocol is said to provide key confirmation. If a key agreement protocol
provides both key authentication and key confirmation, it is called an A uthenticated Key
agreement with key Confirmation (AKC) [127].
A number of security properties are generally believed to be necessary (or good) for an
AK and AKC.
1. Known session key security (KSK). Each execution of the protocol should result in
a unique secret session key. The compromise of one session key should not help
compromise the keys established in other sessions, e.g. parallel sessions, previous
sessions and future sessions.
2. Forward secrecy (FS). If the long-term keys of one or more parties are compromised,
the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected. We say that
a protocol has partial forward secrecy: s-FS, if one or more but not all of the parties'
long-term keys can be corrupted without affecting previously established session keys
between these parties, and we say that a protocol has perfect forward secrecy: p-FS,
if the long-term keys of all the parties involved may be corrupted without affecting
the security of any session key previously established between these parties. In the
identity-based cryptosystems, there is a stronger notion of forward secrecy, called
master key forward secrecy: m-F8. Specifically, the KGC's long-term secret key may
be corrupted and so are all the parties' long-term private keys, but the security of
previously established session keys by any parties should not be affected.
116
3. Key-compromise impersonation resilience (KG!). The compromise of party A's long-
term private key will allow an adversary to impersonate A, but it should not enable
the adversary to impersonate other parties to A.
4. Unknown key-share resilience (UKS). Party A should not be able to be coerced into
sharing a key with party C when in fact A thinks that it is sharing the key with party
B.
Authenticated key agreement protocols can be built from both symmetric-key security
mechanisms such as secret-key cipher and message authentication code and asymmetric-
key security mechanisms such as public key encryption and signature. If the symmetric-key
mechanism is used, then either a random symmetric key or a human-chosen password should
be distributed before the key agreement protocol is executed. Without the involvement
of a trusted third party such as a key distribution center or a key transport center, the
number of the shared symmetric keys or passwords grows dramatically with the number
of users. While, with a trusted party in the system, the trusted party has to be online to
participate in each protocol execution. This complicates the protocols and also generates
a single point of failure. If the traditional (certificate-based) public key cryptography is
used, an infrastructure such as PKl to manage certificates should be deployed. It has been
proven that such systems are difficult to build and manage. Another solution is to use
the identity-based cryptography (lBC) [138] in which each party's public key is the party's
identity. Hence, no certificate is required in lBC and the management of public keys is
greatly simplified.
Two party identity-based key agreement protocols (lB-KAP) constructed from pair-
ings are our focus in this chapter. We will formally analyse a few existing two-party
identity-based authenticated key agreements from pairings including the enhanced Smart
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protocol [143, 63], the enhanced Shim protocol [144, 166] and the McCallugh-Barreto proto-
cols [124, 125]. These security analyses will be conducted in a properly defined two-party key
agreement security model originated from Bellare and Rogaway's seminal work [32]. Then
we present an IB-KAP with unilateral identity privacy. The protocol apart from establish-
ing authenticated secret also hides a user's identity from an adversary, and is particularly
suitable for certain environments where identity privacy is important.
To convert an AK to an AKC, a well-known method is to make use of a secure message
authentication code (MAC) algorithm, which as defined in [15] takes a key and a message
as input and outputs a tag on the message. A and B each generate such a tag by using
the shared MAC key derived from the agreed secret by a key derivation function and a
selected message that could include A and B's identifiers, protocol transcript and a message
index. A and B then exchange their tags to confirm that they have got the shared session
secret [23, 59, 116]. In the following part of the chapter we just focus on the security of
AKs.
5.2 Two-Party Key Agreement Security Model
Key agreement protocol design has a long history. However, many protocols were designed
in ad hoc modes. Proposed protocols were often broken, sometimes years after they were
first presented. To address this problem, some methodologies have been developed to check
or prove the security of protocols.
In 1993, using the indistinguishability notion which requires that an adversary cannot
III polynomial time differentiate the agreed key from a random sample generated from
the agreed key's distribution, Bellare and Rogaway [32] formalised a model (from now
on we will refer to it as the Bellare-Rogaway model) of symmetric key based two-party,
authenticated key agreements by borrowing the notion "matching protocol runs" from [71].
Based on the Bellare-Rogaway model, some extensions were made to formalise other types
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of authenticated key agreement protocol, including the two-party asymmetric key based
KAP [38], two-party KAP with a trusted server [34], KAP with extra security properties,
e.g. forward secrecy [30], anti-dictionary attack [30], smart card model [l.S.:l] and AK with
confirmation [23]. More complicated cases, the group KAP models, can be found in [17, 18,
135].
In 1998, Bellare et al. proposed another KAP model [16] using the simulation paradigm.
Later, Shoup [146] presented a different model based on the simulation strategy. Canetti
and Krawczyk readdressed Bellare et al.'s simulation model and proposed the secure channel
notion in [59]. A more general paradigm, the so-called universally composable security, can
be found in [60].
A different line of work, using a "logic-based" approach to "reason" that an authenti-
cation protocol is correct, was pioneered by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [8]. Although
this idea is useful and easy to apply, it has a serious drawback: a proof of the correctness
of a protocol does not guarantee that the protocol is secure. Abadi and Rogaway tried to
combine the advantages of "logic reasoning" and "provable indistinguishability model" in a
unified approach [7].
In this chapter we will use a modified Bellare-Rogaway key exchange model [32] to
analyse a number of two-party protocols. In the model, each party participating in a
session is treated as an oracle. An oracle IIi,j denotes the s-th instance of party i involved
with a partner party j in a session. Note that an oracle IIi,j can be uniquely identified by
i and s. The oracle IIi,j executes the prescribed protocol II and produces the output as
II(l k i J' S. P. PJ' tran~·, r~ .,x)= (m,MJ.,afJ·,j) where x is the input message; m is the
, , , • , • " ~,J ~,J ~,.,
outgoing message; S; and Pi are the private/public key pair of party i; c5i,j is the decision
of the oracle (accept/reject the session or no decision yet); ai,j is the generated session key
and Pj is the public key of the intended partner j (see [32, 23] for more details). After the
response is generated, the conversation transcript trani,j is updated as tran'i,j.x.m, where
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"a.b" denotes the result of the concatenation of two strings, a and b. An adversary can
access an oracle by issuing some specified queries defined in the game below.
The security of a protocol is defined through a two-phase game between an adversary
A and a simulator which simulates the executions of a protocol by providing the adversary
with access to oracles. In the first phase, A is allowed to issue the following queries to
oracles in any order.
1. Send(IIi,j' x). Upon receiving the message x, oracle IIi,j executes the protocol and
responds with an outgoing message m or a decision to indicate accepting or rejecting
the session. If the oracle IIi,j does not exist, it will be created as an initiator, the
party who sends out the first message in the protocol, if x = A, or as a responder
otherwise. In this thesis, we require i f. i, namely, a party will not run a session with
itself. Such restriction is not unusual in practice.
2. Reveal(IIi,j)' If the oracle has not accepted, it returns 1-; otherwise, it reveals the
session key.
3. Corrupt(i). The party i responds with its private key.
Once the adversary decides that the first phase is over, it starts the second phase by
choosing a fresh oracle II~ . and issuing a Test(II~].) query, where the fresh oracle IIi]· and
t,] z., '
Test(II~ .) query are defined as follows.
t,]
Definition 5.2.1. (fresh oracle) An oracle IIi,j is fresh if (1) IIi,j has accepted; (2) IIi,j is
unopened (not been issued the Reveal query); (3) party j f. i is not corrupted (not been
issued the Corrupt query); (4) there is no opened oracle II;,i' which has had a matching
conversation to IIi,j .
The above fresh oracle is particularly defined to cover the key-compromise impersonation
resilience property since it implies that party i could have been issued a Corrupt query.
4 Test(II~.) Oracle II~ . which is fresh, as a challenger, randomly chooses b E {O, I}. t,] . t,]
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and responds with the session key if b = 0, or a random sample from the distribution
of the session key otherwise.
After this point the adversary can continue querying the oracles except that it cannot
reveal the test oracle ITiJ' or an oracle ITt, . which has a matching conversation to ITs .If such
,J,t t,J
an oracle exists, and it cannot corrupt party j. Finally the adversary outputs a guess b' for
b. If b' = b, we say that the adversary wins. The adversary's advantage is defined as
AdvA(k) = 12Pr[b' = b] - 11.
We use session ID to define matching conversations. Two oracles IP . and nt . have at,J J,L
matching conversation to each other if both of them have the same session ID. In this thesis,
we will use the concatenation of the messages in a session (the transcript of an oracle) to
define the session ID.
A secure authenticated key (AK) agreement protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 5.2.2. Protocol IT is a secure AK if:
1. In the presence of a benign adversary, which faithfully conveys messages, on ni,j and
ITt, " both oracles always accept holding the same session key, and this key is dis-J,t
tributed uniformly in the session key space;
2. For any polynomial time adversary A , AdvA(k) is a negligible function of security
parameter k.
It is straightforward to see that when a party will not run a session with itself, if a
protocol is secure regarding Definition 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, then it is secure in a weaker security
model in which the fresh oracle IT~ , requires that both party i and j are uncorrupted (sucht,J
fresh oracle is used in [32, 23]).
If a protocol is secure regarding the above formulation, it achieves implicit mutual key
authentication and the following general security properties: the known session key security,
the key-compromise impersonation resilience and the unknown key-share resilience [23, 64].
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• Mutual key authentication. Condition 2 in Definition 5.2.1 guarantees that the session
key can only be computed by the engaged two parties. Therefore any protocol that
is secure under the definition provides the mutual key authentication.
• Known session key security. The Reveal query allows the adversary to compromise
session keys. So Condition 2 in Definition 5.2.1 guarantees that adversary is not able
to learn any information of the chosen session key even if the adversary may have
revealed other session keys apart from the information it can learn without revealing
those keys .
• Key-compromise impersonation resilience. This is an essential property of an entity
authentication mechanism. For an AK protocol, we slightly change the notion as that
the compromise of party A's long-term private key should not enable the adversary
to impersonate other parties to A in a session by computing any bit information of
the session key established with A. The fresh oracle definition is particularly designed
to capture the notion that an adversary may have compromised a party's long-term
private key. Condition 2 in Definition 5.2.1 therefore guarantees that the adversary
still cannot learn any bit of information of the session key established by party A in
a session with an uncorrupted party which may be impersonated by the adversary,
even if the adversary has compromised A's long-term key.
• Unknown key-share resilience. Suppose in a protocol II, a party i is coerced into
sharing a session key SK in a protocol execution s with a party j in an execution t,
but i believes sharing the key with party w in the s-th execution of II. The protocol
can be easily defeated by an adversary with the allowed queries in the model as follows:
the adversary reveals the oracle IIi,w to get key SK and chooses IIj,i as the fresh oracle
in the Test query and the adversary wins the game trivially. Hence the unknown key-
share resilience is guaranteed if a protocol is secure regarding Definition 5.2.1.
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Now we consider the forward secrecy property. Informally, forward secrecy of a protocol
requires that the security of a session key established by a party is not affected even if
the long-term key of either the party or its peer party in the session is compromised.
We emphasize that the peer party in the session may be impersonated by the adversary.
Many AK protocols (with implicit key authentication) including the protocols presented
in this chapter cannot achieve forward secrecy in this sense. Specifically, an adversary
A can breach the security as follows: A first impersonates party A to B in a session by
choosing an ephemeral secret and generating corresponding messages following the protocol
specification. After B receives all the messages and completes the session by computing
the session key, A then corrupts A and computes the session key established by B with the
knowledge of the used ephemeral secret and A's long-term key.
Because it appears there is no natural way to identify that the adversary does not know
the ephemeral secret of a message in the test session, we use a slightly "weaker" notion,
which requires the adversary to be benign in the test session and with the knowledge of one
party's long-term key to distinguish the session key from a random sample to win the game.
This appears able to reflect the common requirement on a protocol with forward secrecy.
Moveover, we give the adversary an extra capacity that it can corrupt a party at any time
in the game.
Definition 5.2.3. An AK protocol is said to be forward secure if any polynomial time
adversary wins the game with negligible advantage when it chooses as the challenger (i.e.
in place of the fresh oracle) an unopened oracle ni,jwhich has a matching conversation to
another unopened oracle nt, .and both oracles accepted and only one of i and j can be],t
corrupted. If both i and j can be corrupted, then the protocol achieves perfect forward
secrecy. If in the game, the master secret key can be disclosed, then the protocol achieves
master key forward secrecy. The corruption of long-term keys or the disclosure of the master
secret key may happen at any time of the game.
Regarding the master key forward secrecy, the adversary may be a passive-but-malicious
KGC as in CL-PKE in Section 4.2. Hence in a stronger formulation, the adversary should
be allowed to setup the system parameters.
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5.3 Review on Existing Schemes from Pairing
After Shamir proposed the concept of IBC, a number of IB-KAP schemes were proposed
based on RSA or DL problem, e.g. [100, 133, 158].
In 2000, Sakai et al. introduced an identity-based non-interactive key establishment
scheme based on bilinear pairings over elliptic curves [152]. In this work, they proposed an
important ID key construction from pairing: the SOK key construction (see Section 3.3 for
more information on ID key constructions). After that, many other IB-KAPs using this
key construction were presented, such as the Smart protocol [143], Scott protocol [137], CK
protocol [63], Shim protocol [144], BMP protocol [26] and Wang protocol [161]. Among
those proposals, the Smart protocol [143] is the first two-party key agreement standing
firmly against heuristical security analysis. As the Smart protocol does not achieve PFS
and master-FS, Chen and Kudla proposed an enhanced variant of the scheme, which we
refer to as the Smart-Chen-Kudla scheme (SCK for short) [63]. While, the Smart protocol
requires two pairing operations which seem costly1, Shim then proposed a protocol using
a single pairing in [144]. However, the Shim protocol suffers from the man-in-the-middle
attack [149] (see the attack in Section 5.4). Later, as observed by Yuan and Li [166], the
Shim protocol can be easily enhanced to recover from the attack. Moreover, Yuan and Li
heuristically argued that the enhanced protocol, which we refer to as the Shim-Yuan-Li
protocol (SYL for short), exhibits many desired security properties.
In 2003, Sakai and Kasahara presented a new identity-based key construction using
pairings, i.e. the SK key construction [151] (see Section 3.3 for details). Based on the SK
key construction, McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key
agreement protocol (referred to as MB-1) on CT-RSA 2005 [125], which appears to be more
efficient in computation than those based on the SOK key construction. However, as we
lWith the progress on understanding pairings, it has been shown that the Smart protocol is in fact more
efficient than many other protocols on certain types of pairing [52J.
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pointed out [124], the scheme is vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack (see
the attack in Section 5.5). In order to recover from this security weakness, McCullagh and
Barreto [124], and Xie [163] proposed two fixes (called MB-2 and Xie protocol) respec-
tively. Unfortunately, Xie's protocol still suffers from the key-compromise impersonation
attack [119] (see the attack in Section 5.5). Li et at. proposed some other variants of the
MB protocols with some heuristical security analysis [119].
As demonstrated by numerous cases in the literature, such as the attack on the Shim
protocol, the key agreements designed in ad hoc modes are often vulnerable to certain at-
tacks. Some formal analysis, normally a valid reduction based on a hardness assumption in
a formal security model, is desirable for one to build confidence in the security of schemes.
Among these protocols, some of them have been formally analysed in the Bellare-Rogaway
model based on various assumptions, such as the Smart protocol which was formally anal-
ysed in [109] based on the GBDH assumption, CK protocol which was analysed in a weaker
variant of the Bellare-Rogaway model based on the BDH assumption, BMP protocol which
is analysed based on the BDH assumption and Wang protocol which is analysed based on
the DBDH assumption. Some other protocols such as the MB protocols and Xie protocol,
have a security analysis but the security reduction is invalid.
The properties of those protocols, including the security attributes, existence of re-
duction, used key construction, implementable pairings and computation complexity, are
summarised in Table 5.1.
In the first part of this chapter we will formally analyse three protocols including SCK,
SYL and MB-2 in the modified Bellare-Rogaway model presented in Section 5.2. The SCK
protocol exhibits very strong security properties. Moreover it could be implemented with
pairings on the ordinary curves to achieve the best performance among those protocols that
use the SOK key construction and have the same security strength, even though the protocol
requires two pairing operations (see [52] for the detailed performance comparison). We will
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Table 5.1: Identity-based Key Agreements from Pairings
Key Pairing Security Properties
Schemes Const. Type KSK FS KCI UKS Reduction Computation
s p m
Smart[143] SDK 1,2,3,4 .( .( x x .( .( GBDH 2P+2M
SCK[60] SDK 1,2,3,4 .( .( .( .( .( .( BDH(l) 2P+3M
CJL[58] SDK 1,2,3,4 .( .( .( .( .( .(
- 2P+4M
Shim[144] SDK 1, 4 b r 0 k e n - IP+2M
SYL[166] SDK 1,4 .( .( .( .( .( .( BDH(2) IP+3M
BMP[26] SDK 1,4 .( .( .( .( x .( BDH IP+2M
Scott[137] SDK 1, 4 - .( .( .( x
- -
IP+ 2E
CK[63] SDK 1,4 .( .( x x .( .( GBDH IP+2M
Wang[161] SDK 1,4 .( .( .( x .( .( DBDH IP+3M
MB-l[125] SK 1,2,3,4 - .( .( x x - - IP + 3AI
MB-2[124] SK 1,2,3,4 .( .( x x .( .( €-GBCAAI (3) IP + IE + 2M
Xie[163] SK 1,2,3,4 b r 0 k e n - IP + IE + 2M
LYL-l[1l9] SK 1,2,3,4 - - - x - - - IP + 2E + 2M
LYL-2[1l9] SK 1,2,3,4 - - - x - - - IP + 2E + 2M
1. The scheme is proven in Section 5.4.1.
2. The scheme is proven in Section 5.4.2.
3. The scheme is proven in Section 5.5.3.
formally analyse the protocol in Section 5.4.1 based on the weakest possible BDH assumption
for this type of protocol. The SYL protocol achieves the same security properties as the SCK
protocol and can have better performance if it is implemented with the Type-l pairings on
the supersingular curves. We will formally analyse the SYL protocol in Section 5.4.2 based
on the BDH assumption. As a result of using the SK key construction, the MB protocols
are the most efficient ones among all the existing schemes. We will point out the errors in
the existing security analysis and formally analyse a simple variant of the MB-2 protocol in
Section 5.5 but based on the stronger f-GBCCA1 assumption.
5.4 Security Analysis of the SCK and SYL Protocol
In this section we formally analyse the security of two schemes based on the SOK key
construction. The first one is the Smart-Chen-Kudla (SCK) scheme in [60] and the second
one is the Shim-Yuan-Li (SYL) scheme in [166]. SCK is the most robust and efficient scheme
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with pairings on the ordinary curves (the Type-2, 3, 4 pairings) for the high security level
such as the 128-bit security level. On the other hand, SYL is the strongest and the most
efficient scheme with the pairings on the supersingular curves (the Type-1 pairings) for the
relative low security level such as the 80-bit security level. The two protocols use the same
key construction and exchange same message flows as follows:
Setup. The KGC executes the following operations:
1. On input 1k, generate a set of pairing parameters of the required size.
2. Pick a random S E tl p and compute R = SP2'
3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions as follows:
HI : {a, 1}* ~ GI(resp. (2),
H2: {O,l}* x {O,l}* x G2 x G2 X G2 X G t ~ {O,l}n
for some integer n > 0. The codomain of HI is GI for the SCK protocol and G2 for
the SYL protocol.
4. Set s as the master secret key which is kept secret by KGC and publish others as the
system public parameters (also called the master public key).
Extract. For any user with an identity IDA E {a, 1}*, given the master secret key s
and the system parameters, the KGC executes the SOK Extract algorithm to compute
QA = HI(IDA), DA = SQA and passes DA as the private key to this user via some secure
channel.
In the protocols, party A and B randomly choose x and y from tlp respectively and
perform the protocol as follows:
A ~ B: TA = X P2
B ~ A: TB = yP2
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On completion of the protocol, A and B use one of following schemes to compute a
session secret shared between them.
The SCK scheme: A computes K = e(xQB, R) . e(DA, TB) and XTB = xyP2 , and B
computes K = e(yQA, R) . e(DB, TA) and yTA = xyP2 . The session key is computed by
SK = H2(A, B, TA, TB, xyP2 , K).
The SYL scheme: A computes K = e('tj;(TB + QB),xR + DA) and XTB = xyP2 , and B
computes K = e('tj;(yR+ DB), TA + QA) and yTA = xyP2 . The session key is computed as
SK = H2(A, B, TA, TB, xyP2, K).
Both the original Smart [143] and Shim [144] protocol do not include the DR value xyP2
in the session key generation function by the hash function H 2 and both have vulnerabilities.
The Smart protocol does not achieve p-FS and m-FS. With the knowledge of D A = sQ A
and DB = SQB, the session key can be computed as SK = H~(A, B, TAl Ta, e(DA, Ta) .
e(DB, TA)). The Shim protocol suffers from a man-in-the-middle attack as follows [149]:
Adversary A randomly chooses x', y' E Zp, and intercepts and replaces A and B's messages
A A
T~=X'P2-QA
T~=y'P2-QB
B
Figure 5.1: Man-In-The-Middle Attack on The Shim Protocol
with x'P2 - QA and y'P2 - QB respectively as in Figure 5.1. A can compute both secrets
KA = e('tj;(TA) , R)Y' . e('tj;(R) , QA)Y' and KB = e('tj;(R), TB)X' . e('tj;(QA), R)X' established by
A and B respectively.
By including the DR value xyP2 in the session key generation function, the two protocols
become more robust and can achieve all the security properties presented in Section 5.1. In
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the following part of this section, we formally analyse the security of these two protocols.
5.4.1 Security Analysis of the SCK Protocol
In this subsection, we formally analyse the SCK scheme. The security of the scheme can
be summarised by Theorem 5.4.1 and 5.4.2.
Theorem 5.4.1. The SCK scheme is a secure AK, provided the BDJ!!: assumption holds
and the hash functions are modeled as random oracles. Specifically, :~~~ose in the attack.
a PPT adversary A which makes qi queries to Hi for i = 1,2 and creates qo oracles, wins
the game with non-negligible advantage E(k). Then there exists a PPT algorithm B to solve
the BDJt!j I 2 problem with advantage
, ,
Notice, that the proof is relative to an oracle which computes the isomorphism. In
pairing parameter instances where such an isomorphism exists, this is equivalent to the
BDH2,1,2 problem. However, one can implement the SCK scheme for pairing parameters
which do not have an explicitly computable isomorphism.
Proof: We define the session ID as the concatenation of xP211yP2. The first condition
in Definition 5.2.2 is trivial to prove. Now we prove that the protocol meets the second
condition.
Given a BDH~,1,2 problem instance (aP2, bPI, cP2), we construct an algorithm Busing
the adversary A against the protocol to solve the BDH~,1,2 problem.
B simulates the system setup to adversary A as follows. The system public parameters
includes the pairing parameters of the input problem, R = aP2 (hence B does not know the
master secret key), and two functions HI and H2 which are instantiated as random oracles
under the control of B .
Algorithm B randomly chooses 1 < I < ql and 1 < J < qo and starts simulating the
real world where the adversary A launches the attack. Algorithm B answers the following
queries, which are asked by adversary A in an arbitrary order. We slightly abuse the
notation II~ . to refer to the t-th party instance among all the party instances created in
t,J
the attack, instead of the t-th instance of party i. This would not affect the soundness of
the security model.
• HI(IDi): Algorithm B maintains an initially empty list Hiist with entries of the form
(IDi, Qi, fi)' The algorithm B responds to the query in the following way.
If 1Di already appears on Hiist in a tuple (IDi, Qi, fd, then B responds with
HI (IDi) = o;
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Otherwise, if 1Di is the I-th unique identifier query, then B inserts (1Di' bPI, 1-)
into the list and returns bPI (hence the private key of 1D1 should be abPI which
is not known by the algorithm B ).
Otherwise, B randomly chooses Pi E Zp, inserts (1Di' PiPI, Pi) into the list and
returns PiPI.
• H2(1D~, 1D~, Xu, Yu, Zu, Ku): Algorithm B maintains an initially empty list H~ist with
entries of the form (1D~, ID~, Xu, Yu, Zu, Ku, hu). The algorithm B responds to the
query in the following way (for easily following the reduction, we suggest one reading
the Send and Reveal query first).
If a tuple indexed by (1D~, 1D~, Xu, Yu, Zu, Ku) is on the list, then B responds
with hu '
- Otherwise, B goes through the list L (maintained in the Reveal query) to find a
tuple with values (1D~, 1D~, Xu, Yu, II;,j) and proceeds as follows (in the following,
without loosing generality, we assume Yu is the message generated by oracle
IIL, so Xu is the incoming message to II;,j' By the behavior of Send query,
Yu = ff.JaP2)'
* Test if e(1/J(Yu) , Xu) = e(PI, Zu) holds and for Type 2 or 4 pairings test if
e(1/J (Xu), Yu) = e(1/J(Zu), P2) holds as well. If the equations hold, B then
does the following:
Find the values f~ 0 and SK~ . corresponding to oracle II~ J" from the listl,J l,J "
n maintained in the Send query,
Find the value Pj from Hiist for party with IDj.
Compute the shared secret via the following equation
K~ 0 e(xiQJ' , R) . e(Di, Xu)l,J
e(ff.JaPjPI, aP2) . e(abPI, Xu),
since Xi = ff.Ja, Qj = PjP1 , D, = abPI
e(ff.J Pj1/J(aP2) , aP2) . e(bPI, f~ 0 Zu), since ff.JaXu = z..
l,J
Note that II; 0 is put on the list L in the Reveal query only when II;,j has
,J a b t )been revealed and o, = abP1 , but H2(1Du' IDu ' Xu, Yu, Zu, K i,j had
not been queried before the Reveal query. So, S Ki,j has been randomly
sampled.
Set hu = SKI,j'
Remove (1D~, 1D~, Xu, Yu, IIt) from the list L. Put (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu,
z; K~., hu) in the list H~ist., l,J
Check if K~ 0 = K u . If it is not true, B randomly chooses new hu Es-s u t{O, l}n, inserts (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, Zu, «; hu) into the list H2l S •
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. Return hu .
* Otherwise (no tuple on L meets the test), algorithm B randomly chooses
hu E {O, l}n, inserts (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, »; «; hu) into the list and returns
»:
Otherwise (no related tuple on L is found), B randomly chooses hu E {O,1}n,
inserts (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, z.: tc; hu) into the list and returns b.:
• Corruptf Iu.): B looks through list Hiist . If IDi is not on the list, B queries HI (IDd.
B checks the value of f i : if f i -=I ..l, then B responds with £i'l/J(aP2) = £iaPI; otherwise,
B aborts the game (Event 1) .
• Send(Il~,j' M): B maintains a list n for each oracle of the form (IlL, tran~,j' r;,j'
n; SKi,j' ff,j) where tranL is the transcript of the oracle so far; rL is the random
integer used by the oracle to generate message, ff,j is used for special purpose explained
below, and Ki,j and SKi,j are set ..l initially. Note that the n list can be updated in
other queries as well, such as the Reveal query and the H 2 query. B proceeds in the
following way:
If M is the second message on the transcript, do nothing but simply accept the
session. Otherwise,
Query HI (IDi) and HI (IDj).
If t = J,
* If fj -=I ..l, then abort the game (Event 2).
* Otherwise respond with cP2 and set r~ , = ..l (if M = A, then party IDi is, t,)
an initiator, otherwise a responder as M is the first message of the session).
Otherwise,
* If f' = ..l randomly choose ft. E Zp and respond with ff)·aP2 and sett, t,) ,
r~ . = ..l.t,)
* Otherwise randomly choose r~ , E Zp and respond with r;)'P2'
, t,) ,
• Reveal(Il~,j): B maintains a list I:- with tuples of the form (IDi' IDj, Xi, YJ, Il~,),
B proceeds in the following way to respond:
Get the tuple of oracle Il~,j from n.
If oracle n: , has not accepted, then respond with ..l.
t,)
If t = J or if the J-th oracle has been generated as Il~,b and IDa = IDj, IDb = IDi
and IlJ and n: , have the same session ID, then abort the game (Event 3).
a,b t,)
If SK~ , -I- ..l, return SKi),·tJ ~ ,
Otherwise,
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* If rt,j =1= -.L (so fi =1= -.L and D, = fiaPI = fi'/fJ(aP2» , compute K~. =
e(rt,jQj, aP2) . e(fi'/fJ(aP2) , M) where Qj is found from Hiist for ide;t~fier
IDj and M is the received message on tranL. By making an H2 query, set
SK{,j = H2(IDi, IDj, rLP2, M, rLM, Kf,) if ilL is an initiator oracle, or
SKi,j = H2t(IDj, 1Di, M, rLP2, rLM, Kf,) otherwise, and update n by
putting SKi)' then return SK~ . as the response.
, IJ
* Otherwise, i.e. it should have r~· = p.a and D· = abPI. AlgorithmI,) I,) I
B does not know both values and should not be able to compute «', =
A(ft Q F) A( t I,)e i,ja j, a 2 . e abPI, M) and fi,jaM (note that the model requires that
i =1= j). Algorithm B proceeds as follows:
Go through the list H~ist to find a tuple (IDi, IDj, fLaP2, ]I.!, Zu, «;
hu ) if 1Di is the initiator or a tuple (ID)', 1Di, ]I.!, f~ .aP2, z., «; hu )I,)
otherwise, meeting the equation e('/fJ(ff, jaP2), M) = e(PI, Zu) and for
Type 2 or 4 pairings e('/fJ(M) , ff,jaP2) = e('/fJ(Zu) , P2) as well.
If such Zu is found, then compute
Kf,j e(fLaQj, R) . e(Di, M)
e(fLafjPI, aP2) . e(abPI' M), since o, = abP1, o, = f!jPI
e(ff,jfj'/fJ(aP2) , aP2) . e(bP1, f~' Zu) since ff,jaM = z;
I,)
D = e(fi'/fJ(aP2), M),
where M is the incoming message of II!. and note that because i =1= j according toI,)
Definition 5.2.1, it has D; = fiaPI = fi'/fJ(aP2) where fi =1= -.L is found from Hiist
corresponding to identifier 1Di of Ilf,j' and
and set SKf,j = H2(IDi, IDj, ff, jaP2, M, z; KI,j) if oracle Ilt,j is the
initiator or SKi,j = H2(IDj, 1Di, M, ff,jaP2,z.; Ki,j) otherwise.
Otherwise, randomly sample SKL E {O,l}n, put (IDi, IDj, fL aP2,
M, ilL) if 1Di is the initiator or (IDj, 1Di, M, fLaP2, Il~,j) into list L.
B responds with SKL and updates n by putting SKL·
• Test (ilL): If t =1= J or (t = J but) there is an oracle Ilj,i with the same session ID with
Il~ . that has been revealed, then B aborts the game (Event 4) (note that according
I,)
to the rules of the game, n: .should have accepted, i.e. there are two messages on the
I,)
oracle's transcript, so the check can be done properly). Otherwise (f!j = -.L, Qj = bPI
and rt,j = -.L), B randomly chooses ( E {O, I}" and responds to A with (.
Once A finishes queries and returns its guess, B proceeds with the following steps:
• Compute
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• Algorithm B randomly chooses Ke from H~ist and returns Kef D as the response to
the BDH challenge.
Claim 5.4.1. If B did not abort the game, A could not find inconsistency between the
simulation and the real world.
Proof: The simulations of all the random oracles are valid and the messages of the oracles
are uniformly distributed in the message space. Particularly, the simulator makes use of the
programmability of random oracle H 2 and the pairing as the decisional algorithm of DH on
G 2 to keep the consistence of responses to the H 2 queries and the Reveal queries. So the
adversary should not notice any difference from the real attack environment.
Claim 5.4.2. Let Event 5 be that K = e(cbP1, aP2 ) . e(f(I/J(aP2 ) , M) was not queried on
H 2 . Then Pr[Event 5] > E(k).
Proof: Suppose in the game, the chosen fresh oracle for the Test query is ITL and party
i is the initiator (the result holds if party i is the responder for the similar reason). Let H
be the event that (IDi, IDj, Mf, MJ, *, *) has been queried on H2 where Mf is the message
from party i and MJ is the message from party j or the adversary A . Now let us consider
the following situations:
• Situation 1. A reveals IT~v where u ~ {i,j} or v ~ {i,j}, i.e. IDs are different from
,
the fresh oracle. Because IDu and IDv , instead of 1Di and IDj, will be queried as the
identifier to H 2, event H will not be caused by such Reveal queries. Recall that for
the model defined in Section 5.2, it is required that i -# j.
• Situation 2. A reveals IT'lfJi where j is the initiator (if i is the responder for the chosen],
fresh oracle, then j is the responder, i.e. party j has the same role in the w-th session
as i in the t-th session). The Reveal query will only query in the form of H2(IDj, 1Di, *,
*, *, *), so event H will not be caused by this type of Reveal query.
• Situation 3. A reveals lIj,i where j is the responder (if i is the responder for the
chosen fresh oracle, then j is the initiator, i.e. party i and j have matching roles in
the sessions). In this case, H2 could be queried on (IDi, IDj, Mi, Mj, *, *). Because
of the rule of the game lI'lfJ· has no matching conversation to IT~ ]', which means either
, ],t .,
M~ -I- M'!V or M~ -I- M"!J (recall that the session ID which is the message transcript
t ~ t ] ~ ]
of the session, is used to define matching conversations. Two oracles have matching
conversation to each other only if both have the same message transcript). Hence
event 11 will not be caused by this type of Reveal query.
• Situation 4. A reveals lItj for w -# t and party i plays different roles in the t-th and
w-th session. As analysed in situation 2, event 11 will not be caused by this type of
Reveal query.
• Situation 5. A reveals ITtj for w -# t and party i plays the same role in the t-th
and w-th session. Because for both oracles ITtj and ITtj' i is not controlled by the
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adversary, it is only negligibly likely that Ml = M]" if the used random flips are
generated uniformly. Hence event H will not (or with only negligible probability) be
caused by this type of Reveal query.
Let H' be the event that H2(ID'i, IDJ" M i , M i , Z~ " K i .) was queried where zi . computedl J l,J l,J z J
as the DH value and K;J' computed through pairings are the agreed secret of Ilt '. We note
, lJ
here there are two possibilities that event H' happens in the proof of using random oracles.
• Case 1. The simulator, which could not compute Z~ , and K~ " was forced to respondl,J l,J
with a random sample SK;,j in some Reveal query. Hence, although the oracle H2
was not explicitly queried with the tuple value, in this case, we regard that H' has
happened, as the random oracle should return a unique result corresponding to each
input and if H2 is later explicitly queried on (ID'i,IDJ·,M~,M~,Z~ .,K~ .), then SK~.l J l,J l,J t,J
should be returned.
• Case 2. The adversary queried H2 with (ID'i' IDj, Ml, Mj, Z;,j' K;,).
As analysed above, we know that the Reveal queries won't cause H' with non-negligible
probability. Hence Case 1 will only happen with negligible probability at most. In other
words, event H' happens with non-negligible probability only if A has queried H2(IDi, IDj,
Ml, Mj, Z;,j' K;,j)'
As H2 is a random oracle, we have Pr[A winsIH
'] = ~. Then we have
Pr[A wins] Pr[A winsIH'] Pr[H'] + Pr[A winsIH'] Pr[H']
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< Pr[H'] + "2(1 - Pr[H']) = "2 + "2 Pr[H'].
Pr[A wins] > Pr[A winsIH
'] Pr[H']
1 I 1 1 [']
"2(I-Pr[H])="2-"2 Pr H.
It follows that E(k) = 12 Pr[A wins] - 11 < Pr[H']' which means, A has computed Kj,'i with
probability E(k) and queried it on H2·
Let Event 6 be that, in the attack, adversary A indeed chose oracle ilL as the challenger
oracle where IDj was queried on HI as the I-th distinct identifier query. Then following the
rules of the game defined in Section 5.2, it's clear that Event 1, 2, 3, 4 would not happen
and the game won't abort. So,
1
Pr[(Event 1 V Event 2 V Event 3 V Event 4)] = Pr[Event 6] > qI . qo
Let Event 7 be that B found the correct K]. Overall, we have
Pr[B wins]
This concludes the proof.
>
>
Pr[Event 6 1\ Event 5 1\ Event 7]
1 Pr[Event 5]
Ql'qo'q2
Ql'Q
1o'Q2 E(k).
o
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Theorem 5.4.2. The SCK scheme has master key forward secrecy, provided the DJ-t:: ')2._.2
assumption is sound and H2 is modeled as random oracle. Specifically, suppose a PPT
adversary A wins the game with non-negligible advantage E(k). Then there exists a PPT
algorithm B to solve the DItf 22 problem with advantage
, ,
DH1/J 1
Adv 2,2,2 > -E(k).B-2
Again the comment with respect to the computability of the function 'l/J holds.
Proof: Given a DHt,2,2 problem instance (aP2, bP2) on a set of pairing parameters, we
construct an algorithm B to make use of A to compute abP2. Algorithm B simulates the
system setup to adversary A as follows: Randomly sample s E 'Zp and set the master public
key to be R = sP2 with the pairing parameters and two hash functions HI and H 2 , and
set the master secret key as s. The hash function H 2 will be modeled as a random oracle
under the control of B , and HI will be a normal cryptographic hash function. Moreover.
the master secret key s is passed to A as well, so B no longer simulates the Corrupt query.
As in Theorem 5.4.1, we use II~ . to represent the t-th one among all oracles created in
t,)
the attack. Again algorithm B answers the following queries, which are asked by adversary
A in an arbitrary order.
• H2(ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, Zu, Ku): Algorithm B maintains an initially empty list H~ist with
entries of the form (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, Zu, Ku, hu). B responds to the query in the
following way.
If a tuple indexed by (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, Zu, Ku) is on the list, then B responds
with b-;
Otherwise, B goes through the list E (maintained in the Reveal query) with
tuples of the form (IDi' IDj, Xi, Yj, KI,j' II~,j) to find a tuple with values (ID~,
IDb X y; K II~.) and proceeds as follows (again, we assume Xu is theu' u, u, u, t,)
incoming message to II~,j):
* Test if e('l/J(Yu) , Xu) = e(PI, Zu) and for Type 2 or 4 pairing test as well
e('l/J(Xu) , Yu) = e('l/J(Zu), P2). If the equation holds then,
Find the value SK~ . from the list n.v.:
Remove (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, «; IILj) from the list.c. Put (ID~, ID~,
X y; Z K SK~.) in the list H2list and return SKI)" Note thatu, u, u, U, t,) , t
II~ . is put on the list E only when it has been revealed, so SKi,j has
t,)
been sampled.
* Otherwise (no tuple on .c meets the test), algorithm B randomly chooses
hu E {O, l}n, inserts (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, z., «; hu) into the list and returns
b«
Otherwise, B randomly chooses hu E {O,l}n, inserts (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, z.:
K u, hu) into the list and returns hu'
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• Send(II~,j' M): B maintains a list n for each oracle of the form (Ilt . trani . tl,
K t S K t t) h t·. I,]' I,]' I,]'i,j' i,j' Ci,j were trani,j IS the transcript of the oracle so far; Jl j' cL are used
for speci~l purpose explained below, and KL, S KI,j are set -1 initially. This list is
updated in the Send query as well as in the Reveal query and H2 query. B proceedsin the following way:
If M is not the second message on the transcript,
* Randomly sample ff,j E Zp.
* Randomly flip c~]. E {O, I}. If CI~]' = 0, set V = ft .aP2 else V = ft .bP2 ., , I,]' I,]
If V = P2, then responds to the DR challenge with -J- bP2 if ct . = ° orf . I,]'1 t,]T aP2 otherwise (Event 1).
"]
* If M i= A, compute
KL = e(ff,jH1(IDj), saP2)' e(sH1(IDi), M),
if c~ . = ° else setI,J '
and accept the session.
* Return V.
Otherwise, compute KI,j = e(ff,jH1(IDj), saP2) . e(sH1(IDi), M) if C~,j = 0, else
compute KI,j = e(ff,jH1(IDj), sbP2) . e(sH1(IDi), M), and accept the session.
• Reveal(II~,j): Algorithm B maintains a list E with tuples of the form (IDi' IDj, Xi,
}j, KI,j' II~,j)' The algorithm B proceeds in the following way to respond:
Get the tuple of oracle IlL from n.
If II~,j has not accepted, return -1.
If the Test(II:,b) query has been issued and if II~,j = rr:'b' or IDa = IDj and
IDb = IDj and two oracles have the same session ID, then disallow the query
(this should not happen if the adversary obey the rules of the game).
If SKL- i= -1, return SKf,j'
Otherwise,
* Go through the list H~ist to find a tuple (IDi' IDj, Mi, Mj, Zu, KI,j, hu) if
IDi is the initiator or a tuple (IDj,IDi' Mj, Mi, Z«, KI,j' hu) otherwise,
meeting the equation e('l/J(Mi), Mj) = e(P1, Zu) and for Type 2 or 4 pairing
e('l/J(Mj), Mi) = e('l/J(Zu), P2) as well, where M, and Mj are the messages of
party i and j in tranr,j'
* If such Zu is found, then return SKL = hu.
* Otherwise, randomly sample SKI,j E {U;L}", put (IDi' IDj, Ali, l\1j , KI,j'IlL) if IDi is the initiator or (IDj, IDi' M j , Mi' «. rr~,) into list i:
B ~esponds with SK~ . and puts SKI]· into n.IJ ,
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• Test(II~,j): By the rule of the game, there is a partner oracle Il" with the same
. ID . h II t ).1
seSSIOn WIt i,j and both should not be revealed. B proceeds as follows:
Check if C~,j = cj,i' If it is true, then abort the game (Event 2).
Otherwise, without loosing generality we assume ct. = G and c", = 1 l' e
, I J J I ,. .
Mi = ftJaP2 and M j = r;:ibP2. B randomly chooses 'c E {G, 1}n a~d responds
to A with C.
Once A finishes queries and returns its guess, B proceeds with the following steps:
• For every pair (Xu, Yu, Zu) on H~ist with Xu = Mi, Yu = M j , if the tested oracle IIt .
is an initiator oracle, otherwise with Xu = Mj, Yu = Mi' check if e(1jJ(Xu), Yu) I,J
e(PI , Zu) and for Type 2 or 4 pairings, e(1jJ(Xu), Yu) = e(1jJ(Zu), P2 ) as well hold (Ali
and M j are found in tranL). If no such Zu meets the equation, abort the game
(Event 3).
• Otherwise, return ft .~fw Zu as the response to the DR challenge.
'1,,] J, t
Following similar arguments as in Theorem 5.4.1, we have following two claims:
Claim 5.4.3. If B did not abort the game, A could not find inconsistency between the
simulation and the real world.
Claim 5.4.4. Pr[Event 3] > E(k).
As Pr[Event 2] = 1/2, we have
Pr[B wins] Pr[Event 1 V (Event 2/\ Event 3)]
> E(k)/2.
o
A few subtle points of the proofs are worth mentioning. First, the proofs need an extra
operation, which is not explicitly specified in the protocol. Namely, the proofs assume
that all values lie in the correct groups. This assumption has generally applied explicitly
or implicitly in the literature. The importance of such check will be further discussed in
Section 5.4.4. Second, we assume that XTB (yTA resp.) has a unique representation. This
assumption has no significance in practice but is needed to keep the indistinguishability of
the reductions from the real world. Third, for Type 4 pairings, there is negligible probability
that the pairing is trivial. We ignored this issue in the reduction.
We note that by choosing R = sPI and the codomain of HI to be ([;2, there is an-
other instantiation of the SCK scheme. We call it SCK'. SCK' has better computation
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performance and much shorter exchanged messages. On the other hand it can only be
, <
implemented with Type 1, 3 and 4 pairings. The above proofs can be replicated for the
SCK' with Type 1 or 3 pairings based on assumption BDH'l/J and DH'l/J respectively
2,2,1 2,2,1
with very little changes. The reduction for Type 4 pairing is more involved notationally,
but the essential proof technique remains the same.
5.4.2 Security Analysis of the SYL Protocol
We now turn to considering security of the SYL scheme. Note that the SYL scheme can
only be implemented when the isomorphism exists and hashing in ([;2 can be done efficiently.
So the SYL scheme works only with Type 1 and Type 4 pairings. Here we formally present
the proof for Type 1.
The security of the SYL scheme can be summarised by Theorem 5.4.3 and 5.4.4.
Theorem 5.4.3. The SYL scheme is a secure AK, provided the BDH assumption is sound
and the hash functions are modeled as random oracles. Specifically, suppose in the attack,
a PPT adversary A which makes qi queries to Hi for i = 1,2 and creates qo oracles, wins
the game with non-negligible advantage E(k). Then there exists a PPT algorithm B to solve
the BDH problem with advantage
Adv9DH(k) > 1 E(k).
ql . qo . q2
Proof: Given a BDH problem instance (P, aP, bP, cP), we construct an algorithm Busing
the adversary A against the protocol to solve the BDH problem.
B simulates the system setup to adversary A as follows. The system public parameters
includes the pairing parameters of the input problem, R = aP (hence B does not know the
master secret key) and two functions HI and H 2 which are instantiated as random oracles
under the control of B .
Algorithm B randomly chooses 1 < I < ql and 1 < J < qo and starts simulating the
real world where the adversary A launches the attack. Algorithm B answers the following
queries, which are asked by adversary A in an arbitrary order.
• HI (IDi): Algorithm B maintains an initially empty list Hiist with entries of the form
(IDi' Qi, f i ). The algorithm B responds to the query in the following way.
If 1Di already appears on Hiist in a tuple (IDi' Qi, f i ), then B responds with
HI (IDi) = Qi'
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Otherwise, if 1Di is the I-th unique identifier query, then B inserts (IDi, bP, 1-)
into the list and returns bP.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses fi E Zp, inserts (IDi, fiP, fi) into the list and
returns fiP.
• H2(ID~, IDt, Xu, Yu, Zu, Ku): Algorithm B maintains an initially empty list H~lst with
entries of the form (ID~, IDt, Xu, Yu, Zu, «; hu). The algorithm B responds to the
query in the following way.
If a tuple indexed by (ID~, IDt, Xu, Yu, Zu, K u) is on the list, then B responds
with hu .
Otherwise, B goes through the list I:- (maintained in the Reveal query) with
tuples of the form (IDi, IDj, Xi, Yj, II;],) to find a tuple with values (ID~, IDt~
t . 'Xu, Yu, IIi,j) and proceeds as followmg:
* Test if e(Xu, Yu) = e(P, Zu). If the equation holds then,
Find the values ff,j and SKi,j corresponding to oracle II~,j from the list
n.
Find the value f j from Hii st for party with IDj.
Compute the shared secret via the equation where M = Xu if Xu is the
incoming message to the oracle IItj' or M = Yu otherwise,
Ki,j e(M + Qj, Xi R + D i ),
e(M + fjP, (ff,ya)aP + abP), since Xi = ff,ya, D, = abP
e(M, ff,yaaP) . e(M, abP) . e(fjP, ff,yaaP) . e(fjP, abP),
e(Zu, aP) . e( f: ,Zu, bP) . e(ff,yfjaP, aP) . e(ejbP, aP),
t,]
since ft ,aM = z;
t,]
1
e(Zu + ff,yfjaP + fjbP, aP) . e(it ,zu, bP)
t,]
Note that II~ , is put on the list I:- only when II;], has been revealed and
tJ I
o, = abP, but H2(ID~, IDt, Xu, Yu, z.: Ki,j) had not been queried
before the Reveal query. So, SKf,y has been randomly sampled.
Set h-« = SKi,j'
Remove (ID~, IDt, Xu, Yu, II;,) from the list 1:-. Put (ID~, IDt, Xu, Yu,
K t h)' h n t H 1i stZu, i,j' u m t e IS 2'
Check if K~, = K u . If it is not true, B randomly chooses new b-« E
t,] I' t{O, l}n, inserts (ID~, IDt, Xu, Yu, z.; «; hu) into the list H2t S •
. Return hu ·
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* Otherwise (no tuple on L meets the test), algorithm B randomly chooses
b-: E {O, l}n, inserts (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, z., «; hu) into the list and returns
hu .
Otherwise, B randomly chooses ti; E {u.I}", inserts (ID~, ID~, Xu, Yu, z.:
K u , hu ) into the list and returns hu .
• Corruptf Ili.): B looks through list Hiist . If IDi is not on the list, B queries HI(IDd.
B checks the value of Ri: if Ri =1= ..l, then B responds with RiaP; otherwise, B aborts
the game (Event 1) .
• Send(II~,j' M): B maintains a list n for each oracle of the form (II~,j' tran~,j' r;,j'
Ki,j' S Kf,j' IL) where tran~,j is the transcript of the oracle so far; rf,j is the random
integer used by the oracle to generate message, If ' is used for special purpose explained
l)
below, and KI,j and SKI,j are set ..l initially. Note that this list is updated in the
Reveal query and H2 query as well. B proceeds in the following way:
If M is the second message on the transcript, do nothing but simply accept the
session. Otherwise,
Query HI(IDd and HI(IDj).
If t = J,
* If Rj =1= ..l, then abort the game (Event 2).
* Otherwise respond with cP and set r~ , = ..l (if M = .x, then party IDi is
, IJ
an initiator, otherwise a responder as M is the first message of the session).
Otherwise,
* If Ri = ..l, randomly choose If,j E Zp and respond with ILaP and set
rf,j = ..l.
* Otherwise randomly choose r~ . E Zp and respond with rf)· P.
, I,) ,
• Reveal(IIL): B maintains a list L with tuples of the form (IDi' IDj, Xi, Yj, II~,j)'
B proceeds in the following way to respond:
- Get the tuple corresponding to oracle II~,j from n.
If oracle II~ . has not accepted, then respond with ..l.
I,)
If t = J or if the J -th oracle has been generated as II~,b and IDa = IDj, IDb = IDi
and III and II~ . have the same session ID, then abort the game (Event 3).
a,b I,)
If SK~ . =1= ..l, return SKI)"
IJ '
* If r~ , =1= ..l (so Ri =1= ..l and D, = RiaP),
I,) u t
. Compute K~ , = e(M + Qj, (rf)· + Ri)aP) where Qj is found from HIls
I,) .'. t S SKt -for identifier IDj and M IS the received message on trani,j' et i,j -
H (ID ' ID· r~ .P M r~ ·M K~.) if II t , is an initiator oracle, or SKI)' =2 I , ), I)' 'I,) , I,) I,) t'
H (ID ' ID· M r~ .r r~ ·M K~ ,) otherwise, and return SKi)' as the re-2 ) , I , 'I,)' I,) , I,) ,
sponse.
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* Otherwise, i.e. it should have r~ . = Jt ·a and D· - abP Al ith B dt,] t,] z - . gOr!. m oes
not know both values and should compute K~ . = e(AI + f·P it .a.R + D.)d Jt t,]] 1 ~,] ~
an i,jaM (note that the model requires that i =1= j). Algorithm B proceeds
as follows:
Go through the list H2list to find a tuple (ID' ID· J.t ·aP ~I Z K
. t, l> t] ,11, U, u-
hu ) If 1Di is the initiator or a tuple (ID· ID· M J~ .'aP Z K h)
'. ], t, 't,] , u, u, u
otherwise, meetmg the equation e(M, il,jaP) = ei P, Zu).
If such Zu is found, then compute
K~ .
t,] e(M + fjP, il,jaR + D i )
~( 1 t . 1
e -JtZu + fjP, ii,jaaP + abP) smce AI = -t-ZU'
i ].a j. ·a
, tJ
e(Zu, aP) . e( f~ .Zu, bP) . e(iLfjaP, aP) . e(fjbP, aP),
t,]
e(Zu + il,jfjaP + fjbP, aP) . e(J~ .Zu, bP)
t,J
and return SKi]· = H2(IDi, IDJ' , if·aP, M,Zu,Kt.) if party i is the, .'l. t,]
initiator or SKL = H2(IDj, 1Di, M, ii,jaP, ZUl Ki,j) if i is the responder.
Otherwise, randomly sample SKL E {O, 1}n, put (IDi, IDj, It,jaP,
M, II;,) if 1Di is the initiator or (IDj, 1Di, M, il,jaP, II;,j) into list L.
B responds with S Kf.j'
• Test (II;,j ): If t =1= J or (t = J but) there is an oracle IIj,i with the same session
ID with IIL that has been revealed, then B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise
(f-j = 1.., Qj = bP and rL = 1..), B randomly chooses ( E {O, 1}n and responds to
A with (.
Once A finishes queries and returns its guess, B proceeds with the following steps:
• For every pair (Xu, Yu, Zu) on H~ist with Xu = cP, Yu = M if the tested oracle II;,j is
an initiator oracle, otherwise with Xu = M, Yu = cP where M is the received message
on tran~ " check if e(Xu, Yu) = e(P, Zu) holds. If no such Zu meets the equation,t,]
abort the game (Event 5).
• Otherwise, compute
Note that because i =1= j according to Definition 5.2.1, it has D, = fiaP where fi =1= 1..
1-11
found from Hiist corresponding to identifier 1Di and
KI,j e(M + Qj, XiR + Di ) ,
e(M + bP, caP + RiaP)
e(P, p)ubc . e(bP, RiaP) . e(M, caP + RiaP),
e(P, p)ubc . e(fi bP, aP) . e(Zu, aP) . e(RiM, aP) since M = ~Zu,
c
e(P, p)ubc . D.
• Algorithm B randomly chooses Ke from H~ist and returns Kef D as the response to
the BDH challenge.
Following the similar argument as in Theorem 5.4.1, we have following two claims.
Claim 5.4.5. If B did not abort the game, A could not find inconsistency between the
simulation and the real world.
Claim 5.4.6. Let Event 6 be that K = e(M +bP, (c+fi)aP) was not queried on H2. Then
Pr[Event 5/\ Event 6] > E(k).
Let Event 7 be that, in the attack, adversary A indeed chose oracle IItj as the challenger
oracle where IDj was queried on HI as the I-th distinct identifier query. Then following the
rules of the game defined in Section 5.2, it's clear that Event 1, 2, 3, 4 would not happen.
So,
1
Pr[(Event 1 V Event 2 V Event 3 V Event 4)] = Pr[Event 7] > --
ql . qo
Let Event 8 be that B did not abort in the game. Let Event 9 be that B found the
correct K], Overall, we have
Pr[B wins]
This concludes the proof.
>
>
Pr[Event 8 1\ Event 6 1\ Event 9]
Pr[Event 7 1\ Event 5 1\ Event 6 1\ Event 9]
1 Pr[Event 5 1\ Event 6]Ql'qo'q2
1 E(k)Ql 'Qo'Q2 .
o
Theorem 5.4.4. The SYL scheme has master key forward secrecy, provided the DH as-
sumption on G = G 1 = G2 holds and H2 is modeled as random oracle. Specifically, suppose
a PPT adversary A wins the game with non-negligible advantage E(k). Then there exists a
PPT algorithm B to solve the DH problem in G with advantage
1
AdvflH > 2"E(k).
Proof: The proof is very similar to Theorem 5.4.2. Here we only specify the difference
from the proof in Theorem 5.4.2 which is mainly how the agreed secret K is computed.
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• Send(IIL, M):
If M is not the second message on the transcript,
* If M =F A, compute Kf,j = e(M + HI (IDj), V + HI (IDd )8 and accept the
session.
Otherwise, compute K~. = e(M + HI(ID') f~ .a.P + HI(ID·))8 if et . = 0 elset ~ t,] ] , t,] t t,] ,
compute Ki,j = e(M + HI (IDj), ff,jbP + HI(IDi))8, and accept the session. 0
Similar to Theorem 5.4.2, one can aslo establish a reduction by allowing the adversary
to setup the system parameters.
Following the observation of the security model in Section 5.2, we can confirm that the
SCK scheme and the SYL scheme achieve very strong security properties including implicit
mutual key authentication, known session key security, key compromise impersonation re-
silience, unknown key share resilience and master key forward secrecy.
5.4.3 The Built-in Decisional Function
To the best of our knowledge, so far the two proofs above are the only two security reductions
which are constructed successfully based on the weakest complexity assumption (the BDH
assumption) possible for this type of protocol using the Diffie-Helmman exchange with the
security property of key-compromise impersonation resilience.
The first formal security analysis of an IB-KAP from pairings in the random oracle
model was given by Chen and Kudla [63]. In the first version of their proof, Chen and
Kudla claimed that the CK scheme is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model. Later on we
pointed out a flaw in their proof in dealing with reveal queries. They then corrected this
error by modifying the proof under a weaker variant of the Bellare-Rogaway model, where
the adversary is not allowed to make any reveal queries [62]. After that, a number of
other protocols in this type were analysed in this weak model as well, for example, the TvIB
scheme [124]. Note that the reduction of the MB scheme in [124, 125] is invalid even in the
weak model and the detailed discussion on this issue is given in Section 5.5. Choo, Boyd.
1-13
and Hitchcock in [43] revisited the CK scheme and MB scheme and demonstrated that with
slight change these two protocols can be proven secure in the random oracle model wit h a
looser restriction that the adversary is not allowed to make reveal queries to a number of
selected sessions, but allowed to other sessions. Their contribution improved the CK and
MB scheme and their security analysis, and can also benefit other schemes. However, since
a reveal query captures the known session key security property, neither the full nor partial
restriction of disallowing reveal queries is really acceptable. The BMP scheme in [26] can be
proven based on the BDH assumption to hold a number of security properties but without
the key-compromise impersonation resilience.
In the security proof of this type of protocol following the model defined in Section 5.2,
a simulator S of a real protocol has a goal to solve a pairing related hard problem, while an
adversary A has a goal to break the protocol. The reason that S has the difficulty to answer
reveal queries to certain sessions is that, without solving a hard computational problem,
the simulator normally cannot compute the session secrets in these sessions. This property
is required on purpose in this type of protocols, otherwise these protocols may not have the
security property of key-compromise impersonation resilience. In the follow we explain this
in details.
In general, three types of secrets are used in this type of key agreement protocols: the
KGC master secret key, each party's identity-based private key, which is computed using
the master secret key and the party's identifier, and each party's ephemeral secret, which
is used to compute the party key token. In a protocol, after exchanging the key token with
the other party, each party takes as input the master public key, its own identity-based
private key and ephemeral secret along with the other party's identifier and the key token,
and computes a pairing (or a few pairings) as a session secret shared with the other party.
To build a proof based on the BDH assumption, S's goal is to solve a random BDH
problem, i.e. given (xP, yP, zP) for x, y, z E Zp, S has to compute e(P, P)xyz. In the
1-1-1
game, algorithm S arranges these three secrets as follows: The master secret key is x; the
identity-based public key of the attacked party (say 1) is related to y (so S does not know
1's private key); the ephemeral secret of the challenge party (say J) is z. To answer reveal
queries from A, S has to deal with the following different sessions:
• Challenge sessionffI] i- IIt} ! ) : A impersonates oracle IIs! } and challenges oracle IIt
, , , },I'
S does not need to answer any reveal query to this session, based on the definition of
the security model in Section 5.2.
• Session (III,), II~,I): A impersonates oracle II~,I and asks a reveal query to oracle III,}'
S is not able to compute the session secret because it does not know 1's private key;
otherwise, the session secret can be computed by using the party ephemeral secret and
the partner long-term key, and therefore the key-compromise impersonation resilience
property does not hold in this protocol.
• Session (III ,C' II~,I): A impersonates oracle II~,I (c t/: {1, J}) and asks a reveal query
to oracle III c. Again, S is not able to compute the session secret for the same reason
,
as the above session.
• Session (III,c, II~,I): A impersonates oracle III,c and asks a reveal query to oracle
II~,I' S can compute the session secret by following the protocol correctly.
• Session (IIC,D' IIb,c): A impersonates either oracle IIc,D or IIb,c and asks a reveal
query to the other oracle, where C and D is not 1. S can compute the session secret
by following the protocol correctly.
Computing the session secret guarantees that S can answer the reveal queries, but is not
necessary when the security proof is composed in the random oracle model. In the random
oracle model, when it controls a random oracle, which takes as input the session secret and
outputs a random number as the session key, S can choose a random number as the answer
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to a reveal query even though it cannot compute the session secret. The problem is that for
some sessions, as Sessions (III,], II~,!) and (III,e, IIb'!) discussed above, 5 cannot compute
a session secret, but A may be able to do so. Therefore, in order to check whether or not 5
acts as a real protocol, A can query the random oracle with the correct session secret after
the reveal query. If 5 cannot recognize this correct value, it cannot make the output of the
random oracle consistent with the responses to the reveal query.
This tells us that the computation of a session secret in the reduction can be replaced
with a related decisional operation in the random oracle model. As long as 5 is able to
make a right decision to A's random oracle query, the behavior of 5, from A's point of view,
is indistinguishable from the real world. Researchers have tried a number of various ways
to solve this problem. Let us take a closer look at them.
In the early attempt of solving the problem, we used a coin query to force the adversary
to register the ephemeral secret used to generate the key token with the simulator [64J. The
model with the coin query can address certain attacks which are not covered in the model
with the reveal query completely disallowed. On the other hand, for some attacks, the
adversary may not know the ephemeral value corresponding to the key token used in the
attacks. Hence, the model requires a protocol to be analysed in two separate reductions,
one with the reveal query disallowed and the other with both the coin query and the reveal
query allowed. However, this approach still does not guarantee the security of a protocol
even if both valid reductions in the model can be constructed.
Kudla and Paterson in [112] proposed a modular proof approach, which introduces a
decisional oracle in the security proof. By resorting to this decisional oracle, the simulator
can choose a random number to answer a reveal query and maintain all random answers
consistent to each other. This approach has been used to prove secure a number of protocols
such as the Smart protocol [109] under a gap assumption. However, this approach has to
rely on the assumption that such a decisional oracle exists and the gap problem is sound.
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The former may not be true in this type of protocols, and the latter may not be as strong
as the computational problem.
Wang in [161] proposed an approach, which is opposite to the Kudla and Paterson one.
This approach has to resort to a computational oracle and is used to analyse the Wang
scheme [161] based on a decisional assumption instead. As in the Kudla and Paterson
approach, the problem of relying on an oracle, which nobody knows how to construct using
any polynomial algorithm in the real world, also happens in this approach. In addition,
using this approach the simulator has to guarantee that the computational oracle would
not be bullied by the adversary to compute the underlying hard problem challenge.
It is worth mentioning a new proof technique introduced recently by Gentry [82]. The
technique enables us to provide proofs for certain lEEs without random oracles. Generally
in a game of IBE, a simulator like the simulator in the key agreement game, is faced with
the similar difficulty that it has to answer certain decryption query but without knowing the
corresponding private key. However, by applying the Gentry's technique the simulator can
compute a valid private key of every party involved in the game. Hence all the decryption
queries can be answered correctly. The same technique can be applied to key agreements
with similar key construction. However the technique substantially relies on two bases:
(1) a stronger intractability assumption like f-BDHI and (2) a nondeterministic Extract
algorithm different from ones in the SOK and SK key constructions.
If the underlying assumption fails, the proof becomes meaningless. This means that
a proof of security is worth more when the assumption is weaker. To improve the above
solutions for a complete proof with the weakest possible assumption, we have adopted a new
approach in the above proofs, which incorporates a built-in decisional function. With this
function, the simulator can now take the advantage of the "help" of the adversary either to
compute the session secret or to maintain the consistency of random oracle answers. Such
a built-in decisional function can be constructed by including a DH key token computed
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with the ephemeral secret in the exchanged message and including the DH key value as part
of the established session secret. Based on the fact that the DDH problem is not hard in
the pairing-friendly groups, the simulator in the new approach does not need to rely on an
outside computational oracle (when the isomorphism 'IjJ is efficiently computable) in order
to generate the session key to be revealed as required in the Wang approach, or an outside
decisional oracle to keep the consistency between the random oracle queries and the reveal
queries as required in the Kudla and Paterson method, or the knowledge of the adversary
ephemeral secret as required in the approach of [64]. As a result of incorporating the built-
in decisional function, the security reduction can be constructed on the weakest possible
assumptions for this type of protocols. This is not just playing a proof trick in the random
oracle. The approach indeed guides the protocol design. By including the DH key value
as part of the session secret, the adversary is forced to know at least one ephemeral secret
of a DR token to compute the session key. This significantly constrains the adversary's
attacking methods.
To be specific, in the above two protocols, to introduce an efficient built-in decisional
function into the protocols, the DR key value XyP2 and the pairing-computed key K are
used together in the session key computation through a random oracle H 2 . The decisional
?
function then is constructed as e('IjJ(X), Y) . e(P1 , Z) where X, Yare the exchanged key
tokens and Z is the DR key value input of H 2 . Now the simulator surely can make use of
the decisional function to find out that the session secret including xyP2 and K has not
been queried, if xyP2 has not been queried on H2. When the DH value has indeed been
queried on H2, the simulator has to compute K, otherwise, it will have to resort to a BDH
decisional oracle as required by the Kudla-Paterson method. By noticing that the difficulty
of computing K in some sessions is to compute e('IjJ(abP2), Y) for some Y = yP2 generated
by the adversary, the simulator makes use of its freedom of choosing some ephemeral secret
x for X = xP2 to set X = ro.P; (or X = rbP2) in those sessions. Now with the value
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Z = raY (or Z = rbY) found by the decisional function and value r, K can be computed
as e('l/J(abP2) ,Y) = e('l/J(bP2), ~Z) = e(bP1 , ~Z) (or e('l/J(aP2), ~Z)). So, with the decisional
function the simulator now can either find out the session secret has not been queried with
the random oracle or compute the agreed secret value from the correct DH key value.
The same approach can be applied to prove the security of some other schemes.
5.4.4 Group Membership Testing
In almost all key agreement schemes with Diffie-Hellman tokens, an assumption is made
that tokens passed from one party to another lie in the correct groups. Such assumptions are
often implicit within security proofs. However, one either needs to actually check that given
tokens lie within the correct group, or force the tokens to lie in the group via additional
computation, or by choosing parameters carefully so that the problem does not arise. Indeed
some attacks on key agreement schemes either in practice or in principle are possible because
implementors do not test for group membership, for example the small subgroup attack [115]
and the even more sophisticated attacks [123, 129].
The proofs in this section and following sections also ask for checking the group mem-
bership of exchanged tokens. To demonstrate the importance of such check, we present an
attack on the optimised SYL protocol. Suppose one optimises the SYL protocol with Type
4 pairings in the following way.
A ~ B: TA = xP2
B ~ A: TB = yP1
Upon completion of the message exchange, A computes XTB = xyP1 and K = e(TB +
'l/J(QB) , xR + D A) and B computes y'l/J(TA) = XyPl and K = e(y'l/J(R) + 'l/J(DB), TA + QA).
Recall that R = SP2 = sipl + SP2 is the master public key and s is the master secret key
and k is the embedding degree here. This optimised version has smaller bandwidth cost and
better performance than the original SYL specification. Suppose to save time that party B
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does not check whether TA lies in the subgroup generated by P2, but only whether it lies
in G2, i.e. it computes some of the subgroup membership test but not all of it. \Ve show in
this situation that an adversary C can impersonate party A to B.
Without losing generality, we assume
Adversary C chooses random integers x and z from Z;, and generates the message TA in
the following attack.
CA ~ B : TA = x kPI - bP2 + ZP2
B ~ CA : TB = yPl = yPl
Now B computes y'ljJ(TA) = yxPl = XTB and
K e(y'ljJ(R) + 'ljJ(dB), TA + QA)
e(ysPl + 'I/J(SQB), X~Pl - bP2 + ZP2 + aPl + bP2)
e(ysPl + s'I/J(QB), zP2)
e(TB + 'I/J(QB), SP2r
e(TB + 'I/J(QB), R)Z
Both XTB and K = e(TB + 'ljJ(QB) , R)Z can be computed by C.
To prevent this attack, party B should also check that for TA = Xl kPl + X2P2, Xl = x2,
i.e. TA is in the cyclic group generated by P2 . A careful analysis of the proof of the SYL
protocol reveals that for the above optimization one is unable to obtain a proof if full group
membership testing is not performed.
Group membership testing in G l = ~h, G t , 9, and 92 can be done in the standard
way via multiplication and by inspection of the representation. If the cofactor is smaller
than p, one can test membership via cofactor multiplication. However, in many pairing-
based situations the cofactor is larger than p, in which case membership of the group of
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exponent p is tested by multiplication by p. Note that depending on the security parameter,
this membership test may be quite expensive, as one may need to perform quite a large
multiplication.
In the Type 2 and 4 situations, there are other group tests that may need to be per-
formed, which cannot be performed as above, namely testing whether a given point Q is a
multiple of P2 = tPI + P2. In other words we wish to test whether Q E (P2). We first test
whether Q has order p by testing, via multiplication as above, whether it is in 9. Then we
write Q = aPl + bP2, for unknown a and b; one can compute aP1 and bP2 from Q via
which requires one multiplication in ((;1. We need to test whether a = bjk, which can be
done by performing the following test
e(kaP1 , P2) = e(P1, bP2)
e(PI, Q - ~Tr(Q)).
In the Type 4 situation, another situation occurs when we wish to test whether a point
Q = aPl + bP2 is a multiple of a point P = CPl + dP2 without knowing a, b, cor d. We first
test whether P, Q E 9 as above. Then we test whether a = tc and b = td for some unknown
t by testing whether
e(Tr(Q), P - ~Tr(P)) = e(Tr(P), Q - ~Tr(Q)).
5.5 Security Analysis of the McCallugh-Barreto Protocol
Using the SK key construction, McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based KAP
at CT-RSA 2005 [125], which appears to be the most efficient one in computation among
the existing proposals of this type. However the scheme is vulnerable to a key-compromise
impersonation attack. In order to recover from this security weakness, rVlcCullagh and
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Barreto [124], and Xie [163] independently proposed two fixes. Attempting to demonstrate
the security of the schemes, they provided a security reduction for each protocol in the
weak variant of the Bellare-Rogaway's key agreement model without the Reveal query as
we noted already in Section 5.4.3.
In this section, we revisit the security proofs in [125, 124, 163] and show that all these
three proofs are problematic. More specifically, in their security reductions, the property
of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. We note
that in any identity-based cryptographic scheme, given a certain identity string and the
system parameters, it is universally verifiable whether the private key corresponding to the
identity string is correctly constructed or not. Therefore, if a simulator of the real world
where an adversary launches attack, is not able to offer the adversary necessary evidence,
which allows the adversary to verify the correction of a simulated key construction, the
simulation fails, because the adversary can immediately notice the inconsistency between
the simulation and the simulated real world. All the three proofs failed to provide this
feature.
As pointed out in [119], Xie's scheme still suffers from the key-compromise imperson-
ation attack and further a trivial man-in-the-middle attack, hence here we do not formally
analyse it. Instead, we slightly modify McCullagh and Barreto's second protocol [124] and
then present a formal reduction for the scheme in the key agreement model presented in
Section 5.5.2. The new reduction demonstrates the security strength of the scheme.
5.5.1 The MB Protocol and its Variants
Here we recall McCullagh and Barreto's protocol and its variants. These protocols use the
same key construction (the SK key construction) and exchange the same message flows.
However, in the last step of the protocols, each protocol has a different scheme to compute
an established session key.
Setup. The KGC executes the following operations:
1. On input 1k, generate a set of pairing parameters of the required size.
2. Pick a random s E Z; and compute R = sPI .
3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions as follows:
HI : {a, 1}* ~ z;,
H2 : Gt ~ {a, l}n
for some integer n.
4. Set s as the master secret key which is kept secret by KGC and publish others as the
system public parameters (also called the master public key).
Extract. The schemes employ the SK key construction [151]. Given an identity IDA, the
master secret key s, and the system public parameters, the algorithm computes HI(IDA) =
a E Z; and the corresponding private key DA = s~aP2 for IDA. QA = aPI + sPI will be
treated as the real public key corresponding to IDA.
Protocol. Suppose HI (A) = a and HI (B) = (3. Party A and B randomly choose x and y
from Z; respectively. The protocol proceeds as follows.
A ~ B : TA = XQB = x((3PI + sPd
B ~ A: TB = yQA = y(aPI + sPd
On completion of the protocol, there are three ways to compute the agreed secret, and
each has different security strength. Here we slightly change the protocols in [125, 124, 163]
by employing an extra hash function H 2 on the agreed secret to generate the session keys.
In the original schemes described in [125, 124, 163], the use of H2 is not explicitly required.
It will result in a potential security problem, which will be discussed in Section 5.5.2.
MB-l (McCullagh-Barreto's first scheme (MB-l) [125]). A computes K = e(TB, DA)X
= e(PI, P2)xy and B computes K = e(TA, DB)Y = e(Pl, P2)XY. The agreed session key is
SK = H2(e(P}, P2YY). This scheme appears to provide an interesting security property:
the perfect forward secrecy. However, this scheme does not achieve the key-compromise
impersonation resilience.
A KCI attack works as in Figure 5.2 where adversary EB knows A~s long-term private
key D A and impersonates B to A in the attacking session by computing the session key
SK = H2(e(TB, DA)X) = H2(e(TA, DA)Y) established at A.
A
TB=yQB
EB
Figure 5.2: Key Compromise Impersonation Attack on The MB-l Protocol
To defeat the attack, Xie and McCullagh-Barreto attempted the following two variants
respectively.
MB-2 (McCullagh-Barreto's second scheme (MB-2) [124]). A computes K =
e(TB, DA)·e(Pl, P2)X =e(PI, P2)x+y and B computes K = e(TA, DB)·e(p1, P2)Y = e(Pl' P2)x+ y .
The agreed session key is SK = H2(e(P1, P2)x+y). Although now the protocol achieves the
key-compromise impersonation resilience property, this scheme loses another desirable sc-
curityattribution: the perfect forward secrecy, i.e. with the knowledge of DA and DB, K
can be computed by K = e(TB' DA) . (TA, DB).
Xie's (Xie's scheme [163]). A computes K = e(TB' DAy+l·e(p1, P2Y = e(P1, P2)XY+x+y
and B computes K = e(TA, DB)y+l . e(PI, P2)Y = e(P1, P2)XY+x+y. The agreed session key
is SK = H2(e(P1, P2)Xy+x+Y). Unfortunately this modification is still vulnerable to the
key-compromise impersonation attack [119].
A KCI attack on the protocol works as in Figure 5.3 where the adversary EB imperson-
ates B to A in the attacking session by computing the session key SK = H2(e(TB, DA)x+l.
e(Pl,P2)X) = H2(e(j3P1 + sP1,DAyy+y-l) = H2(e(TA,DA)Y' e(PI,p2)y-l) established at
A.
15--1
A
Figure 5.3: Key Compromise Impersonation Attack on The Xie Protocol
The protocol also suffers from a trivial man-in-the-middle attack [119] as in Figure 5.--1
where the adversary A can compute SK = e(P1 , P2)-I.
A A B
Figure 5.4: Man-In-The-Middle Attack on The Xie Protocol
5.5.2 On the Existing Security Proofs
A Sketch of Existing Proofs. Here we give a sketch of three security proofs from [125,
124, 163] respectively", each for one variant of the MB protocol as described in Section 5.5.1
implemented with Type-1 pairings, i.e. ((;1 = ((;2 and PI = P2 = P. The proofs were
intended to adopt a weakened Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model by forbidding all
reveal queries.
All of the three proofs are based on the bilinear inverse Diffie-Hellman (BIDH) problem,
described in Assumption 2.6.5, i.e. given (P, exP, (3P), computing e(P, P){3/CY. is computa-
tionally infeasible. Each proof involves two algorithms: an adversary A and a challenger
2Xie's protocol suffers from the man-in-the-middle attack, therefore in principle it cannot be proven in
the Bellare-Rogaway model, so there must be errors in the reduction. Here we still analyse the reduction
and explicitly point out the errors, which again demonstrate the necessity of a valid security reduction of a
scheme in a well-defined model to guarantee security.
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(i.e. a simulator of the real world) a. A's goal is to break a specified protocol, and a's goal
is to solve the BIDH problem with the help of A.
Each proof includes a set of parties modeled by oracles. A can access any oracle by
issuing the queries of Create, Corrupt, Send, and Test. All queries by A pass through a.
Before the game starts, a randomly selects a pair of oracles, IIi,) and II~,i' a expects that
A is going to attack the oracle IIS . by playing the role of II t. . In the three proofs A andt,J J,1' ,
a play the game described in Section 5.2 in the following three slightly different ways.
Proof 1 (for MB-1 [125]). To answer a Create/Corrupt query for any oracle m where
m i- j, a chooses a random integer Ym E Z;, and answers YmP as m's public key and
Y;;.,,1 P as m's private key. a answers o I? as j's public key and does not know j's private key
0-- 1P. To answer a Send query for any oracle except IIi,), a follows the protocol properly.
To answer a Send query for IIi,), a chooses a random integer Xi E Z; and answers Xi P . The
proof relies on that an input from A as II;,i'S response is exactly the value of (3P. After a
Test query for IIi,), if A successfully breaks MB-1 by distinguishing the established key, K
= e(P, P)xi/3/yiCi, from a random number, a can get e(P, P){3/O: by computing Ky';Xi.
Proof 2 (for MB-2 [124]). a answers Create/Corrupt queries in the same way as it
did in Proof 1. To answer a Send query for any oracle except IIi,), a follows the protocol
properly. To answer a Send query for IIi,], a answers (3P. The input from A as II;,i's
response is an arbitrary value 8P. After a Test query for IIi,], if A successfully breaks
MB-2 by distinguishing the established key, K = e(P, p){3/Ci+8/Yi , from a random number,
a can get e(P, P){3/Ci by computing K / e(P, rv!»,
Proof 3 (for Xie's protocol [163]). To answer a Create/Corrupt query for any oracle
m where m tf:. {i, j}, a chooses a random integer Ym E Z;, and answers Ym P as m's public
key and Y;;.,,1 P as m's private key. a answers o.I? as i's public key and does not know
i's private key 0-- 1P. a answers (3P as j's public key and does not know j's private key
(3-1P. To answer a Send query for any oracle except IIi,], a follows the protocol properly.
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To answer a Send query for IIi,j' B chooses a random integer Xi E Z; and answers xi!3P.
The proof relies on that an input from A as IIj,i's response is exactly the value of (3P
(i.e. YjO:P = f3P for some Yj). After a Test query for IIi,j' if A successfully breaks Xies
protocol by distinguishing the established key, K = e(P, P)(Xi+ I ){3 /a . e(P, P)Xi, from a
random number, B can get e(P, p){3/a by computing (K/ e(P, P)X1 )I/(x,+I).
Analysis of Their Proofs. We now show that all the three reductions described in the
last subsection are invalid. More specifically, the reductions have following three problems.
Problem 1: From A's point view, the simulation offered by B is distinguishable from the real
world of an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol.
In any identity-based cryptographic system, the correctness of a private key derived from
a chosen identity string, ID, is verifiable, given system public parameters. In those security
reductions based on a standard model (e.g. [10, 12]), an adversary can use ID directly as
the public key to verify the result of a private key generation query, i.e. Corrupt query.
In those security reductions based on a random oracle model, such as [19, 60], to verify a
correct key derivation can be done with a query of ID to the random oracle.
It is addressed in (125, 124, 163] that the identity map function HI in the MB protocol
and its variants is by means of a random oracle. However, how to respond to the HI query
is not specified in these three proofs. Another related missing part is that these three proofs
do not specify either which entity has the access to the master secret key s, or what the
system parameters that A would get access to should be. We can see that B is not able to
answer the HI query by following the Create and Corrupt queries specified in these three
proofs. As a result, A cannot verify correctness of either Create or Corrupt query result
from ID and the system parameters. A can then immediately notice that B is a simulator,
instead of the real world. We discuss this issue in the following two cases, dependent on
whether or not B knows the value of s.
1·);-
1. The value s is not known to B. Following the three proofs, to answer the Cre-
ate/Corrupt query to an oracle with the identity IDm , B assigns a random element
pair, YmP, y;,1 P E Gi, as the public/private key pair. However, B is not able to give
the value of U m = HI (IDm ) , satisfying umP = YmP - sP, because to solve the discrete
logarithm problem in Gl is computationally infeasible, which is implied by the used
BIDH assumption. Therefore, B is not able to answer the oracle query HI (ID
m
) , and
A then cannot verify correctness of the received YmP and y;,1 P from IDm and sP.
2. The value s is chosen by B . Following the reductions, to answer the Create query to
an oracle with the identity IDj in Proof 1 and Proof 2 (or 1Di in Proof 3), B assigns
o P E Gi, as the public key to the party j (or i). However, again B is not able to give
the value of Uj (or ud, satisfying UjP (or UiP) = eel? - sP, because of the hardness
of DLP in G 1 . Therefore B is not able to answer the oracle query Hl(ID j ) = Uj (or
HI (IDi) = Ui) and A then cannot verify correctness of the received public key eel? for
IDj (or IDd under the master public key sP.
In conclusion, since B cannot answer some HI quenes, A can immediately notice the
inconsistency between the simulation and the real world.
Problem 2: B in Proof 1 and Proof 3 requires that A provides an expected value as a response
to a specific oracle. This is not a reasonable requirement.
The problem arises because A is not controlled by B. Even the assumption that the
adversary would follow the protocol strictly to generate messages is too strong to cover many
dangerous attacks. A sound reduction can only require that messages from the adversary
are in the specified message space at most.
Problem 3: H2 is not clearly required in the MB protocol and its variants. As a result, the
reduction to the computational BIDH assumption does not follow.
The simulation B cannot be created based on the BIDH assumption for the original
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protocols in [125, 124, 163]. Instead, even if both Problem 1 and 2 are solved. a simulation
could only be created based on the decision BIDH for the original protocols if they are
secure. Otherwise, the adversary can win the game with the probability to differentiate a
random element of G t from the true value. This is the reason why we employ an extra hash
function on the agreed secret to generate a session key S K.
5.5.3 A Modified Scheme and its Security Analysis
The MB-2 protocol does not achieve the known-session key security, i.e. the compromise
of one session key would not affect other session keys' security, and so is insecure in the
Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model with the Reveal query allowed.f The adversary A
launches the known session key attack as in Figure 5.5, where A randomly chooses rAE Z;
and issues the Reveal query to B's session of transcript (TA,T B ) to get the session key
SK = H 2 (e(Pl ' P2 )X+Y+TA). Then A chooses A's session of transcript (TA, T~) as the fresh
oracle to issue the Test query. The session of A and B have different transcripts, therefore
A is allowed to issue the Test query on the chosen session which is fresh. Because the two
sessions have established the same session key, A wins the game trivially.
A A B
TB=yQA
Figure 5.5: Known Session Key Attack on The MB-2 Protocol
We can slightly tweak the session key generation method in MB-2 to recover from the
attack, furthermore the modification enables us to reduce the security of the scheme to the
3Note that the reductions in [124, 125J proceed in the model with the Reveal query disallowed, though
they are invalid.
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f-GBCAAI assumption in the full model presented in Section 5.5.2. The modified scheme,
which we refer to as MB-2', generates the session key as follows:
where H3 : {O, I}" x {O, l ]" X G1 X G1 X Gt -t {O, l ]" is a hash function. As the original
protocol, the new scheme still cannot achieve PFS.
Theorem 5.5.1. MB-:! is a secure AK, provided that HI, H3 are random oracles and
the f-GBCAAl assumption is sound. Specifically, suppose that there is a PPT adversary
A against the protocol with non-negligible probability E(k) and in the attack HI has been
queried ql times and qo oracles have been created. Then there exists a PPT algorithm B to
solve the (ql-1)-GBCAAh,2 problem with advantage
Adv~q1-1)-GBCAAl1,2 (k) > 1 E(k).
ql . qo
Proof: Condition 1 of Definition 5.2.2 directly follows from the protocol specification. In
the sequel we prove that the protocol satisfies Condition 2. We show that if A exists, we
can construct an algorithm B to solve a (ql - 1)-GBCAAl1,2 problem with non-negligible
probability.
Given an instance of the (ql -1)-GBCAAl1,2 problem (sP1, ha, (hI, hl~SP2), ... , (hq1-J,
h 1 + P2)) with a set of pairing parameter where hi E R Zp* for °< i < qi - 1 and theq1 -1 S
DBIDH1,1 oracle ()DBIDH, B simulates the Setup algorithm to generate the system pa-
rameters (GJ, G2, Gt, p, e, PI, P2, SPI, HI, H3), i.e. using S as the master secret key which
it does not know. HI and H 3 are two random oracles controlled by B .
B randomly chooses 1 < I < ql and 1 < J < qo, and interacts with A in the following
way:
• Hl(IDd: B maintains a list of tuples (IDi' hi, Di ) as explained below. We refer to this
list as Hiist . The list is initially empty. When A queries the oracle HI at a point on
1Di' B responds as follows:
If 1Di already appears on the Hiist in a tuple (IDi' hi, Dd, then Bresponds with
H 1(IDd = lu,
Otherwise, if the query is on the I-th distinct ID, then B stores (IDI' ha,..1) into
the tuple list and responds with HI(IDI) = ha·
Otherwise, B selects a random integer hi(i > 0) from the (ql - 1)-GBCAAl l ,2
instance which has not been chosen by B and stores (IDi' hi, hi~S P2 ) into the
tuple list. B responds with HI (IDi) = tu,
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• H3(IO i , IOj, Ti, Tj, Kd: At any time A can issue queries to the random oracle H
3
. To
respond to these queries, B maintains a list of tuples called Hlist. Each entry in the
list is a tuple of the form (IOi , IOj, t; Tj, «; (t, 0d indexed b~ (IOi, IOj, t., Tj, Kd.To respond to a query, B does the following operations:
- If on the list there is a tuple indexed by (IOi, IOj, Ti, Tj, Kd, then B responds
with (t.
Otherwise, B goes through the list A built in the Reveal query to find tuples of
the form (IOi, IOj, Ti, Tj, r t , (t, ot) and proceeds as follows:
* Compute D = Kt/(PI , P2 )rt .
* Access ODBIDH((ho+s)PI , Tj , D) if ot = 0 or access ODBIDH((ho+s)PI , Ti,
D) otherwise. If ODBIDH returns 1, B inserts (IDi' IDj, r; Tj , x., (t) intoH~ist and responds with (t to the query and removes the tuple from A.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses a string (t E {O, l }" and inserts a new tuple
(IDi' IDj, Ti' Tj, «; (t) into the list H~ist. It responds to A with (t.
• CorruptfIu.): B looks through list Hiist. If IDi is not on the list, B queries HI(IDi).
B checks the value of D( if D, i- 1-, then B responds with Di; otherwise, B aborts
the game (Event 1).
• Send(II~,j' T): B maintains a list with tuples of (II~,j' rL, tranL) and responds to the
query as follows:
- B looks through the list Hiist. If IDj is not on the list, B queries HI (IDj). After
that, B checks the value of t.
- If t i= J, B honestly follows the protocol to respond the query by randomly
sampling d,j E Z; and generating the message rI,j (HI (IDj )PI + sPI ) .
If t = J, B further checks the value of D j , and then responds the query differently
as below depending on this value.
* If D j i= 1-, B aborts the game (Event 2). We note that there is only one
party's private key is represented as 1- in the whole simulation.
* Otherwise, B randomly chooses y E Z; and responds with yPI. Note that
II~ . can be the initiator (if T = ;\) or the responder (if T i= A).t,J
• Reveal(II~,j): B maintains an initially empty list A with tuples (IDi' IDj, Ti , Tj , r'', (t,
o'; B responds to the query as follows:
If t = J or if the J -th oracle has been generated as II~,b and IDa = IDj, IDb = IDi
and two oracles have the same session ID, then abort the game (Event 3).
Go through H{ist(IDd to find the private key D, of party i with identity IDi.
- If Di i= 1-, compute K = e(Ti, Di)' e(PI , P2rL where T; is the incoming message
and r~ . is the random flips of the oracle II~J" B responds with H3(IDi, IDj, T I ,tJ ,
Tj, K) if the oracle is the initiator, otherwise H3(IDj, IDi' Tj, T i , K).
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O;he.rwise, .B.~oes through H£ist to find tuples indexed by (IDi, ID·, Ti, T·) (if
II .. IS the initiator) or by (ID· ID T T) [if ITt . J J
( t ,J
). J' i, j, iIi j IS the responder). For each
Ki ;(t in the found tuples, '
* Compute D = Kt/e(PI, P2r f, j .
* Access ODBIDH((ho + s)PI, Ti, D). If ODBIDH returns 1, then B responds
to the query with (t. Note that there can be at most one K, meeting the
test.
?therwise (no K, is found in the last step), randomly choose (t E {O,l}n and
insert (IDi, IDj, t; Tj , rjJ" (t, 1) if the oracle is the initiator or (IDJ' ID· T·t t.' , ,t, J'
'r; ri,j' (,0) into A. B responds with (t.
• T~st(II~,j): If t i- J or (t = J but) there is an oracle IIj,i with the same session ID with
IIi,j that has been revealed, B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise, B randomly
chooses a number ( E {O, I} n and gives it to A as the response.
Once A finishes the queries and returns its guess, B goes through H£ist and for each K~,
• Compute D = (K~/e(T, Di ) )I/y, where T is the incoming message to the tested oracle
IIij'
• Access ODBIDH((ho+s)PI, PI, D). If ODBIDH returns 1, B returns D as the response
of the (ql - 1)-GBCAA1 1,2 challenge.
• If no K~ meets the test, fail the game.
Claim 5.5.1. If algorithm B does not abort during the simulation, then algorithm A's view
is identical to its view in the real attack.
Proof: B's responses to HI queries are uniformly and independently distributed in Z; as in
the real attack. H 3 is modeled as a random oracle which requires that for each unique input,
there should be only one response. We note that the simulation substantially makes use
of the programmability of random oracle and the access to the DBIDH oracle to guarantee
the unique response for every H 3 query. The responses in other types of query are valid as
well. Hence the claim follows.
Note the agreed secret in the chosen fresh oracle II~,j should be K = e(T, Di)· e(PI, P2r
where r(hoPI +sPd = yPI (recall that party j's public key is hoPI+sPI and the private key
is unknown to B and represented by 1-), i.e. r =~ and K = e(T, Di ) . e(yPI, ho~sP2).
Following the similar argument as in Claim 5.4.2, we have following claim.
Claim 5.5.2. Let Event 5 be that K = e(T, Di ) . e(YPI, ho~sP2) was not queried on H3·
Then Pr[Event 5] > E(k).
Let Event 6 be that, in the attack, adversary B indeed chose oracle IIij as the challenger
oracle where IDj was queried on HI as the I-th distinct identifier query. Then following the
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rSules of the game defined in Section 5.2, it's clear that Event 1, 2, 3, 4 would not happen.
0,
Pr[(Event 1 V Event 2 V Event 3 V Event 4)] = Pr[Event 6] > 1
q1 . qo
Overall, we have
Pr[A wins] Pr[Event 6 1\ Event 5]
> q/qO E(k).
This completes the security analysis of the protocol. D
If one considers that the used assumption for MB-2' is too strong, another variant is to
instantiate the SIG-DR [59] with the BLMQ-IBS [25] as the signature scheme. The protocol
can be proven based on the f-SDR assumption [59], but is relatively slower than MB-2'. In
the protocol, each party needs to compute one pairing, four multiplications in G 1 and two
exponentiations in G t , while the MB-2' protocols requires one pairing, two multiplications
in G1 and one exponentiation in G t .
5.6 An Identity-Based KAP with Unilateral Identity Privacy
In previous sections, we have discussed some general IB-KAPs. These protocols more or
less achieve the general security properties such as the known-session key security, KCI-
resilience, etc. While, apart from these general security properties, some other special
security properties might also be required in certain environments. User Identity Privacy
(IP) , which means that no outsider adversary can determine the participant's identity in
each protocol execution, is of particular interest in some environments.
For some network services, the service subscriber's identity is a piece of sensitive infor-
mation which must be protected from outsiders. A typical example of such service would
be the mobile network access. In the mobile network, the mobile station as a client and
the base station (or access point) as a server have to authenticate each other, so the mobile
station can be assured that it is using the authentic service provider, instead of a bogus
access network; while by authenticating the mobile station, the base station can control
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the access to the network service. For the nature of the wireless communication, the sig-
nals can be easily eavesdropped. If the mobile station's identifier is not protected during
the authentication process, an adversary can easily obtain this information. By using the
identifier, an adversary can further obtain other information which could be valuable to
users. The adversary may locate a user and track his or her movement; also it can analyse
the traffic between the user and the network to extract the user's communication behavior.
Hence, the privacy of user identity over the air interface in mobile networks is essential to
guarantee the user's location privacy and prevent an adversary from associating a user with
his or her activities. Another example would be that the service itself is sensitive, such as
the crime report hotline. The user would not want others to know who has accessed such a
service. Even in general network environments, some key agreement protocols such as the
Internet Key Exchange protocol [95], also regard identity privacy as a desired property.
Achieving identity privacy in a key agreement protocol is not a new challenge. Many
efforts were made to address this issue, especially in the mobile networks, e.g. [27, 1, 96].
However, these schemes rely on either the symmetric-key cryptography or the traditional
asymmetric-key cryptography so that they may face various challenges, such as secret key
sharing or certification distribution, in applications. In this section we propose an efficient
identity-based two-party key agreement protocol with client identity privacy for use in the
client-server environment, and investigate its security properties.
5.6.1 Description of the Scheme
The scheme adopts the basic SOK key construction method. In the system, the KGC
generates the system parameters and private keys via the following Setup and Extract
algorithm respectively:
Setup. The KGC executes the following operations:
1. On input 1k, generates a set of pairing parameters of the required size.
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2. Pick a random s E Zp and compute R = SP2.
3. Pick four cryptographic hash functions as follows:
HI : {O, 1}1 ---4 G2 .
H 2 : G2 x G2 ---4 Zp.
H3 : Gt ---4 {O, 1}w.
H 4 : {O, 1}1 x {O, 1}1 X G2 X G2 X {O, 1}W x G t ---4 {O, I}"
for some integer n, l > °and w = pog2 P1+ l (pog2 P1is the bit length of p).
4. Set s as the master secret key which is kept secret by KGC and publish others as the
system public parameters (also called the master public key).
Extract. For any user with an identity IDA E {O, 1}1, given the master secret key sand
the system public parameters, the KGC executes the SOK Extract algorithm to compute
QA = HI(IDA), DA = SQA E G2 and passes DA as the private key to this user via some
secure channel.
We suppose that the client possesses the identity A and the server possesses the identity
B. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is always an association procedure (such
as a TCP connection procedure or a physical connection establishment phase) between the
client and the server before starting the key agreement protocol. Once the association has
been established, A and B proceed as follows (this process is also depicted in Figure 5.6).
1. The server B randomly chooses TB E Zp and sends (B, TBQB) to the client, where
QB = HI (B). It should be noted that the server B does not know the identity of the
client.
2. The client A responds as follows: 1) randomly choose T A E Zp; 2) compute h =
H2(TAQA,TBQB); 3) compute the agreed secret K = e('Ij;(DA),TBQB + hQByA; 4)
generate a mask Z = (TAIIA) EB H3(K ); 5) send TAQA and the mask Z to the server
B.
(Client) A
rA ER Zp;
h = H2(rAQA, rBQB);
K = e('l/J(DA), rBQ B + hQB yA;
Z = (rAliA) E8 H3(K)
B(Server)
h = H2(rAQA, rBQB);
K = e('l/J(rAQA), DByB+h;
reliC = Z E8 H3(K);
?
re Hl(C) . rAQA
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Figure 5.6: Identity-based Key Agreement with Unilateral Identity Privacy
3. The server B processes the incoming message as follows: 1) compute h = H2(r AQA,
rBQB); 2) compute the agreed secret K = e('l/J(rAQA),DBrB+ h; 3) recover the client
identifier C and the client's random flips rc from the mask Z by reliC = Z E8 H3(K);
4) check if the equation reHl(C) = rAQA holds. If the equation does not hold, B
aborts the protocol.
4. On completion of the AK protocol, both parties compute the session key S K as
specified in Figure 5.6.
We note that the protocol does not have to work in the client/server mode. Two
peer parties can also establish session keys with or without protecting the responder's
identity privacy. The protocol specification as above works in both situations. However,
because so, the protocol specification requires a hash function HI whose codomain is G2
and a homomorphism 'l/J : G2 -t G1 . Hence this protocol specification can only be imple-
mented with Type-1 and Type-4 pairings. When the protocol is implemented with Type-4
pairings, it can be optimised by replacing rBQB with rB'l/J(QB) and then A computes
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K = e(rB'l/J(QB) + h'l/J(QB),DArA and B computes K = e('l/J(DB),rAQAVB+h, or by re-
placing rAQA with rA'l/J(QA) and then B checks re'l/J(H1(C )) ? rA'l/J(QA). If the check on
the message membership is carried out, the former optimisation is faster.
If the protocol works only in the client/server mode, the pairing-type restriction can be
overcomed as follows: Choose the following two hash functions to replace HI,
H~ : {O, 1}* ~ G2 .
H~' : {O, 1} I ~ G1.
The server identity IDs is mapped to an element in G2 by Qs = H~ (IDs) and the client
identity IDe is mapped to an element in G 1 by Qe = H~'(IDe). And 'l/J is the trivial
identity map. We can also switch the codomain of H~ and H~' and the inputs of pairing
computation. The domain of H 2 and H 3 should be adjusted correspondingly.
5.6.2 Security Model of KAP with Identity Privacy
The model defined in Section 5.2 cannot be directly used to formulate the protocols with
the identity privacy property. In the protocol with identity privacy, a party may not know
its partner's identity before some stage of the protocol. Hence in the formulation if an oracle
does not know its partner's identifier, it cannot use this information when generating the
response, while at the end of the protocol, the oracle should be able to output the intended
partner's identifier, if it accepts the session.
There is an obstacle in the Bellare-Rogaway model to simulate the situation that an
adversary only passively eavesdrops the conversation between two parties when the protocol
has identity privacy, because in the model, the adversary supposes to fully control the
network and to schedule the messages among the parties. Without knowing the identity
of oracles, the adversary cannot dispatch the messages. In [61], Canetti and Krawczyk
introduced an extra identifier "destination address" to simulate the "post-specified peer
setting" which is a related notion to identity privacy. In the model of [61], a session is
activated by the adversary using a triple (i, t, d) where i is the party identifier, t is the
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session identifier, and d is the destination address. However, although using destination
address d can simulate the situation that the party sends out a message to an unknown
party with address d, such activation still allows the adversary to know the source identifier
of the message.
Instead of introducing further complexity into the Bellare-Rogaway model, we consider
identity privacy only when simulating the behavior of an honest party who strictly follows
the protocol specification and is modeled as an oracle, and allow the adversary to know the
source and possibly destination identifiers of each message generated by these honest parties.
In other words, we can think that in the attack the honest parties reveal to the adversary the
hidden identifiers in messages. While, the adversary is not required to know the identifiers
in a message faked by itself. Hence the adversary's ability is not restricted, but the model
is only used to check the common security attributes, such as mutual key authentication,
known session key security, etc. Identity privacy has to be scrutinised separately.
To use the Bellare-Rogaway model, we have to make some necessary changes. (1) ITi,*
is used to denote an oracle. Note that the pair (i, s) is able to uniquely identify an oracle
simulating a party i in its s-th session. (2) The queries defined in Section 5.2 should be
adopted for Change 1.
• Send(ITi,*, x). Oracle ITi,* who does not know its partner so far, follows the protocol
II(1 k i S· p. trati" r~ x) to generate response. We note that the partner's iden-
, , z, z, z,*' z,*'
tifier and public key are not used as the input to algorithm IT, hence this query is
not just about changing of the notation of an oracle from ITi,j to IT1, * , but restricting
the behavior of the oracles. If the oracle recovers a partner identifier j through some
algorithm F: j = F(1 k, i, S«, Pi, trani,*, ri,*, x), it replaces the unknown partner iden-
tifier * with j and retrieves j's public key Pj . This is a new query in the model, but
a similar formulation has been used in [61].
168
• Reveal(IIi,*)' If the oracle has not accepted, it returns 1-; otherwise, it must have
known its partner j, and then IIi,j reveals the session key. Here, the oracle is not
required to disclose the partner's identity even if it has accepted the session (we note
that the adversary may not know the oracle's partner because the message to II~
t,*
may be faked by the adversary).
We further note that an oracle IIi,* to be tested should be fresh, hence it has accepted
and known its partner j.
5.6.3 Security Analysis of the Scheme
Before formally analysing the protocol, we describe a game to ease the analysis.
Interactive game with a BDH challenger. An algorithm 8 with a pair of PPT sub-
algorithms (81(r1; ···),82(r2; ... )) where ri is used by B, as the random tape, engages
with a challenger in the following game:
Interactive BDHi,j,k game
(aPi, bPj, CPk) f- .r(1t);
(X, a) f- 8 1(r1; «r; bPj, CPk);
h f- Zp;
K f- 8 2(r2; h,a).
where Z" is a BDH challenge generator with parameters It; i,j,k E {1,2}; a,b,c ER Zp; a
is the state information passed from 8 1 to 82 and X E G2. We say that 8 wins the game if
it computes K = e(P1, X + hbP2)ac. Define the advantage of the adversary as the function
of t by
AdvB(t) = Pr[8 wins].
Theorem 5.6.1. If the BDHi,j,k assumption is sound, any PPT algorithm 8 participating
in the interactive BDHi,j,k game can only have negligible advantage.
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Proof: Given a BDHi,j,k instance (aPi, bPj, cPk), we construct an algorithm in the following
way:
(X, 0") ~ 8 1(r1; aPi, bPj, cPk ) ;
h ~ Zp;
K 1~ 8 2(r2; h,O");
1>1
Claim 5.6.1. For any algorithm 8 with PPT sub-algorithms (81,82) with advantage E(t)
to win the interactive BDH game, the above algorithm outputs e(P1, P2)abc with probability
E2 (t).
Proof: At point 1>1, the algorithm computes correct K 1 = e(P1,X + hbP2)ac with proba-
bility E(t). Because h is chosen independently from X and 0", two execution of 82 should
have the equal probability to output the correct answer. Hence at point 1>2, the event that
K 1 = e(aP, X + hbP)C and at the same time K 2 = e(P1, X + (h - 1)bP2)ac happens with
probability E2 (t). The claim follows.
The theorem follows from the claim. D
Now, we investigate the security of the proposed protocol.
As defined in Definition 5.2.1, for a chosen fresh oracle IP J. in the game, party i cant,
be corrupted, which is particularly used to address the known-key impersonation resilience
property. Because the protocol differentiates the role of parties, i.e. some are clients and
others are servers, and this can be done by requiring that the client and the server identifers
are in two separate sets, say (IDC , IDS), we consider the security of the AK protocol in the
following two cases:
(1) Server authentication. We consider the known-(client)-key attack that the adversary
tries to impersonate a server to a client whose private key is known to the adversary or the
adversary is benign (honestly conveying messages between oracles), i.e. the chosen fresh
oracle II~ . is with i E IDc and j E IDS and i is corrupted by the adversary.
t,J
Lemma 5.6.2. The protocol is secure against the known-client-key attack, provided the
BDH2,2,2 game is hard to win and the hash junctions are modeled as random oracles.
Specifically, suppose there is a known-client-key PPT adversary A against the protocol with
non-negligible probability E(k) and in the attack q1 server identifiers are queried on HI and
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adversary A c~eates qc client oracles and queries q3 and q4 times on H3 and H4 respectively.
Then there exists a PPT algorithm B to win the BDH2,2,2 game with advantage
Adv:DH2.2,2(k ) > [ E(k) ]2.
qI . qc . max{q3, q4}
Proof: The first condition is trivial to prove. Now we prove that the protocol meets the
second condition.
We prove the lemma by constructing an algorithm B using the adversary A against the
protocol as a subroutine to win the interactive BDH2,2,2 game with non-negligible advantage.
The game proceeds in the following way. After Q outputs the challenge (sP2,aP2, bP2),
B simulates the system setup to adversary A as follows. The system parameters are set as
(GI,G2,G t,p, e, W, SP2, HI, H2, H3 , H4), i.e. the master secret key is s, which B does not
know; HI,H2,H3,H4 are random oracles controlled by B.
Recall that in the protocol, it is required that the client and server identifers are in two
separate sets (IDC , IDS), which is the way to differentiate the roles of parties. In this proof,
we use two types of Send query to reflect the behavior of the protocol.
• SendS (llf *' M): This query is sending a message to a server oracle. Message M
,
is in the form of (Y, Z) or >.. If M = >., a server oracle will be created. We use *
to represent the sender because the receiver of M does not know the sender before
it unmasks the message in the real world. In the simulation, B cannot make use of
knowledge of its partner's identifier before it decrypts the incoming message.
• Send'< (IIr,*, M): This query is sending a message to a client oracle. Message M is
in the form of (j, X). This query will trigger the creation of a client oracle. As in the
previous proofs in this chapter, we slightly abuse the notation. We use IIf,* to denote
the t-th client oracle among all the client oracles created in the game, instead of the
t-th instance of party i.
Algorithm B randomly chooses 1 < I < qI and 1 < J < qC and starts simulating the
real world where the adversary A launches the attack by answering queries as follows.
• HI (IDi): B maintains an initially empty list Hiist with entries of the form (IDi, Qi, fi).
B responds to the query in the following way.
If IDi already appears on Hiist in a tuple (IDi, Qi, fi), then B responds with
HI (IDi) = o;
If IDi is the I-th unique server identifier query, then B inserts (IDi,bP2,.l) into
the list and returns bP.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses f i E Zp, inserts (IDi, fi P2, fi) into the list and
returns fiP2.
• H2(Xi, Yi): B maintains an initially empty list H~ist with entries of the form (Xi,)Ii, Zi)
indexed by (Xi, Yi). B responds to the query in the following way.
1'11
- If a tuple indexed by (Xi, Yi) is on the list, then B responds with Zi.
- Otherwise, B randomly chooses Zi E 7l.P' inserts (Xi, Yi, Zi) into the list and
returns zi,
• H3(Ki): B maintains an initially empty list HAist with entries of the form (Ki, ki)
indexed by Ki, B responds to the query in the following way.
- If a tuple indexed by K, is on the list, then B responds with ki .
Otherwise, B randomly chooses k, E {O, I} w, inserts (Ki, ki ) into the list and
returns ki .
• H4 ( I Di, IDj, Xi,}j, Zi, Ki): B maintains an initially empty list Hiist with entries of
the form (IDi' IDj, Xi, Yj , z; x; (i) indexed by (IDi' IDj, Xi,}j, z; Ki). B responds
to the query in the following way.
- If a tuple indexed by (IDi' IDj, Xi,}j, Zi, Ki) is on the list, then B responds with
(i.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses (i E {O,I}n, inserts (IDi' IDj, Xi,}j, z; tc; (d
into the list and returns (i.
• Corrupt (IDi): B looks through list Hfist. If 1Di is not on the list, B queries HI (IDi)'
B checks the value of f( if fi =F ..1, then B responds with fisP; otherwise, B aborts
the game (Event 1).
• SendS (II~ , M): B maintains a list n for every (client or server) oracle of the formt,*
( II~ . r~ . tran~ . K~., SK~ .) where r~ . is the random string used to generate message;t,] , t,] , t,] 't,] t,] t,]
tran~ . is the transcript of the oracle so far, and Ki]· and SKf]· are set ..1 initially.t,] , ,
B proceeds in the following way:
If M = A, B randomly chooses r E 7l.p and responds with (i, rQi) where Qi is
found from Hfist with identifier i (i.e. d,* = r).
Otherwise (M = (Y, Z)), B proceeds in the following way:
* If fi on Hfist corresponding to i is not..i, then compute K = e('l/J(Y), fiSP2rI,.+z
where Z = H2(Y, r; *Qd. Use M K = H3(K) to unmask Z to recover (re, C).
, t dIf Y = rc HI (C), then set the partner of the oracle as C, Ki,e = K, an
SKf,e = H4(C, i, Y, r~,eQi, Z, Kf,e); otherwise, reject the session.
* Otherwise (fi = .l.),
Try every ke = H3(Ke) on HAist as M K to unmask Z to recover (re, C)
and test Y = reHl(C), If the equation holds, store (re, C) into an
initially empty list L.
If E is empty, reject the message. (Rejection 1)
1_')1-
Otherwise, for any tuple (rc, C) in L compute K = e( 'l/J(Y), SbP2r~. +z =
e(~(rcHdC)), sbP2)rL", +z = e(rcepjJ(sP2), bP2)(rL +z), where t. is fromHltst f id ifi C )1 or 1 enti er ,and z = H2(Y, r1 *Qd. Note that K is the correct
value that party i should compute. '
Use M K = H3(K) to unmask Z again to recover (r*,ID*) and test if
equation r"HI (ID*) = Y holds.
If the equation holds, set the partner of the oracle as ID*, Kf,ID'" = K,
and SK: ID* = H4(ID*, i, Y, r'. ID* Qi, Z, K~ ID*)'
, z, t,
Otherwise, reject the message. (Rejection 2)
• SendC(IIi,*, M): (Message M is in the form of (j,X)). B proceeds in the following
way:
- Set the partner of the oracle as j.
If t = J and ej =I- 1- which is found from Hiist with identifier j, B aborts the
game (Event 2).
Otherwise, if t = J, B randomly chooses U E Zp and checks if (uaP2, X) has
been queried on H2, until one such pair is not found on H~ist. Such u can always
be found, because A is a PPT algorithm of the security parameter k. All the
instructions executed before this point belong to the algorithm B1 of B . B dumps
the content on all the maintained lists and system parameters to the tape 0-, and
outputs (X, 0-). The interactive BDHt 22 challenger returns h ER Zp. After this
, ,
point, all the instructions belong to algorithm B2 of B . B reconstructs all the lists
and system setup from 0- and immediately inserts (uaP2, X, h) into H~ist. Now
B continues to respond to A 's queries. B randomly chooses M K E {O, 1}w, r E
Zp and generates Z = (rIIIDi) ED M K, and then responds with (uaP2, Z). If
A rejects the message (Event 3), B randomly chooses Ke from list H~ist and
returns Ki/u to the interactive BDHt,2,2 challenger.
- Otherwise, B randomly chooses r E Zp and computes KL = e(e(IjJ(Sp2) , X +
zQ j r, where ei and Qj are found from Hiist with identifier i and j; z =
H2(rQi, X). B computes Z = (rIIIDi) ED H3(Kf,j) and SKf,j = H4(i , j, rQi, X, Z,
Kf,j) and responds with (rQi, Z) .
• Reveal(IIi .): The oracle must have accepted and so knows its partner j. Otherwise
1- should be returned. If i E IDc and t = J, or i E IDS but IIi,] has a matching
conversation with IIJ with u E IDc , B aborts the game (Event 4). Otherwise,u,v
B returns SKf,j'
• Test (Ill .): The oracle should be fresh, so must have accepted and knows its partner
j. If i ~ IDc or t =I- J, or (i E IDc and t = J but) there is an oracle IIj,i with
the matching conversation to II~ . has been revealed, B aborts the game (Event 5).
t,)
Otherwise, B randomly chooses a number ( E {O, l ]" and gives it to A as the response.
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Once A responds, B randomly chooses a tuple from Hiist with the value K
e
. B computes
K I / u d t .
e an re urns It to the interactive BDH2,2,2 challenger. Note that if the game does not
abort, for the challenge oracle «; = e(fi'l/J(sP2), X + hbP2)ua/e i •
Let Event 6 be that, in the attack, the adversary A indeed chose oracle II J as the
challenger oracle whose recovered partner's identifer ID· was queried on HI asthe I-th
distinct identifier query. Then following the rules of the game, it's clear that Event 1,
2, 4, 5 would not happen, and so the game would not abort before B can answer the
interactive BDH2,2,2 challenge. Hence we have
1Pr[(Event 1 V Event 2 V Event 4 V Event 5)] = Pr[Event 6] > __
ql . qo
Claim 5.6.2. Let Event 7 be that H3(e('l/J(sP2), Y +hbP2)UG) was not queried. Then Event
3 only happened with negligible probability if Event 7 and Event 6 happened.
Proof: When Event 6 happened, the agreed secret of the oracle should be e(?/J(sP2), Y +
zbP2)ua. Because H3 is a random oracle, H3(e('l/J(sP2), Y + zbP2)ua) will be a uniform
sample from {O,l}W, so is the correct Z. If H3(e('l/J(sP2),Y + zbP2)ua) was not queried,
A who impersonated the server oracle, can only with negligible probability differentiate the
correct mask Z from the faked one (rIIIDi) EB M K where M K is uniformly sampled from
{O,l}w.
Claim 5.6.3. If M K = H2(K) is not queried, then a message (Y, (reliC) EB M K) will be
accepted by the server in the real world with only negligible probability.
Proof: The message will be accepted by the server, only if the recovered message reliC
from Z meets the equation Y = reHI(C). Define a relation
R = {(r, ID,Y) I r HI (ID) = Y, r E 'Zp, HI is a hash function, HI(ID) E G2}.
If M K is not queried, the situation can be described by the following game.
(Y, Z) ~ BHl (1", R);
MK ~ {a, l ]!";
rellC=ZEBMK;
If (re, C, Y) E R, accept, else reject.
If HI (C) has not been queried, then the equation holds with negligible probability
because HI is modeled as a random oracle. Suppose, in the attack, qe distinct client
identifiers were queried on HI' Then for a chosen Y there are at most qe pairs could
possibly meet the equation (Le. I R 1= qe in the real attack). Given a mask Z, when AI K
is a uniformly sampled from {O,l}W independently, the unmask result reliC should have
an even distribution among 2w possibilities. Then the probability that the unmask result is
one of qe pairs (i.e. ire, C, Y) E R where reliC = Z EB M K), is 1S. Note that in the game
both qe and ware polynomials of security parameter k. Hence the probability is negligible.
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Claim 5.6.4. If B did not terminate the game, A cannot notice inconsistence between the
simulation and the real world with non-negligible probability.
Proof: It is clear that if B did not terminate the game, then the responses to queries includ-
ing Hl,H2,H3,H4, Corrupt, Sendc , Reveal and Test, are consistent with the ones in the
real world. Now let us take a close look at the response to query Sends (rr~ *' M). Except
for the two rejections, other parts of B 's behavior honestly follow the protocol. Rejection
1 only happens when A did not query M K = H 3(e(X, sbPY+Z). From Claim 5.6.3, in the
real world, the server accepts the message with only negligible probability. Rejection 2
happens if the client message component Z is not valid. This could happen in the attack
by a naughty adversary which generates X = rcH(C), but uses M K = H3(T) with some
other T =I=- K to mask rcliC. If the server accepts the message, the adversary will be quite
assured that it is in a simulation, instead of being in the real world.
Following the similar argument as in Claim 5.4.2, we have the following claim.
Claim 5.6.5. Let Event 8 be that <. = e('I/J( sP2) , X + hbP2)ua was not queried on H 4 .
Then Pr[Event 81 Event 3] > E(k).
Let Event 9 be the event that B finds the correct e('I/J(sP2) , X + hbP2)ua on the list
H~ist and Let Event 10 be the event that B finds the correct e('I/J(sP2) , X + hbP2)ua on the
list Hiist.
Overall, we have
Combining Theorem 5.6.1, the lemma follows.
Pr[B wins]
>
>
Pr[Event 6 1\ Event 7 1\ Event 9 IEvent 3] Pr[Event 3]
+ Pr[Event 6 1\ Event 81\ Event 10 IEvent 3] Pr[Event 3]
1 Pr[Event 3] + 1 . E(k) Pr[Event 3]
ql 'qC 'q3 ql -ac 'q4
_1_ .1 . E(k)
ql'qC max{q3,q4} .
o
(2) Client authentication. Now we consider the known-(server)-key attack that the ad-
versary tries to impersonate a client to a server whose private key is known to the adversary
or the adversary is benign, i.e. the chosen fresh oracle rrtj is with i E IDs and j E IDc and
i is corrupted.
Lemma 5.6.3. The protocol is secure against the known-server-key attack, provided the
CBDE assumption is sound and the hash functions are modeled as random oracles.
2,2,2 . l . h
Specifically, suppose there is a known-server-key P PT adversary A agamst th~ protoco uiit
non-negligible probability E(k) and in the attack ql client identifiers are queried on HI and
qS server oracles are created. Then there exists a PPT algorithm B to solve the CBDH2,2,2
problem with advantage
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Proof: Given a GBDH2,2,2 problem instance (sP2, aP2, bP2) and a DBDH 2,2,2 oracle ODBDH
which given (XP2, yP2, zP2,T) returns 1 if e(PI , P2)XYZ = T; otherwise returns 0, we con-
struct an algorithm B using the adversary A against the protocol to solve the GBDH2,2,2
problem.
B simulates the system setup to adversary A as follows. The system parameters are set
as (GJl,G2,Gt,p,e,'l/J,sP2,HI,H2,H3,H4), i.e. the master secret key is s, which B does not
known; H I,H2,H3,H4 are random oracles controlled by B.
As in Theorem 5.6.2, we use two types of Send query. While, this time we abuse the
notation of II~ * used in Sends. We use II~ to denote the t-th server oracle among all the
., t,*
server oracles created in the game.
Algorithm B randomly chooses 1 < I < qI and 1 < J < qs and starts simulating the
real world where the adversary A launches the attack.
• HI (IDd: B maintains an initially empty list Hiist with entries of the form (IDi' Qi, €i)'
B responds to the query in the following way.
If 1Di already appears on Hiist in a tuple (IDi' Qi, €i), then B responds with
HI (IDi) = o;
If 1Di is the I-th unique client identifier query, then B inserts (IDi, aP2,1-) into
the list and returns aP.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses €i E Zp, inserts (IDi' €i P2 , €d into the list and
returns €iP2 .
• H2(Xi, Yi): B maintains an initially empty list H~ist with entries of the form (Xi, Yi, Zi)
indexed by (Xi, Yi). B responds to the query in the following way.
- If a tuple indexed by (Xi, Yi) is on the list, then B responds with Zi·
Otherwise, B randomly chooses Zi E Zp, inserts (Xi, Yi, Zi) into the list and
returns zi,
* Compute K = e('l/;(aP2),ZtetSP2)'
* Access oracle ODBDH(SP2, aP2,x', K).
* If ODBDH returns 1, B removes the entry from L and sets KI,j = Ke and
SKI,j = H4(i, j, utaP2, x', z: KL). Then B inserts (Ke, kd into list H~lSt
and responds with kt ·
• H3(Ke): B maintains an initially empty list H~ist with entries of the form (Ki, kd
indexed by Ki. B responds to the query in the following way.
If a tuple indexed by Ke is on the list, then B responds with the corresponding
s;
Otherwise, for every tuple (II~,j' ut , z", r, x', z: kt ) on list L which is maintained
in the Send'< routine,
l/u tKg
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* Otherwise, continue.
B randomly chooses kf E {O, I}W, inserts (Kf, kf) into the list and returns ke.
• H4 ( I Dl, 1D2, Y1, X 2 , Zl, K v ) : B maintains an initially empty list Hiist with entries of
the form (IDi' IDj, Yi, x.. z; «; (d indexed by (IDi' IDj, Yi, x.. z., K i ) . B responds
to the query in the following way.
If a tuple indexed by (IDl' 1D2, Y1, X 2 , Zl, K v ) is on the list, then B responds
with the corresponding (i.
Otherwise, for every tuple (II~ , ut zt ft x' zt kt ) on list rt,J ' , , , , , J.."
l/u t
* Compute K = '('ljJ( :) t t p ) .e a 2 ,Z X S 2
* Access oracle ODBDH(SP2, aP2 , x', K).
* If ODBDH returns 1, B removes the entry from E and sets K t , = K; and
t,J
SKI,j = H4(i,j, utaP2, x', z', Kf,). B inserts itc; kt ) into list H~ist. If
1Dl = i, 1D2 = j, Y1 = utaP2 , X 2 = x-, and Zl = z', then B responds with
SKI,j'
* Otherwise, continue.
B randomly chooses (i E {O, l}n and inserts (IDl' 1D2, Y1, X 2 , Zl, tc., (i) into the
list and returns (i.
• Corr-uptf Ili.): B looks through list Hiist. If 1Di is not on the list, B queries HI (IDi).
B checks the value of fi: if fi =f: -1, then B responds with fisP2; otherwise, B aborts
the game (Event 1).
• SendS (II~ *' M): B maintains a list n for every (client or server) oracle of the form
(II~ "tran~ ',d J" KI J', SKi J,) where tran~J' is the transcript of the oracle so far; rfJ't,J t,J., ,." ,
is the random integer used by the oracle to generate message, and KI,j and SKL are
set -1 initially. B proceeds in the following way:
If t = J,
* If M = A, B responds with (i, bP2) and sets rf * = -1.,
* Otherwise (i.e. M = (Y, Z)), B tries every k; on H~ist and kt on £. as M K
to umask Z to recover ire, C) and tests Y = reHl(C). If no pair meets the
equation, or if for all the recovered messages (re, C) unmasked using some
kw's, fe on Hfist corresponding to C is not -1, B aborts the game (Event
2). Otherwise, there is at least a kw = H3(Kw ) unmasking a valid C whose
corresponding fe on Hiist is -1, i.e. H1(C) = aP2·
Otherwise,
* If M = A, B randomly chooses rf,* E Zp and responds with (i, r~,*Qi) where
Qi is found from Hiist with identifier i;
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* Otherwise (M = (Y, Z)), B computes K = e('l/J(Y), fisprt.+z, where t
1
is from Hitst for identifier i; r~ is from list n for oracle IIt and z =
( t t,* t,*H2 Y, ri,*Qi). B unmasks Z to recover (rc, C) using M K = H3(K) and
tests Y = rc HI (C). If the equation does not hold, B rejects the mes-
sage; otherwise, B sets the partner identifier as C, Kf.c = K and computes
SKf.c = H4(C , i, Y, r;'cQi' Z, KI,c)'
• Sendv CIlt*, M): (Message M is in the form of (j, X)). B maintains an initially empty
list .c with entries of the form (Il~,j' ut, zt, ft, x', z', kt). B proceeds in the following
way:
Set the partner of the oracle as j and find f j from Hiist with identifier j.
If fi = .L from Hiist with identifier i, B proceeds in the following way.
* Randomly chooses u E Zp and computes z = H2(uaP2, X). Hence the agreed
secret of this oracle should be
KI,j = e('l/J( saP2) , X + ZfjP2)U
= (e('l/J(saP2), X) . e('l/J(aP2) , zfjsP2))U
* For every (Ke, ke) on H~ist,
K 1 / u
Compute K = e('I/J(apAzejsP2)'
Access oracle ODBDH(SP2, aP2, X 2, K).
If ODBDH returns 1, B sets KI,j = K, and computes Z = (ulli) EB ke and
SK~ . = H4(i,j, uaP2, X, Z, KI J· ) . Then B responds with (uaP2, Z).tJ ,
Otherwise, continue.
* For every (. " ,Kv, (v) on Hiist,
K 1/ uCompute K = e('I/J(aP2),zejSP2)'
Access oracle ODBDH(SP2, aP2, X, K).
If ODBDH returns 1, B sets KI,j = «; Then Buses k = H3(KL) as
M K to mask ulli and responds with (uaP2, (ulli) EB M K).
Otherwise, continue.
* It is highly unlikely that the above two searches can find proper response,
because K~ . is depending on z and u which are just generated randomly. So,t,J
the searches above can be omitted. Instead, B directly randomly chooses k E
{O, l.}", computes Z = (ulli) EB k and stores the tuple (ilL, u, z, f j , x, Z, k)
into list .c. B responds with (uaP2, Z).
Otherwise, B randomly chooses r E Zp and computes KL = e(fi'l/J(sP2 ) , X +
zQ .)", where fi and Qj are found from Hiist with identifier i and j; z =
H2(rQi' X). B computes Z = (rlli) EB H3 (K L ) SKI,j = H4(i ,i. rQi, X, Z, KI,j)
and responds with (rQi, Z).
1
Pr[Event 5] > --
ql . ae
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• Reveal(IIL*): The oracle must have accepted and so knows its partner j. Otherwise 1.
should be returned. If i E IDs and t = J, or i E IDe but has a matching conversation
to II~,v with u E IDs, B aborts the game (Event 3). Otherwise, B returns SKi,j'
• Test(II~,*): The oracle should be fresh, so must have accepted and knows its partner
. If' d S . SJ. i "F ID or t f= J, or ('t E ID and t = J but) there is an oracle IIw . with
th t hi . t J,t
e rna c mg conversation to IIi,j has been revealed, then B aborts the game (Event
4). Otherwise, B randomly chooses a number ( E {O,1}n and gives it to A as the
response.
Once A responds, B proceeds in the following way. For all the K on Hlist
v --1'
• Compute K = C~(rcl/J(a~\eiSP2)Z )I/rc where z = H2(Y, bP2) and (Y, Z) is the incoming
message to II/,* and re and C are recovered in the Sends(IIf*, AI).
,
• Access oracle ODBDH(SP2, aP2, bP2, K).
• If ODBDH returns 1, return K as the answer to the GBDH problem. Note that the
agreed secret of tested oracle should be
K/* = e(1/J(Y) , f isP2r f.*+z,
= e(re1/J(aP2), f isP2r f.*+z
= e(1/J(aP2),bsP2Yc .e(re1/J(aP2),fiSP2)Z since rf* = b/fi.,
• If for all K v , the test fails and B fails the game.
Claim 5.6.6. If B did not abort the game, A could not find inconsistency between the
simulation and the real world with non-negligible probability.
Proof: The response to queries are indistinguishable from the one in the real world. In
particular, to respond to queries on H3 and H4 , B significantly uses the access to ODBDH
and the programmability of a random oracle to make sure that the response is consistent
with the one in Sende.
By the rule of the game, the message (Y, Z) to the chosen test oracle has to be accepted.
Hence the recovered value reliC from Z has to meet the equation reHI(C) = Z. If C is not
queried on HI, which is a random oracle, the message passes the check with only negligible
probability. So, the identifier of IIt* 's partner must have been queried on HI in the game.
Let Event 5 be that, in the attack, the adversary A indeed chose oracle IIt* as the
,
challenger oracle whose recovered partner's identifer IDj was queried on HI as the I-th
distinct identifier query. Then following the rules of the game, it's clear that Event 1, 3,
4 would not happen. And
Claim 5.6.7. Event 2 happened with negligible probability if Event 5 happened
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Proof: There are two possibilities that Event 2 could happen. 1) For the J-th server
oracle, the partner oracle's identifier 1D* was not queried on HI as the I-th one. While.
this could not ha~pen if Event 5 happened. 2) M K = H3(e('IjJ(X), sP2)b+z) is not queried
(we note that B simulates some queries on H3 in responding to Sendc query, though it does
not know the query value), but the message (Y, Z) passes the check Y = rcHI(C) where
rcliC = Z EEl M K to be accepted by the server. From Claim 5.6.3, this will only happen
with negligible probability.
Following the similar argument as in Claim 5.4.2, we have the following claim.
Claim 5.6.8. Let Event 6 be that K = e('IjJ(Y), f i sP2r !.·+z was not queried on H 4. Then
Pr[Event 6] > E(k).
Overall, we have
1Pr[B wins] = Pr[Event 5/\ Event 2/\ Event 6] > . E(k).
qI . qs
This completes the proof. D
Lemma 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 show that the protocol possesses the following security proper-
ties: mutual key authentication, known session key security, key-compromise impersonation
resilience and unknown key-share resilience. Based on these results and the fact that the
GBDH assumption implies the corresponding BDH assumption, it is straightforward that
the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5.6.4. The protocol is a secure AK, provided the GBDH2,2,2 assumption is sound
and the hash functions are modeled as random oracles.
Now let's look at the the forward secrecy. Note that a protocol satisfies Definition 5.2.2
does not necessary achieve the forward secrecy. The protocol in Figure 5.6 achieves PFS.
Theorem 5.6.5. The protocol has PFS regarding Definition 5.2.3, provided that the BDH2,2,2
assumption is sound and the hash functions are modeled as random oracles. Specifically,
suppose there is a P PT adversary A against the protocol's PFS with non-negligible advan-
tage E(k) and in the attack adversary A creates qc client oracles and qS server oracles and
queries q3 and q4 times on H3 and H 4 respectively. Then there exists a PPT algorithm B to
solve the BDH2,2,2 problem with advantage
o160
Proof (sketch): If the adversary A can win the game by choosing some session between
party I and J, given (aP2, bP2, sP2) we construct an algorithm B for the BDH problem as
follows. B sets s as the master secret key which it does not know, i.e. R = SP2 in the svstern
public parameters. Without loosing generality we assume that QI = X P2 is the client's
public key and QJ = yP2 is the server's public key for some randomly chosen x, y E Zp
by B. B sets DI = SXP2 and DJ = SyP2. In the attacking session, the algorithm sets
rIQI = aP2 and r JQJ = bP2, i.e. rt = a/x and r J = b/y. Note that according to the rules
of the game, the adversary should not tamper with the messages in the challenge session.
Then the algorithm computes T = e(P1,P2)sab = e('I/J(QI),QJ)ST/TJ = e('l/J(T[~),DJ)h' where
h = H 2(aP2, bP2 ) and K is the established secret of the session which is computed by the
adversary subroutine. Note that A has to compute K to win the game with non-negligible
advantage because H4 is a random oracle. While, in the proof, there is a pitfall: in the
challenge session, B has to generate a client message (aP2 , Z) in which it does not know
both a/x (the random flips used by the client I in the challenge session) and the mask key
M K. Fortunately, B only needs to generate a message which cannot be differentiated by
the adversary from the valid one. B can randomly sample M K E {O, I} W to mask a dummy
value for a/x. As H3 is a random oracle, if A notices the difference between the faked Z and
the valid one, it must have queried K on H3, then B can solve the BDH problem. These
tricks have been played in the proof of Lemma 5.6.2.
User identity privacy is achieved for the following reasons. (1) We note that r A IS
randomly sampled from Zp, hence r AQA is evenly distributed in message space ((;2 which
could be sampled by any other client with the same distribution. Therefore r A Q A for client
B is indistinguishable from rxQx for any other client. (2) The client's identity is hidden
by the mask operation in the second flow. The used mask key is the output from a hash
function on the agreed secret so that it is evenly distributed in the key space if we assume
the hash function can be modeled as a random oracle. Hence, the masked result is also
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evenly distributed in the message space and indistinguishable from random.
It is clear that, if the adversary knows the master secret key s, then it can compute K,
so that the scheme does not achieve the master key forward secrecy. However, this property
may not necessarily be a defect since it provides a possible way for legal interception which
is also important in mobile communications.
A few points of the protocol appear worth mentioning. In Section 5.4.~, we have dis-
cussed the importance of testing the group membership of exchanged messages. The proto-
col integrates the test ofrAQA (rA1!J(QA) resp.)'s membership by checking rcHl(C) ? rAQA
?
(rc1!J(HI(C)) . rA1!J(QA) resp.). If the test of rBQB E G2 is too costly, one may choose to
ignore it with certain risk. The protocol provides some protection on this "lazy" implemen-
tation. Before rBQ B is used, it has been masked by a random point hQ A. One choosing
rBQB cannot decide the representation of rBQB + hQA. Moreover, for the Tate pairing the
second input can be any point on the curve, which does not decide the order of the pairing
result. Interestingly, this has been echoed in the security analysis in Section 5.6.3. When
dealing with an adversary who chooses rAQA, the security reduction is based on the gap
BDH assumption, which requires that messages lie in the right group for the decisional or-
?
acle to work. Hence the check rc HI (C) . rA QA is crucial both for the proof to go through
and for the security of the protocol. Note that rBQB is chosen properly in this case by
a legitimate party. When dealing with an adversary who chooses rBQB, the security re-
duction is based on the BDH assumption, which does not pose such requirement explicitly.
However, the attacks in [123, 129] on HMQV [106] and the attack in Section 5.4.4 show
that proofs should be carefully interpreted, which appears worth further study. A cautious
measure is to fulfil the assumption that messages are with the right representation with
some form of validation.
IS2
5.6.4 Efficiency Discussion and Comparison
All the existing protocols discussed in Section 5.3 do not provide identity privacy. However.
as IKE [95], we can tweak some protocols such as the SCK and SYL, which use Diffie-
Hellman tokens, to provide identity privacy against certain adversaries. IB-KAPs require
peer party's identifer to compute the shared secret, which will be used for entity' authen-
tication. Hence we have to slightly modify IKE to adapt to this requirement. Figure 5.7
presents a simplified identity-based IKE from pairing, which may be of independent interest.
(Initiator)A
K 1 = H2 (rA P2, r BP2, r ArB P2);
B = ENCK~(Zd;
K 2 = KSCK or KSYL;
AUTHA = H3(K2, A, B, rAP2, rBP2, Zd;
Z2 = ENCK1 (AIIAUTHA)
AUTHB = ENCK~(Z3);
AUTHB ~ H3(K2, B, A, TAP, rBP2, Z1, Z2)
r B P2 ,z 1
B (Responder)
rB ER Zp;
K 1 = H2 (rA P2, r BP2,TATBP2);
Z1 = ENCK 1 (B)
AIIAUTHA = ENCK~(Z2);
K 2 = KSCK or KSYL;
AUTHA i; H3(K2, A, B, TAP2, rB P2, Zd
AUTHB = H3(K2,B,A,rAP,rBP2,Z1,Z2);
Z3 = ENCK 1 (AUTHB)
1. Hi is a cryptographic hash function for i = 1, ... ,4.
2. ENCK(M) is a symmetric key encryption scheme encrypting message M with secret key K and
ENC- 1(C) is the decryption operation with the ciphertext C and secret key K.
K K ( K) is the established secret by the SCK (resp, SYL) scheme including the DH3. scK resp. SY L
value.
Figure 5.7: Simplified Identity-based IKE
IKE provides identity privacy for both the initiator and the responder against passive
adversaries, but does not protect the identity privacy of the initiator against an active
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adversary who impersonates the responder. The identity-based IKE protocol in Figure 5.7
does not guarantee identity privacy for either party against active adversaries. One may use
the IKE main mode authenticated with identity-based signatures [93,45, 25]. The protocol
then involves the signature signing and verification process which can be costly. Even the
efficient BLMQ-IBS [25] requires two exponentiations in G t , two multiplications in G 1 and
one pairing. The CC-IBS [45] and Hess-IBS [93] are slower than BLMQ-IBS in general
implementation.
The comparative efficiency and security properties of the presented IB-KAPs with iden-
tity privacy are summarised in Table 5.2. For simplicity, we only consider the Type-1
pairings. From the results we can see that our proposal in Figure 5.6 ranks among the
fastest schemes.
Table 5.2: Efficiency and Security Comparison
Schemes Key Const. KSK p-FS KCI UKS IP Computation
The Proposal SDK ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ll) IP + 2M + IE
IKE with SCK SDK ./ ./ ./ ./ Passive'<' 2P + 31\1
IKE with SYL SDK ./ ./ ./ ./ Passive'<' IP+3M
IKE with Hess-IBS SDK ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ (3) 2P + 4M + 2E
IKE with CC-IBS SDK ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ (3) 2P+5M
IKE with BLMQ-IBS SK ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ (3) IP+4M + 2E
1. Identity privacy is only preserved for the client (the responder).
2. Identity privacy is only achievable against passive adversaries.
3. Identity privacy is achievable for both parties against passive adversaries, but only achievable for the
responder against active adversaries.
The IKE protocol in Figure 5.7 requires four message flows. For the protocol authenti-
cated with signatures, three message flows are required at least to establish a shared secret
like the Station-to-Station protocol [127]: The responder can include the encryption of its
identity and signature on the Diffie-Hellman tokens in the second messages along with TB P2·
The initiator responds with the encryption of its identity and signature on the exchanged
messages so far in the third message. The proposed protocol with two message flows in
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Figure 5.6 is more round efficient to establish a shared secret than other protocols.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the identity-based two-party authenticated key agree-
ment protocols from pairings. We formally analysed several practically efficient this type of
key agreements, including the enhanced Smart protocol, the enhanced Shim protocol and the
McCallugh-Barreto protocols, in the enhanced Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model. We
provided proofs for the first two schemes based on the weakest possible assumption (BDH)
for this type of protocol by adopting a new technique: the built-in decisional function. This
has not been accomplished before and the method can be used to analyse some other proto-
cols with similar structure. For the McCallugh-Barreto protocols, we first pointed out the
errors in the existing security analyses and then slightly tweaked the MB-2 protocol and
formally proved its security but based on the strong f-GBCAAI assumption. The formal
analyses build strong confidence in the security of these schemes. Then, in considering that
the user identity may be sensitive information in many environments, we proposed a special
identity-based key agreement, which achieves unilateral user identity privacy, and formally
analysed its security. We also demonstrated the importance of verifying that the exchange
message possesses certain arithmetic properties in this type of protocol and showed how to
process the group membership check for such purpose.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Open Problems
The (Weil or Tate) pairings on elliptic curves used to be considered to be destructive in ECC.
Only recently, after some pioneering works with pairings, such as the Joux's pairing-based
tripartite key agreement and the famous Boneh-Franklin lBE, pairings have been quickly
become an essential tool to construct many novel cryptographic schemes. Despite some
doubts on the new pairing-related complexity assumptions, pairing-based cryptography has
been gathering momentum in practice [160].
As other fields in cryptography, pairing-based cryptography research mainly consists of
two types of activity: definitional activities which identify concepts that were not known be-
fore, and constructive activities which either demonstrate the plausibility of a cryptographic
definition in the standard model or design efficient schemes for practical applications within
commonly accepted paradigms, such as the random oracle model. This thesis is devoted
to the study of pairing-based cryptography, but has primarily focused on efficient schemes
suitable for practical applications. This requires the constructed schemes not only to meet
robust security definitions but also to achieve high efficiency.
In this work, three pairing-based cryptographic primitives: lBE, CL-PKE and lB-KAP
were studied.
On lBE, using the Sakai-Kasahara identity key construction, we constructed a complete
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IBE (SK-IBE) with provable security in the Boneh-Franklin IBE model based on a rea-
sonable complexity assumption R-BCAAl. With the same key construction, two lD-KE~Is
(SK-KEM1 and SK-KEM2) were proposed. The first bases its security on a gap assump-
tion R-GBCAA1, while the second can be proven to be secure with R-BCAAl. Owing to
the used key construction, three schemes achieve the best performance among all the ex-
isting schemes of the type. Depending on the chosen pairing parameters, the proposed
schemes can be 50% to 300% faster in either encryption or decryption than other schemes.
SK-KEM2 has already been adopted in commercial products.
On CL-PKE, we proposed a heuristic approach to constructing efficient CL-PKE schemes,
namely, when an lBE shares a similar structure with a PKE, using a hash function to bind
the two schemes can result in a CL-PKE. Following this approach, we constructed three
CL-PKEs using three types of lBE, which are secure in the enhanced Al-Riyarni-Paterson
CL-PKE model. Each of the three CL-PKEs has the same ciphertext size as the used lBE
and requires only an extra point multiplication than the based lBE. As the used lBEs are
the efficient one of each type, the CL-PKEs exhibit high performance.
On IB-KAP, several practically efficient schemes including the enhanced Smart protocol,
the enhanced Shim protocol and the McCallugh-Barreto protocols have been analysed in
the enhanced Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model. By adopting the built-in decisional
function in the reduction, the security of the first two schemes, which have not been formally
analysed before, were proven based on the weakest possible assumption for this type of
protocol. This is the first time that a reduction based on the BDH assumption has been
accomplished for a protocol exhibiting all the common security properties including the key
compromise impersonation resilience. For the McCallugh-Barreto protocols, serious errors
in the existing security analysis were pointed out first, and then a slightly tweaked i\IB-2
protocol was formally analysed but based on the stronger R-GBCAA1 assumption. The
formal analysis builds strong confidence in the security of these schemes, particularly for
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and its security was formally analysed.
Although in the last few years pairing has been extensively used as a building block to
construct many novel cryptographic protocols [21}, we believe that its potential in cryptog-
raphy is far from fully explored. On the topics investigated in this thesis, several problems
of theoretical and practical interest remain to be answered.
On the extensibility of SK-IBE/KEM, though the schemes exhibit high efficiency, so
far they still lack certain extensions which may be important in certain environments. It
remains interesting to extend the SK-IBE/KEM to a hierarchal system and to build a robust
system such as a secret sharing scheme for the SK key construction to protect the master
secret.
On the applicability of CL-PKE in practice, two questions, namely, how to distribute
public keys and how to revoke public keys, have to be answered before CL-PKE becomes a
viable cryptographic solution. The problem of constructing CL-PKE secure in the stronger
model (Type-I+Type-II+ security) without random oracles still remains open. It is the-
oretically important to see whether certain constructions admitting proofs in the strong
models with random oracles imply a separation between the random oracle model and the
standard model. Formal analysis of the approach to CL-PKE proposed in Section 4.4 in a
more general framework is also worth study.
On the security analysis of cryptographic schemes, we have seen the proofs have become
more and more complicated and error-prone. It is important to investigate potential ap-
proaches to making the proofs verifiable. There have been several works of this line such
as the game hopping techniques [147, 35J and the computer-aided symbolic proofs with
cryptographic soundness [55, 92]. Certainly more work needs to be done in this area.
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